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ABOUT INCLO
The International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (INCLO) is a network of thirteen
independent national human rights organisations from different countries in the Global
North and South. They work together to promote fundamental rights and freedoms by
supporting and mutually reinforcing the work of member organisations in their respective
countries and by collaborating on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Each organisation is
multi-issue, multi-constituency, domestic in focus, independent of government, and each
advocates on behalf of all persons in its country through a mix of litigation, legislative
campaigning, public education, and grassroots advocacy.
The members of INCLO are: the Agora International Human Rights Group (Agora, Russia);
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU, United States); the Association for Civil Rights
in Israel (ACRI, Israel); the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA, Canada); the Centro
de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS, Argentina); Dejusticia (Colombia); the Egyptian
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR, Egypt); the Human Rights Law Network (HRLN, India);
the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU, Hungary); the Irish Council for Civil Liberties
(ICCL, Ireland); the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC, Kenya); the Legal Resources
Centre (LRC, South Africa); and Liberty (United Kingdom).
INCLO advocates against government and police repression, and criminalisation of
social protests and human rights activism. In fulfilling its mandate, INCLO has published
two reports compiling standards and practices from INCLO jurisdictions. In 2013 INCLO
published its first report, Take Back the Streets: Repression and Criminalization of Protest
around the World, which documents case studies of police responses to protests from
INCLO jurisdictions globally, drawing out the common trends and underlying problems.
The cases highlight instances of excessive, abusive, and unlawful uses of force resulting
in injury and death, and discriminatory treatment and criminalisation of social leaders.
The second report, Lethal in Disguise: The Health Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons,
was released in 2016 in collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights and documents
the misuse and abuse of crowd-control weapons, their detrimental health effects, and
the impact of their use on the meaningful enjoyment of the rights to freedom of assembly
and expression. The report highlighted the proliferation of crowd-control weapons and
the widespread misuse of these weapons resulting in injury, disability and death.
Learn more at https://inclo.net
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ABOUT THE IHRC
The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) is a practice-based educational program
on international human rights law and advocacy for juris doctor (JD) students at the
Law School of the University of Chicago. The IHRC uses international human rights laws
and norms as well as other substantive law and strategies to draw attention to human
rights violations, develop practical solutions to those problems using interdisciplinary
methodologies, and promote accountability on the part of state and non-state actors.
The Clinic works closely with governmental, non-governmental, and international
organisations to design, collaborate, and implement projects which include litigation in
domestic, foreign, and international tribunals as well as non-litigation projects such as
documenting violations, legislative reform, drafting reports, and conducting consultations
and training.
Learn more at https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
To actualise the protection and promotion
of the rights to protest, international law
has identified six legal principles that
should guide and inform state engagement
with protest and public assembly: legality,
precaution, necessity, proportionality,
accountability, and non-discrimination.
However, there is little direction on how
states and their policing and security
institutions can operationalise these
principles.

Dissent and the ability to publicly express
beliefs and opinions are essential to
democracy. Protests and public gatherings
are a central tool of public expression and
engagement, often serving as the only
avenue for advocacy seeking political,
social, or economic reform. Despite the
importance of protest to a free society, many
states have failed to adequately protect
protest and public speech. In fact, policing
institutions overwhelmingly treat protests,
assemblies, and other gatherings as
security threats that should be discouraged.
This approach to public assembly can lead
policing institutions to resort to excessive,
arbitrary, and discriminatory force during
protests. Repressive practices that interfere
with and undermine the freedom to speak,
assemble, and protest burden democracy
and impermissibly hinder public dialogue.

Defending Dissent: Towards State Practices
that Protect and Promote the Rights to Protest
aims to fill this gap by bridging the divide
between principle and practice and provide
guidance on how states can protect and
promote protest and public assembly. It
builds upon previous efforts undertaken
by INCLO and the UN Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association to identify general principles
and good practices of protest policing. The
report relies on information gathered
from comparative desk research on
policies and practices on policing protests,
interviews with policing experts in eight
countriesii, as well as consultations with
and the expertise of INCLO organisationsiii
engaged in advocacy on human rights
and policing. It is organised around
three themes: (1) Preventive measures
and institutional design; (2) Tactics and
the use of force; and (3) Accountability
and oversight. Within these themes, the
report describes good and bad practices
and provides recommendations on how
international standards and principles
can be implemented through national
laws and regulations.

International law principles and standards,
as well as most constitutions and domestic
laws, have long protected the rights to
protest and assembly. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
details a broad range of underlying and
interdependent human rights necessary to
realise the rights to protest and assembly.i
These include the rights to: life; liberty and
security of the person; humane treatment
and respect for the inherent dignity of the
person; privacy; freedom of expression;
of assembly; the freedom to associate
with others; non-discrimination in the
enjoyment of each of these rights; and the
right to an effective remedy for the violation
of human rights. Collectively, these rights
comprise “the rights to protest”, the core
rights a state must protect and promote
to enable the exercise of protest and
public assembly.
6

SECTION 1: PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
LEGISLATION, LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE (1A):iv Effective protection and promotion
of the rights to protest and assembly necessitate a foundational legal and institutional
framework that prepares and equips policing institutions (and other government
services) to engage appropriately with protests and public assemblies. States must
adopt strong, clear, and stable legislation, regulations, and policies that commit the
state and its security institutions to safeguard the rights to protest. States should also
avoid legislative language that qualifies or curtails the rights to protest (e.g. by granting
broad discretion to use emergency powers).
Policing institutions should also develop internal mechanisms and policies that
embed human rights principles in departmental culture, ensuring officers at all levels
understand protection and promotion of the rights to protest as a primary goal
of engaging with protests and assemblies. These mechanisms should create ‘pause
points’ that evaluate consequences for rights protection at each step of planning and
executing protest engagement. These internal mechanisms should be bolstered by a
clear and transparent chain of command that guards against excessive, arbitrary, and
discriminatory escalations of force. Ongoing training for all officers in human-rightscompliant and professionalised policing practices should support these other efforts.

NORTHERN IRELAND: The experience
of Northern Ireland provides a good
example of an effective and robust
legislative framework that promotes
and protects the rights to protest.
Following the Good Friday Agreement,
Northern Ireland engaged in legislative
reform that prioritised human rights and
accountability and this has had a lasting
impact. To ensure accountability of
state and police actors, Northern Ireland
passed legislation that mandated that
all government authorities comply with
the rights guaranteed in the European
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Convention of Human Rights. The statute
placed the police duty to protect human
rights on an equal level with other
traditional police duties. Policing experts
credit these statutory innovations with
helping shift police mentality around
protests from an approach of “control
and stop” to one of facilitation. As
former senior commander Stephen
White described, these Acts are “helpful
for police” by “giv[ing] clear guidance
on what they should be working for”
and describing “what constitutes good
planning and good justifications for
adopted strategies.” Interview with
Stephen White, OBE, Vice President for
Europe, the Soufan Group, in Belfast, N. Ir.
(Dec. 19, 2017).

NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY
(1B): As with all policing duties, police
engagement with protests and public
assemblies should involve consideration
of the rights and needs of community
members, including marginalised groups.
Police should serve and address these
needs in the design and implementation
of relevant protest and public assemblyrelated operations. For example, policing
institutions should take affirmative steps
to recruit police officers representative
of the communities that they serve and
ensure diversity in leadership. Policing
institutions must also ensure equality
and non-discrimination among its officers
and staff in assignments, duties, and
departments. Non-discrimination and
equality principles should be incorporated
into officer training and supervision, and
officers should receive comprehensive
and ongoing instruction and training on
structural inequality and implicit bias.

OREN ZIV / ACTIVE STILLS

ISRAEL: Experiences in Israel illustrate
problematic uses of notification
mechanisms as the government has
used these systems to create barriers
to exercising the rights to protest.
In a recent protest against the Israeli
government’s intention to deport
thousands of African refugees to
Rwanda, the protest organisers – a
group of students and social activists
– were compelled to pay 100 thousand
NIS (equivalent to USD25 thousand)
for security expenses to exercise
their rights to protest. These types of
fees discourage speech and limit the
exercise of the rights to protest.

NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS (1C): Prior
notification systems can interfere with and
impair the rights to protest. If a notification
system is in place, it should only be
used to enable facilitation of public
gatherings. Notification processes should
be simple, quick, widely accessible, and
free. Notification systems should not be
used by the state to prohibit spontaneous
protests or disperse events due to a lack
of notification. If there are restrictions
placed on an event, the restrictions must
be reasonable and not overly burdensome,
they must not prevent protesters from
effectively exercising their rights to protest,
and they must not be selectively enforced
or otherwise applied in a discriminatory
manner. Urgent internal and external
appeal processes must be in place to
guarantee independent review of the
legality of any restrictions imposed.

POLICE TRAINING (1D): Training should
prepare officers to exercise good judgment
and to engage in balanced decision-making
aimed at protecting and promoting the
rights to protest. In many states, training
tends to emphasise the proper use of
crowd-control equipment and preparation
for the worst-case scenario. While these
are both important, training limited to
these elements primes officers to react to
and expect violence. Such training must
be balanced with training that prioritises
communication, dialogue, de-escalation,
8

and graduated use of force. Special emphasis should be placed on training operationallevel commanders on human rights standards. Policing institutions must implement
training and instruction in a manner that develops skills early in an officer’s career. To
reinforce this training, performance evaluations should be based on skills taught during
training and reflect human rights principles.

SECTION 2: TACTICS AND THE USE OF FORCE
To effectively protect protest and public assembly, tactics on the appropriate use of force
and other interventions should be reviewed, guidance should be provided on appropriate
tactics, and accountability mechanisms put in place to ensure compliance. Tactics for
engagement with protests and public assemblies should include de-escalation and nonescalation techniques; genuine engagement with protesters and the use of speciallytrained dialogue officials; reasonable and graduated use of force; data tracking and
reporting; and the protection of the privacy rights of protesters.
DE-ESCALATION AND NON-ESCALATION (2A): Policing institutions should adopt deescalation and non-escalation techniques, which require designing operations with an
understanding of crowd dynamics and anticipation of the likely impact of police behavior
on protesters and bystanders. For example, regular uniforms, as opposed to “riot gear”, can
reflect police intent not to escalate force in their engagement with an assembly. Police officers
should wear regular uniforms when possible, only relying on crowd-control equipment when
necessary. Premature use of crowd-control weapons (CCWs) is not only disproportionate but
can also have the effect of escalating tensions and disorder. Overall, protest spaces should
be planned and organised with the goal of facilitating the exercise of rights. For example,
protest spaces should have adequate entrances and exits. Tactics and strategies that fail
to differentiate between individuals in a protest should be prohibited. Engagement with
individuals in protests and assemblies should always comply with the principles of necessity
and proportionality and promote public trust and police legitimacy.

CANADA: Canada has instituted some
protest engagement procedures that
promote non-escalation tactics as well as the
safety of police and protesters. During the
2010 Winter Olympic Games, the Vancouver
Police Department kept officers out of crowdcontrol equipment and gave clear instructions
not to engage with force, even if provoked by
a small number of individuals. At one of the
first events during the Olympics, when some
individuals behaved provocatively, throwing

rocks and sticks and spitting at officers who
were in regular uniforms, officers obeyed the
command not to respond. Police did not use
force, and no protesters were arrested or
injured. The police were seen to be reasonable,
restrained, and after that night, in the words
of Deputy Chief LePard, “the crowds were
totally with us.” Interview with Doug LePard,
Chief Officer, Metro Vancouver Transit Police
(February 26, 2018).
9

GENUINE ENGAGEMENT, DIALOGUE, AND THE PROMOTION OF JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITY
(2B): Specialised dialogue officials can enable productive engagement and effective
communication between police and assembly participants. Dialogue officials should
facilitate transparency in police tactics and plans; communicate key information to
protesters; and communicate any needs or demands from protesters to the relevant
state actor. Dialogue officials should not be charged with additional policing functions
such as carrying out arrests or using force.
Journalistic activity, including recording or documenting policing operations in a protest,
is protected expression. Moreover, facilitating and protecting this activity increases
transparency, promotes genuine communication, and enables trust in accountability
mechanisms. Journalistic activity should not require special or traditional journalistic
credentials, and police should not confiscate or interfere with use of journalistic or
photographic tools such as smartphones, microphones, and cameras.

SOUTH AFRICA: Standing Order 156 of the
South African Police Service is an example
of a pro-engagement policy that fails to
fully protect journalistic activity by leaving
out key actors. The order directs officers to
engage the media with dignity and respect,
and to ensure that their rights to report and
record are not interfered with. However,
the definition of media officials in the
order does not include citizen journalists.

Further, the order is not always adequately
implemented by police officials. Journalists
are often prevented or manhandled by
police officials when covering protests. In
2015, during the #FeesMustFall protest
outside the South African Union buildings,
journalists were intimidated and harassed
by the police as well as some protestors
when covering the student protests.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE (2C): Command decisions and tactics resulting
in the use of force must be evaluated for their consequences and compliance with the
principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, accountability, and nondiscrimination. Policing institutions should have extensive precautionary measures in
place and sufficient tools to ensure appropriate and graduated responses to serious
security concerns. Minor legal infractions or acts of disrespect should not trigger the
use of force. Policing institutions should promote restraint and dialogue to avoid the
indiscriminate use of force. CCWs should only be used when thoroughly tested,
compliant with human rights, and situationally appropriate. Their use should be
limited to the defense of life and bodily integrity. Training on the use of crowd-control
equipment and weapons should include: the impact and harm caused by each weapon
or piece of equipment; the likely perceptions of and reaction to the use of each weapon,
including the possible escalation in tensions; and whether less harmful means are
available to achieve the particular aim.
10

DATA TRACKING AND REPORTING (2D):
Good practices require policing institutions
to engage in data tracking and reporting.
Legislation should mandate collection
and reporting of data on the use of force,
including: numbers and types of weapons
deployed; arrests; stops and searches
conducted; and the training that officers
have received on the use of CCWs and
equipment. There should be a centralised
system for reporting each instance a
CCW or a firearm is used or drawn,
whether it resulted in injury or death,
and the demographic information of
the individuals against whom force was
used. An unjustified failure to report or
keep adequate records should constitute
grounds for disciplinary action.
SURVEILLANCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS
(2E): Surveillance practices can have a
chilling effect on protest, infringe privacy
rights, and violate associated human rights
of protesters and bystanders. The state
and its security institutions should comply
with the principles of legality, necessity,
and proportionality and not conduct

UNITED STATES: In the United States,
law enforcement are now drawing
information from social media and
creating searchable databases for police
to determine where activists are meeting
and how they are communicating.
Another increasingly used technology to
surveil protesters and activists are IMSIcatchers, also known as “Stingrays” or
“cell site simulators”, invasive cell phone
surveillance devices that mimic cell phone
towers and send out signals to trick cell
phones in the area into transmitting their
locations and identifying information. An
IMSI-catcher can capture call activity from
thousands of uninvolved bystanders

indiscriminate surveillance such as the
collection, retention, and use of personal
information absent individualised suspicion
that a crime has been (or is reasonably
expected to be) committed. A general
belief that someone present in a crowd
may commit some offence in the future
does not justify the use of indiscriminate
surveillance technologies and the retention
of personal information on protesters
(e.g. facial recognition and IMSI-catchers).
Any recording of a protest by policing
institutions should be open, transparent,
and publicised. Search and seizure of
mobile phones should be prohibited in
the absence of probable cause. The state
should not keep any database of activists,
organisers, and individuals involved
in social movements. Finally, the state
may only deploy non- state actors as its
agents in the context of protests subject
to express enabling legislation and
policies that subject them to the same
principles as those governing security
services, in line with standards of human
rights and state responsibility.

while searching for an individual or
group. This kind of indiscriminate
collection and (potential) retention of
personal information treats everyone in
a protest – or in the vicinity of one – as a
suspect and is, by definition, not justified
by any individualised determination.
Such broad surveillance can also be
used for purposes unrelated to public
speech, making participation in speech
a greater risk to the individual.
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SECTION 3: ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT
Meaningful accountability mechanisms are a critical component of protecting the rights
to protest. Those who have the power to enforce the law should be subject to it.
Mechanisms that effectively investigate and address claims of misconduct and violence
ensure all other mechanisms and policies are complied with. Transparent and accessible
mechanisms can markedly improve interaction between crowds and policing institutions,
deter wrongdoing, and help provide legal remedy to victims of police violence. At the
same time, multiple levels of oversight increase the likelihood of detecting misconduct
or criminality. Transparency also helps ensure professionalised policing that complies
with human rights standards.
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS (3A): Well-resourced and staffed independent
oversight mechanisms are central to effective accountability. Such bodies should
investigate all uses of force during protests and assemblies as well as allegations of
police misconduct or criminality. Such bodies should also conduct systemic reviews of
police policies and practices to ensure compliance. These bodies should have sufficient
authority to effectively investigate complaints, including funding, resources, the power
of subpoena, and the ability to impose disciplinary measures and initiate prosecutions
for violations. Policing institutions should be required by law to report uses of force to
these bodies, and to cooperate with investigations.
Policing institutions should foster a culture of compliance and support of independent
oversight and accountability mechanisms, and the oversight process must be independent
and insulated from the influence of policing institutions. The findings of investigations
should be made public and should be easily accessible. There should be an open,
accessible, and safe complaints mechanism, and support structures for sexual violence
complainants should be established. The complaint and accountability process should
protect and promote the best interests of the complainant.

ARGENTINA: Efforts in Argentina at creating accountability mechanisms provide an
example of how oversight and transparency processes can be undermined through
ineffective implementation. An independent oversight body, Office of Transparency and
External Control, was created by the 2016 City of Buenos Aires Security Law. This Office
was charged with publishing complete files of relevant investigations of police misconduct
and criminality. So far, the Office has failed to fulfil this obligation. At the national level,
civil society organisations have faced a series of obstacles when submitting access to
information requests on operational policies and practices in the context of protests.
Although access to public information is guaranteed by law, the response from the relevant
institutions to these requests has been perfunctory, incomplete, or altogether absent.
12

INTERNAL
INVESTIGATIONS
AND
POLICIES (3B): Policing institutions should
establish policies and procedures for
effective internal investigations. Internal
investigations should be carried out by a
high-ranking officer, team, or department
with no involvement in the incident under
review. Processes which frustrate or delay
internal investigations should be identified
and eliminated. Officers suspected or
accused of misconduct should not have
greater procedural protections than those
provided to other government employees,
and officers should not be held to a lower
standard than citizens. Departments
should implement post-event debriefing
to review decisions and identify successes,

CHILE: Chile illustrates insufficient
and inauthentic mechanisms for
accountability that fail to adequately
protect the rights to protest. Following
the death of a bystander at a protest in
2011, when two police officers fired Uzi
submachine guns at the crowd, there
was a wave of resignations from the
policing institution. However, these
“resignations” were ultimately mere
reassignments to different posts. This
sort of false accountability fails to
address the systemic issues that lead
to the use of force and impedes trust
between the public and police officials.

failures, and areas for improvement. In ordinary performance reviews, police should
be evaluated in light of human rights-based standards.
TRANSPARENCY (3C): Transparency is essential. Policies for training, use of force
manuals, and reports and statistics on police practices should be made publicly available
and easily accessible. The state should similarly have an open and documented process
for determining which crowd-control weapons and equipment to acquire, develop, or
trade. Reporting on the deployment and use of crowd-control weapons, equipment, and
all uses of force should be mandated and describe the circumstances justifying the use
of the weapon, equipment, or force. Without releasing personal identifying information,
policing institutions should inform the public about the number of people arrested and
hospitalised during a protest, and the places and reasons for detention.

CONCLUSION
This report explores how policing and security institutions can engage with protests
and public assemblies in a manner that protects and promotes this important form of
public engagement and speech and respects the rights of protesters. The report identifies
good practices and tactics as well as counter-productive and harmful ones with the aim
of promoting a dialogue between the state, its policing institutions, members of civil
society, and other stakeholders on how to protect and promote this critical form of public
participation and expression in a human rights-compliant manner.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol, G.A. Res No. 2200, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
ii
South Africa, Hungary, United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Ireland, Russia, and the Netherlands.
iii
The members of INCLO are: the Agora International Human Rights Group (Agora, Russia); the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU,
United States); the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI, Israel); the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA, Canada); the Centro
de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS, Argentina); Dejusticia (Colombia); the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR, Egypt); the Human Rights Law Network (HRLN, India); the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU, Hungary); the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL,
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iv
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i
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND TERMS

ASSEMBLY SPACES

ACHPR
DIALOGUE
OFFICIALS /
REPRESENTATIVES

CROWD-CONTROL
EQUIPMENT

CROWD-CONTROL
WEAPONS (CCW s )

IACHR

JOINT REPORT

JOURNALISTIC
ACTIVITY
NON-STATE
ACTORS
OSCE

“Any public or common area open to the public (i.e. streets,
sidewalks, parks, plazas, state buildings etc.) including privately
owned spaces [which] are open to the general public and
serve similar functions as public spaces,”1 and may include
other urban or rural private spaces which may be used for the
vindication of rights.
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Officials trained in communication and public engagement who
act as liaisons with organisers and protesters and serve as the
point of contact for the public.
Protective wear which covers the entire body of a law
enforcement officer and often includes a helmet, face visor,
body armour (vests, neck protectors, knee pads), a shield, and
sometimes a gas mask. It also includes equipment such as
barricades and speaker systems.
Weapons used by policing and security institutions in protests
and assemblies, typically excluding live ammunition. CCWs
may include kinetic impact projectiles, chemical irritants,
water cannons, disorientation devices, acoustic weapons, and
directed energy weapons.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Maina Kiai (former Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom
of peaceful assembly and of association) & Christof Heyns
(former Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions), Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on
the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions on the proper management of assemblies, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/ 31/66 (Feb. 4, 2016).
Refers to any individual or organisation involved in taking
pictures, recording, reporting or documenting a protest,
protesters and/or police action, and includes traditional news
and print media, as well as social media and citizen journalism.
Entities such as private military and security contractors2 which
are contracted by, or work in association with, states or statesanctioned agencies in the context of protests.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
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POLICING
AND SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS

RIGHTS TO
PROTEST

SOCIAL PROTESTS,
ASSEMBLIES
AND OTHER
GATHERINGS

UN

State agencies, excluding non-state actors, responsible for
safety and security and the protection and promotion of
the rights to protest – including policing institutions and law
enforcement agencies.
The proper protection and promotion of the right to assemble
and to protest requires the protection of a broad range of
rights, including the following rights under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: life (Art 6); liberty and
security of person (Art 9); humane treatment and respect for
the inherent dignity of the person (Art 10); the right to privacy
(Art 17); the right to hold opinions and freedom of expression
(Art 19); the right of peaceful assembly (Art 20); the freedom to
associate with others (Art 22); the right to non-discrimination
in the enjoyment of each of these rights (Art 2 and 26); and
the right to an effective remedy for the violation of human
rights.3 Collectively, these rights are referred to as the “rights to
protest.”
“[A]n intentional and temporary gathering in a private or
public space for a specific purpose, and can take the form of
demonstrations, meetings, strikes, processions, rallies or sitins with the purpose of voicing grievances and aspirations or
facilitating celebrations.”4
United Nations

Joint Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association and the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on the Proper Management of Assemblies, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/66 (Feb. 4,
2016) [hereinafter Joint Report] (“Even sporting events, music concerts and other such gatherings can potentially be included. While
an assembly is defined as a temporary gathering, this may include long term demonstrations, including extended sit-ins and ‘occupy’-style manifestations. Although an assembly has generally been understood as a physical gathering of people, it has been recognized that human rights protections, including for freedom of assembly, may apply to analogous interactions taking place online.”).

1

Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 44, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/34/54 (Feb. 14, 2017).

2

3
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol, G.A. Res No. 2200, UN Doc A/6316 (1966) (entered into
force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Numerous other conventions, declarations and covenants protect the right to protest including: G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 20 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(ix), Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD]; Convention on the
Rights of the Child art. 15, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art.
29, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S.3 [hereinafter CRPD]; and G.A. Res. 53/144, 1999 Declaration on Human Rights Defenders art. 5 (Mar.
8, 1999) [hereinafter DHRD].
4

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 10.
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1. INTRODUCTION:

BRIDGING THE GAP
BETWEEN PRINCIPLE
AND PRACTICE

States and policing institutions often fail in their
obligations to protect and promote the rights to
protest; instead identifying protests, assemblies,
and other gatherings as security threats; imposing
unnecessary and arbitrary legal restrictions; engaging
in discriminatory practices; criminalising leaders of
protests and social movements; and resorting to force
when there is no real threat to life or physical integrity.

17

Public demonstrations are a fundamental tool of democratic engagement. Public speech
and protests allow individuals and communities to advocate for political reform and
recognition of individual and group rights. Historically, public speech has driven progress
on labour rights and migrants’ rights, prompted an end to corruption and discriminatory
practices, opened the door to enhanced political freedoms and equality in political
representation, mobilised access to land, resisted exploitation of natural resources, and
demanded solutions to housing shortages and the absence of basic social services.
Yet, too often, citizen expression has been met with repressive, arbitrary and, at times,
deadly responses from the state. States and policing institutions often fail in their
obligations to protect and promote the rights to protest; instead identifying protests,
assemblies, and other gatherings as security threats; imposing unnecessary and arbitrary
legal restrictions; engaging in discriminatory practices; criminalising leaders of protests
and social movements; and resorting to force when there is no real threat to life or physical
integrity. These reactionary practices have significantly undermined the freedom to speak,
assemble and protest – key rights to democratic expression and participation, the rule of
law, and rights which are often the only path to the vindication of other fundamental rights.
People assemble and gather in different ways, from an organised march, to a spontaneous
protest, to a sit in or festival, and for different aims: to express dissent or approval or to
celebrate and commemorate. How lawmakers, state agencies, and policing institutions
respond to these gatherings can depend on the identity of the group protesting, the cause,
political context, where and when the protest takes place, and the nature of the group or
institution being challenged (whether governmental, religious, corporate, educational, or
cultural). Whatever the context – whether the protest takes place in an urban or in a rural
area, whether the space is public or private, or whether the event is a show of pride or a
demand to be heard – the repression and/or criminalisation of a protest is a threat to an
essential component of democracy and public dialogue and engagement.
International human rights law and international and regional standards, as well as
most constitutions and national laws, establish principles and standards for protecting
protest and assembly – including the duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the state.
Guidance on protecting and promoting the rights to protest is also provided by regional
and international human rights bodies, international experts, regional courts, and domestic
courts.
5

However, there is little direction on how these various principles and standards should be
operationalised by the state and its policing and security institutions. This report aims to
fill that void by addressing how international standards and principles, and their national
counterparts, are and can be implemented. This report builds upon previous efforts
undertaken by INCLO and the UN Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assemblies and
Association to close the gap between principle and practice. This report relies on extensive
desk research, interviews with twenty-six policing experts in eight countries, as well as
consultations with and the expertise from thirteen INCLO member organisations engaged
in advocacy on human rights and policing. It provides guidance to states, security and
policing institutions, academics, protest and social movement leaders, and civil society on
how the rights to protest can be protected and promoted in reality.
5

Joint Report, supra note 1.
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This report identifies twelve principles and thirty-three practices for protecting and
promoting the rights to protest. The principles and good practices are organised around
three themes: (1) Preventive measures and institutional design; (2) Tactics and the use of
force; and (3) Accountability and oversight. Alongside each principle, the report identifies a
set of good practices drawn from deployment designs, documented models, and strategies
used by policing and security institutions, operational commanders, law enforcement
officials, and independent policing experts. Specific case studies further illustrate good
and bad practices through concrete and contextual examples of implementation. Each
section concludes with a set of principle-specific recommendations.

A. METHODOLOGY
This report was conceived by INCLO following the release in 2016 of the Joint Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association
and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on the Proper
Management of Assemblies (“Joint Report”). The goal of this report is to develop and expand
on the principles identified in the Joint Report and identify and gather specific strategies
and models through which states and security institutions approach protests in a human
rights-oriented manner. The primary desk research and interviewing for this report was
conducted by IHRC, in collaboration with INCLO, during the 2017-2018 academic year. IHRC
began the first phase of the research by collecting scholarship on practices and strategies
around “crowd” and “assembly” management as well as protests and other forms of
public speech. Scholarship collected was authored by academics, human rights groups,
United Nations (UN) actors, think tanks, policing experts, and policing institutions. IHRC
and INCLO then compiled a list of existing experts and operational commanders (from
the initial literature review and from the collective experience and knowledge of INCLO
members) to identify potential individuals for further engagement.
In the second phase of the research, IHRC and INCLO devised questionnaires tailored
to government officials or representatives, members of policing institutions, academics,
and civil society organisations. The questionnaires focused on identifying existing laws,
policies, and institutional structures; the community context; the specific tactics and
strategies employed by policing and security institutions before, during, and after an event;
and the good and bad practices observed or used. Finally, interviews were conducted
with international policing experts, operational commanders and members of policing
institutions, government officials, academics, activists, and human rights advocates
from countries in the Global North and South. The information gathered through these
interviews was then evaluated according to the international human rights framework and
supplemented by case studies and domestic expertise from INCLO member organisations.
The report was drafted collaboratively by INCLO and IHRC.
It should be noted that the literature collected and reviewed for this report was mainly
from English-speaking authors and countries. Similarly, most interviews conducted were
held in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. However, interviews were
also conducted with policing experts in Russia, South Africa, Ireland, the Netherlands,
and Hungary. As a result, many of the law enforcement perspectives shared in this report
reflect the situation in certain countries, which may differ, sometimes significantly, from
the circumstances experienced in others. We have compensated for this imbalance by
providing case studies and examples from different countries from the Global North and
19

South, including: Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Canada, Chile, Peru, Ireland, Colombia,
Hungary, the United Kingdom, Russia, Israel, Egypt, South Africa, Kenya and India.
In presenting this report, deliberate decisions have been made on language and common
narratives around protests and protesters, policing, and marginalisation. The authors
have identified select key terms and associated narratives and provided definitions in
the glossary. The nomenclature selected for this report is a reflection of the aim of this
report: to document international principles and practices that protect and promote the rights
to protest, driving normative developments in the translation from principle to reality.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FRAMEWORK
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the realisation of the
right to assemble and to protest requires the protection of a broad range of fundamental
human rights, including the rights to: life; liberty and security of person; humane treatment
and respect for the inherent dignity of the person; the right to privacy; the right to hold
opinions, and freedom of expression; the freedom to associate with others; the right to
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of each of these rights; and the right to an effective
remedy in the case of the violation of human rights. It is this bundle of rights this report
refers to as “the rights to protest”.
6

Each one of these rights, or any combination of them, may – depending on context – protect
attendees, bystanders, monitors, journalists and people engaged in journalistic activity, and
members of policing and security institutions. In circumstances when a restraint of one of
these rights can be justified by the proper human rights analysis, the other rights remain
applicable and protect the people involved. In the words of the Special Rapporteurs, “[n]o
assembly should . . . be considered unprotected.”
7

There are six legal principles that inform the application of the bundle of human rights
governing state and policing institutions in the protection and promotion of the rights
to protest: legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, accountability, and non
discrimination. These core legal standards determine the lawfulness of each policy, tactic,
deployment, and institutional process identified in this report.
8

•

Legality requires that states develop and enact a legal framework that is compliant
with international standards, protecting the rights to protest in their constitutional,
statutory, or administrative law.

•

Precaution requires that “all feasible steps be taken in planning, preparing, and
conducting an operation related to an assembly to avoid the use of force or, where force

ICCPR, supra note 3. Numerous other conventions, declarations and covenants protect the right to protest including: UDHR, supra
note 3, at art. 20; CERD, supra note 3, at art. 5(ix); CRC supra note 3, at art. 15; CRPD, supra note 3, at art. 29; DHRD, supra note 3, at art.
5.

6

7

Joint Report, supra note 1, ¶ 9.

See Joint Report, supra note 1, ¶ 36, 50; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169 of 17 (Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter UN Code of Conduct]; Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,
Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, 112-13, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1991) [hereinafter UN Basic Principles]; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36 (Apr. 1, 2014) (by Christof Heyns)
[hereinafter 2014 UNSR Report].

8
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is unavoidable, to minimize its harmful consequences.” The principle of precaution
may involve ensuring effective institutional design, proper training, use of force
policies, command structures, and tactical decisions in the field. The principle obligates
the state to take precautionary measures before and during an event to make sure
that interventions by law enforcement officers protect and promote assemblies and
the assembled.
9

•

Necessity and proportionality determine the legality of certain actions taken by
policing and security institutions. Each action must seek to achieve a legitimate goal
and employ the least intrusive and restrictive means necessary and appropriate to
achieve that goal.
10

•

Accountability requires that the state establish a clear and transparent command
structure to minimise the use of force and to facilitate effective reporting of misconduct.
Accountability also requires the establishment of effective review processes for
assessment and investigation of abuses and violations of the law in the management
of assemblies. Accountability would counsel that any violations of the rights to protest
are recorded, reported, credibly investigated, effectively remedied, and sanctioned.

•

Non-discrimination requires the equal protection of the law and the enjoyment of one’s
rights without discrimination on “any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
11

The normative framework outlined requires an understanding on the part of the state and
its policing and security institutions about their role and the role of protests in a democratic
society. Specifically, it requires an understanding that groups or crowds – however small
or large, critical of the establishment, or disorderly – are exercising essential democratic
rights that are protected in international law and standards. A look at the policing models
dominant over the last century reveal a different understanding – one of hostility towards
protests with a focus on the dispersal of crowds and stifling of dissent. While there have
been effective strategies and practices deployed by policing and security institutions in
different countries at different times, the practices presented in this report aim to further
develop an emerging model of policing aimed at the facilitation of fundamental rights. This
model directly confronts these negative assumptions about crowds and conceives of the
proper role of the state and its policing and security institutions in relation to protests in
order to establish a protective, service-oriented, professionalised, and enabling approach
to policing.

C. HISTORY OF STRATEGIES OF POLICING ASSEMBLIES
Since the end of World War II, policing and security institutions in democracies have generally
utilised three strategies in policing protests, assemblies, and other gatherings: escalated
force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation. The history described below
primarily follows the development of these approaches in the United States, but versions
12

9

Joint Report, supra note 1, ¶ 52.

10

Id.

11

ICCPR, supra note 3, at art. 26.

See PATRICK F. GILLHAM, SECURITIZING AMERICA: STRATEGIC INCAPACITATION AND THE POLICING OF PROTEST SINCE THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 5 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 636, 637 (2011).
12
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of these models were applied in other countries at various times and some are still being
used today.
•

1940s–1960s: Escalated force. The police view crowds as “homogenous and dangerous”
and seek to maintain “control” of the crowd at all times. As a result, “[p]olice increase the
level of force they use in response to perceived changes in protesters’ behaviour.” This
escalation of force “can be rapid and extreme” and involves significant indiscriminate
police violence, up to and including the use of live ammunition. While this strategy has
fallen out of favour in some countries, the ideology and its remnants remain in practice
in some jurisdictions.
13

14

15

16

17

SOUTH AFRICA: ESCALATED
FORCE AT MARIKANA. In
Marikana, South Africa, the
South African Police Service shot
and killed thirty-four protesting
mineworkers on 16 August 2012.
In days prior to the massacre,
four miners, two police officers
and two security guards were
killed. Approximately 400 police
officers – heavily armed with
live ammunition and wearing
full combat gear – as well as
military vehicles were deployed
to Marikana. The miners had
set up camp on a hill called
Wonderkop near the Lonmin
mine and, even though police
occasionally engaged with them,
they were committed to their
strike. However, the aggressive
behaviour and heavy armour of

MUJAHID SAFODIEN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

the police caused concern among them. On the
day in question, the police rapidly escalated force
– despite the absence of a threat to life from the
protesters. Many of the miners were found with
gunshot wounds in their backs, indicating that
they were running away and posed no immediate
threat to the police.

13
DAVID R. MANSLEY, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE, DEMOCRACY AND PROTEST POLICING 11 (2014); see also VERN NEUFELD REDEKOP &
SHIRLEY PARE, BEYOND CONTROL: A MUTUAL RESPECT APPROACH TO PROTEST CROWD-POLICE RELATIONS 141 (2010).
14

See REDEKOP & PARÉ, id at 141.

15

MICHELLE D. BONNER, POLICING PROTEST IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE 2 (2014).

16

Id.

17

Id.
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INDIA: THE USE OF THE ARMED FORCES. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act
of 1958 has conferred special powers upon the Armed Forces in “disturbed areas”
in the North Eastern state of Manipur and Kashmir. The Act gives legal immunity to
the Armed Forces, allowing for unrestricted use of escalated force. There can be no
prosecution, suit or any other legal proceeding against anyone acting under the Act.
This Act has been used by the state as a tool for abuse, oppression, and discrimination
since its inception.
•

1970s–1990s: Negotiated management. Flowing from escalated force, negotiated
management seeks to “control” protests through less violent means. This strategy
emphasises negotiation between protesters and police to ensure that the assembly
results in minimal “trouble”. Despite stressing communication, the degree to which
protesters are actually listened to and respected can be minimal – police continue to
direct crowds and seek “to make certain they do things in line with what the police would
desire.” Should these methods fail, police still have access to more forceful methods
of crowd-control. A variant of this approach was applied in this century to some Latin
American countries in an effort to limit violent and even lethal police practices following
highly repressive episodes.
18

19

20

•

2000s–present: Strategic incapacitation. In the strategic incapacitation approach, police
seek to “minimiz[e] risk by identifying and neutralizing possible threats.” This strategy
“rel[ies] on an assortment of surveillance and information sharing tactics to identify
and label potentially disruptive protesters.” Once identified, police seek to “neutralize”
the threat by using “preemptive arrests, crowd-control weapons and equipment, and
control of space tactics”, as well as mass arrests, which contradict the targeting aim of
the strategy.
21

22

23

24

Over time, and with some regional variation, these three models have been – and in
some cases continue to be – applied in varying degrees. In Europe and North America,
for example, cross national differences in protest policing have diminished over time,
and scholars have identified common trends in the evolution of police strategy. Escalated
force predominated until the 1960s but fell out of favour following the violent repression
of social movements in that decade. The more “benign” negotiated management replaced
25

18

See REDEKOP & PARÉ, supra note 13, at 142.

Id.; see also DAVID P. WADDINGTON, POLICING PUBLIC DISORDER: THEORY AND PRACTICE 14 (2007) (“preventative strategies are
less concerned with achieving a genuine process of ‘give and take’ than with ensuring that the police achieve their objectives via the
least confrontational means at their disposal”).
19

See REDEKOP & PARÉ, supra note 13 at 142-43 (displaying visual depicting how the Royal Canadian Mounted Police consider risk and
use of force); Waddington, supra note 15 at 191.
20

21

GILLHAM, supra note 12, at 647 (emphasis in original).

22

Id.

Id.; see also LESLEY J. WOOD, CRISIS AND CONTROL: THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTEST POLICING 26 (2014) (“The strategic incapacitation approach to protest policing recognizes the ways that police combine the intelligence gathering and analysis of intelligence-led
policing in order to pre-empt protest through control or dissuasion of protesters. If police are unable to stop the protest, and protesters continue to appear ‘threatening’ or ‘unpredictable,’ police shift their approach to one that uses mass arrest, supported by the use
of less-lethal weapons and riot control units.”).

23

24

Id at 26.

See WADDINGTON, supra note 19, at 10 (“There is widespread agreement among American and European scholars that the last
three decades have seen a major transformation in the dominant style of public order policing”); Donatella della Porta & Herbert
Reiter, The Policing of Protest in Western Democracies, POLICING PROTEST: THE CONTROL OF MASS DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 1-32, 6 (Donatella della Porta & Herbert Reiter, eds., 1998) (“Over time, cross national differences between the European
countries seem to have diminished. . . . A general trend emerges regarding protest policing styles”).
25

23

Since the end of World War II, policing and security institutions
in democracies have generally utilised three strategies in
policing protests, assemblies, and other gatherings: escalated
force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation.

it as the dominant paradigm from the 1970s-1990s. New fears of terrorism and concerns
that negotiated management failed to adequately constrain “transgressive” protest groups
led strategic incapacitation to emerge in the 2000s and to remain commonplace today.
26

In other regions, such as Latin America, the variation in the use of these strategies was
responsive to local developments. For example, a period of less repressive strategies of
policing often followed periods of violence. In Argentina, “the government has had many
different strategies combining repression, negotiation and control of police violence in
different ways depending on the context [...]. The recent history of Argentina reveals that
it is the central executive that determines police behaviour, with the judiciary exercising
significant power and influence.… As a result, the government’s approach has alternated
between open aggression and repression and strategies of negotiation with explicit limits
placed on the use of force.”
27

26
See MANSLEY, supra note 13, at 11-12; WOOD, supra note 23, at 26-28; GILLHAM, supra note 12, at 637-39; DELLA PORTA & REITER,
id, at 6-8.
27

CELS, El derecho a la protesta social en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 2017, available at: http://www.cels.org.ar/protestasocial/.
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THE FIELD TODAY
Trends in policing strategies in the context of protests have not been consistent globally. For
example, escalated force remains the dominant strategy in Latin America. Furthermore,
police often continue to apply these strategies in a discriminatory manner such that
racially, ethnically, or politically marginalised communities face the most violence and the
greatest burdens on the exercise of their rights to protest. Moreover, all three strategies
explicitly contemplate police use of force and utilise state coercion to “pacify . . . dissent.”
Finally, not all existing policing institutions reveal a clear strategy or a singular approach in
their practices. As a result, these strategies fail to prioritise the protection and promotion
of the rights to protest.
28

29

30

CO-OPERATIVE FACILITATION: AN EMERGING MODEL FOR HUMAN RIGHTSCOMPLIANT PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE RIGHTS TO PROTEST
In response to these deficiencies, a variety of academics and members of civil society have
recently proposed a new model for policing protests best termed “co-operative facilitation”.
This model aims to re-orient state and, specifically, police behaviour around defending and
protecting human rights rather than controlling expression and dissent in public spaces.
Relying on empirical crowd psychology research, this approach begins with the premise
that “crowds should not be seen as an inherent threat,” and that “violence derives from
interactions—notably between crowd and police.” From this starting point, the strategy
emphasises four key themes: education, facilitation, communication, and differentiation.
31

32

These themes require police to understand the social dynamics of crowds, protect and
promote the rights to protest, and avoid indiscriminate tactics. Although not yet fully
implemented in any jurisdiction, aspects of this strategy (such as dialogue officials, emphasis
on facilitation, or avoidance of indiscriminate tactics) represent a more progressive
approach to protest policing. The co-operative facilitation strategy thus seeks to disrupt a
status quo in which violent and repressive police tactics remain all too common, and move
these practices towards a human rights approach to policing of protests.
33

See BONNER, supra note 15, at 2 (“When police are called upon to manage protests in Latin America, most use a reactive approach
known as ‘escalated force.’”).

28

29

See WOOD, supra note 23, at 41-42.

Donatella della Porta & Kivanç Atak, The Police, BREAKING DOWN THE STATE: PROTESTORS ENGAGED 113, 122 (Jan Willem Duyvendak & James M. Jasper, eds., 2015).
30

Stephen Reicher et al., Knowledge-Based Public Order Policing: Principles and Practice, 1 POLICING: A J. OF POL’Y AND PRAC. 403, 414
(2007).

31

32

See Edward R. Maguire, New Directions in Protest Policing, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67, 98-106 (2015).

33

See Reicher et al., supra note 31, at 409-410.
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2

PREVENTIVE
MEASURES AND
INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN

To effectively protect the rights to protest, the state
must orient the relevant state actors towards an
approach of protection and promotion of protest.

26

OVERVIEW
Preventive measures provide a critical foundation for a human rights-based and
professionalised approach to policing in protests. This section reviews and assesses
measures that prevent and anticipate infringement on the rights to protest as consistent
with the principle of precaution.
Preventive measures can include conditions that impact police culture and practice:
regulatory frameworks, chains of command, training on the proportional use of force, and
appropriate education on required skills and measures that avoid discriminatory practices.
Such measures may involve the use of notification systems that facilitate the organisation
of public and private space.

A. LEGISLATION, LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

States must have a legal and institutional framework in place that protects and facilitates
the rights to protest. International law requires that “[s]tates shall respect and ensure
all rights of persons participating in assemblies.” Regionally, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) states that “social and political participation
through the right of freedom of assembly is an essential element to the consolidation
of the democratic life of societies.” This “implies that a presumption exists in favour of
the exercise of the right” and that states must “act on the assumption that [protests]
do not constitute a threat to public order.”
34

35

36

37

•

States must also provide the support, infrastructure and services necessary to
implement the relevant legal and institutional framework. This means “[s]tates should
provide the necessary support to, and sufficient oversight of, the authorities involved
in the management of assemblies, at all levels of government. This includes sufficient
training and necessary financial and human resources.” This also includes the provision
of basic government services necessary for individuals to exercise the rights to protest
– such as traffic regulation, medical assistance and cleaning services.
38

39

34

Joint Report, supra note 1.

CIDH, Segundo informe sobre la Situación de las Defensoras y los Defensores de Derechos Humanos en las Américas, 31 de diciembre de 2011, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 66, párr. 129.
35

36
CIDH, Informe Anual 2015, capítulo 4A, párrafos 65. See also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). Guidelines for the Policing of Assemblies by Law Enforcement Officials in Africa [hereafter referred to as the ACHPR Guidelines], para 2.1.1,
which states that the enactment, interpretation, implementation and enforcement of national laws and regulations governing the
right to assemble freely with others must require law enforcement responses that favour the presumption of the exercise of the right
to assemble freely. Further, see Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly [hereafter referred to as the OSCE Guidelines], para 2.1, which states: “As a fundamental right, freedom of peaceful assembly
should, insofar as possible, be enjoyed without regulation. Anything not expressly forbidden by law should be presumed to be permissible, and those wishing to assemble should not be required to obtain permission to do so. A presumption in favour of this freedom
should be clearly and explicitly established in law.”
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Joint Report, supra note 1. The ACHPR Guidelines state, at para 17.3, that the provision of first aid and other essential services during
an assembly must be provided free of charge to assembly participants. Further, the OSCE Guidelines state, at para 2.2, that “[i]t is
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enjoyed and not subject to undue bureaucratic regulation.”
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•

Legislation, procedures, and codes of conduct should be publicly accessible, including
regulatory instruments and information about law enforcement procedures relating to
assemblies. Law enforcement agencies should establish, and make publicly available,
enforceable protocols and standards of conduct for law enforcement officials that are
consistent with regional and international human rights standards. Such protocols and
standards of conduct, according to the IACHR, must guarantee that members of police
institutions act “with certainty in their duty to protect participants of a public gathering,
demonstration or assembly.”
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•

Effective reporting and accountability mechanisms must be put in place to ensure
security interventions protect and facilitate the rights to protest. According to the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Guidelines, law enforcement
agencies must establish a clear, transparent, and single command structure for the
policing of assemblies. Additionally, the operational roles and responsibilities of law
enforcement officials within the chain of command should be clearly established,
articulated, and publicly known to ensure a single chain of accountability. Additionally,
“[states] should publicly recognize that there is room for differences of opinion and
promote a[n] [overall] culture of tolerance.”
43
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GOOD PRACTICES
To effectively protect the rights to protest, the state must orient the relevant state actors
towards an approach of protection and promotion of protest. All state actors, including
the policing and security institutions, should understand that the rights to protest are
fundamental and central to the proper functioning of a democratic state and the effective
safeguarding of other core human rights. Policing and security institutions should cultivate
a culture of defending dissent. While many practices in this report focus on the behaviour
and culture of security institutions, these practices cannot be properly understood without
reference to the wider political and governmental framework in which these institutions
operate.
45

Key political commitments that inform the practice of policing and security institutions
are necessary to effectively protect and promote the rights to protest. To ensure effective
facilitation, the commitment to safeguarding the rights to protest must be reflected in
legislation, in the mindset of political and police leadership, policing protocols, and in the
40

ACHPR Guidelines, para 4.1.
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officials and policing assemblies, the circumstances in which such equipment will be deployed, the procedures and reasons for imposing limitations on the right to assembly by public authorities, and information on how to access internal and external complaints
mechanisms. In a similar vein, the OSCE Guidelines state, at para 2.6, that relevant regulatory authorities must ensure that the general
public has adequate access to reliable information about its procedures and operations, and the regulatory process should enable the
fair and objective assessment of all available information.
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training of operational commanders and members of policing institutions. As the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime notes in the Handbook on police accountability,
oversight and integrity, “guidance for the police on what to do and how to do it” is an
essential component of effective accountability and police integrity.
46

Protecting and promoting the rights to protest requires political actors to create, fund,
and support the institutional mechanisms necessary for protecting human rights.
Policing institutions, in particular, must be provided with legal, political, institutional, and
cultural support from the state to effectively implement human rights-compliant and
professionalised strategies in interacting with protests.
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLICE ACT OF 2000. The experience of police
reform in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement provides a useful
example of the importance and impact of strong human rights legislation and
policies. During the period of sectarian violence known as “the Troubles” between
Northern Ireland’s Protestant majority (who favoured remaining part of the
United Kingdom) and its Catholic minority (who favoured joining the independent
Republic of Ireland), the Catholic community viewed the overwhelmingly Protestant
policing institution as regularly using disproportionate and excessive force against
them. As a result, the peace process emphasised the protection of human rights
in policing.
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This emphasis produced the Police (Northern Ireland) Act of 2000, which gave
special force in Northern Ireland to the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act. The
Human Rights Act “requires all public authorities, including the police, to act in a
way which is compatible with the rights set out in Schedule 1 to the Act, which are
taken from the European Convention on Human Rights.” The Police (Northern
Ireland) Act of 2000 made this command even more explicit: in addition to the
traditional police duties “to protect life and property; to preserve order; to prevent
the commission of offences; [and,] where an offence has been committed, to
take measures to bring the offender to justice,” the Act also obligates police to
“protect human rights and secure the support of the whole community.” The
Police (Northern Ireland) Act thus strengthens the Human Rights Act in a subtle
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protection and vindication of the human rights of all. Our consultations showed clear agreement across the communities in Northern
Ireland that people want the police to protect their human rights from infringement by others, and to respect their human rights in
the exercise of that duty.”).
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but powerful way: it places the police duty to protect human rights on an equal
level with other traditional police duties.
Experts credit these statutory innovations with helping shift police mentality
when working in the context of protests from “control and stop” to facilitation.
Furthermore, although this legislation places significant positive obligations on
police, commanders in Belfast do not view it as a burden. To the contrary, as
former Senior Commander Stephen White described, these Acts are “helpful
for police” by “giv[ing] clear guidance on what they should be working for” and
describing “what constitutes good planning and good justifications for adopted
strategies.” As a result, this statutory language has helped the Police Service of
Northern Ireland build a strong culture of human rights protection in its approach
to protests.
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Practice 1: Mandate police protection and promotion of the rights to protest
in domestic law and enforce these rights with a strong normative framework
An effective legal framework that mandates respect for social protests is central to the
protection and promotion of the rights to protest. International standards and guidelines,
constitutional principles, legislation, operational standards and standing orders, and
procedures must define what is appropriate – while also guiding the behaviour of policing
institutions. As policing institutions are specifically tasked with enforcing the law, a legal
mandate that directs them to protect and promote the legal rights to protest is crucial for
their efficacy. Constitutional provisions and statutory law should require police protection
of citizens’ human rights in any response to a public assembly, while lower-level regulations
and police policies should provide more developed and contextual guidance to the police
in responding to protests. Laws that specifically regulate police action in the protest and
public demonstration context can ensure a democratic approach to protests by creating
mandates for all relevant branches of the government to promote and protect the rights
to protest.
The absence of a strong, clear, and stable regulatory framework can lead to unpredictable,
uneven, and arbitrary interventions by policing institutions and other state actors. The
legal framework should be clear, comprehensive, and binding. Clear laws not only guide
the behaviour and culture of policing institutions, but also provide clear guidance in judicial
interventions.
When formulating such legal protections, states should take care to avoid legislative
language that weakens or qualifies the rights to protest. Legislation that differentiates
57
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between (for example) “legitimate” and “illegitimate” protests, scheduled and spontaneous
protests, or protesters who have complied with a notification system and those who have
not, could leave some protests without explicit legal protection – and give police justification
for violating the human rights of participants.
Legal loopholes in the protection of the rights to protest should also be addressed. Such
loopholes can be used to weaken these rights, especially by states and government actors
lacking political commitment to protect the rights to protest. Imprecise constitutional or
statutory authority granting broad emergency or public order powers, criminalisation
for minor offences committed in the context of protests, or the undermining of
accountability mechanisms are all legal loopholes that compromise the protection of these
fundamental rights.
PERU: EXCESSIVE AND EXTENDED USE OF “EMERGENCY POWERS”. The
Peruvian government has used its constitutionally protected emergency powers
to declare states of emergency for months at a time, prohibiting protests and
using the military to enforce “public order”. These imprecise standards (e.g.
“public order”) have translated into unchecked discretion. Peru’s use of apparently
constitutional or legal mechanisms are contrary to international law insofar as
they disproportionately violate human rights, including the rights to protest.
58

The use of the armed forces or any militarised security institution (whether it is weaponry,
tactics, the designation of protesters as “internal enemies”, or relying on the military justice
system) has emerged as part of a wider trend of using anti-terrorism powers against
communities organising for basic housing, land, economic and other fundamental rights.
The discretion to use these emergency powers to manage demonstrations reflects a lack
of political commitment to protecting the rights to protest and a general hostility towards
any type of dissent. This lack of political commitment to safeguarding these fundamental
democratic rights then trickles down to impact the culture and behaviour of policing and
security institutions.
The involvement of armed forces in public security – including protest – should be prohibited
in all circumstances. To the extent that armed forces are deployed in context of protest,
their conduct must be subjected to the same standards as policing institutions.
Legislation that grants policing institutions excessive discretion can also compromise the
protection of the various rights to protest by giving its members broad authority to arrest
or disperse. Providing such wide latitude for legally acceptable interventions muddles the
standard for appropriate behaviour and makes it difficult to provide effective oversight.
Furthermore, expansive authority and wide discretion enable policing institutions to
engage in “overly punitive response[s] to relatively minor incidents.” This permits and
promotes an antagonistic model of policing which often results in human rights violations.
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Practice 2: Ensure that the protection and promotion of the rights to protest is
incorporated into police culture, including an appreciation of the importance of
dissenting views in a democratic society
Laws, policies and protocols provide a necessary foundation but must be accompanied
by a culture in police and security institutions oriented towards protecting and promoting
the rights to protest. As former law enforcement officer and Russian policing expert Igor
Burmistrov put it, sometimes “on paper everything looks good here, everything is correct.”
However, further enquiry into how members of policing institutions train, behave in
the field, and are or are not held accountable for their actions, reveals an inconsistency
between norms, policy, and practice.
62

Policing institutions should view protecting and promoting the rights to protest, including
dissent, as central to their function and should expect to be held accountable for failure
to do so. As many interviewed experts emphasised, the task of building a culture of rights
protection and accountability falls primarily on leadership. If the political and policing
leadership demonstrate a commitment to human rights standards, the institutional
hierarchy amplifies their leadership to create a departmental culture that takes the
protection and promotion of human rights seriously.
63

Internal practices and policies aimed towards this end are key to altering culture and
operational norms within policing institutions. Policies may fall into two categories:
•

Proactive policies create “pause points” where relevant officials pause and consider
whether a decision they are about to make is consistent with human rights and if it will
effectively protect and promote the rights to protest before they act. These policies
allow policing institutions to identify and prevent human rights violations.

•

Reactive policies seek to develop systematic review processes of violations after they
occur to avoid repeating them. They use accountability, discipline, and legal sanctions
to deter future misconduct.

Policing institutions committed to human rights and professionalised services should
employ both proactive and reactive policies and engage in a continuing, self-reflective
process aimed at improving strategies to protect and promote human rights in the
communities they serve –including a genuine display of willingness to receive and learn
from criticism. Through this process, policies and practices may evolve and increase
in efficacy.
Practice 3: Establish a clear chain of command that incorporates multiple points of
review and assessment, and fosters a culture of accountability
A clear chain of command determines how authority and power are exercised and delegated
from management and supervision to officers in the field responsible for varying functions.
Interview with Igor Nikolayevich Burmistrov, former Senior Instructor at the Training Centre of Sankt Petersburg Directorate of
Interior.
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It allows instructions and priorities to flow downward along the chain of command and
accountability to flow upward. A clear chain of command for police and security institutions
in the context of protests facilitates good decision-making and effective implementation of
decisions. However, the unique nature of protecting and promoting the rights to protest
in a particular context may require political authorities and policing institutions to develop
specialised command procedures specifically suited to those circumstances. The chain of
command should clearly articulate the distinction in duties between political authorities,
civil servants, and policing institutions to help clarify where responsibility lies for planning
and decision-making and specify who is responsible for authorising key tactics during
an event – especially any action that involves the use of force. The chain of command
should reinforce assessing strategies and options through human rights standards and
charge each commander with the duty of articulating how the selected operational plan
or decision complies with the aim of facilitation and the principles of legality, precaution,
necessity, proportionality, accountability, and non-discrimination.

CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: GOLD-SILVER-BRONZE COMMANDERS.
Some jurisdictions, such as Canada and the UK, utilise a gold-silver-bronze
system to apportion responsibility during a protest. Under this approach, the
gold commander decides overall strategy, the silver commander makes decisions
about tactics, and the bronze commanders lead officers on the ground. Formal
rank does not determine who takes on which role; instead, roles are assigned
by considering the particular needs of the event combined with the skills and
experiences of available commanders. For a given event, there may be multiple
bronze commanders each tasked with different responsibilities and each working
with the silver commander. The silver commander assesses the consequences
of each bronze commander’s operational plan to determine whether a selected
strategy advances the goals of protecting and promoting the rights to protest
and if it can be implemented as planned. The command structure thus ensures
multiple points of review and assessment where commanders evaluate if each
tactic in the adopted strategy complies with the law (is it legal, proportionate, and
necessary?) and what the likely consequences of police action are. The chain of
command can facilitate systematic, principle-driven, and evidence-based decisionmaking, by considering questions like “what if the police encounter resistance to
these tactics?”, and “what are the health and safety implications for [members
of the policing institutions] and members of the public who may be affected by
police action?” This structure also increases accountability by directly attributing
the decisions made during the operation to the individual responsible.
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When policing institutions have structures that incorporate multiple points of review,
commanders must be familiar with the responsibilities given to each role. They should
understand the scope (and limits) of their discretion and know the situations for which
they must seek approval for their decisions. Additionally, commanders who act beyond
the scope of their authority should have their actions reviewed through both internal and
external accountability mechanisms. Having clear lines of decision-making allows policing
institutions to minimise human rights violations that result as a consequence of arbitrary
intervention, confusion, or insufficient planning.
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Practice 4: Provide policing institutional leadership with specialised and
ongoing training
Emphasis on adequate and ongoing training is a key component in giving meaningful
effect to human rights protections. Training should, at a minimum, help commanders
operationalise and internalise the principles of legality, precaution, necessity,
proportionality, accountability and non-discrimination. Training should also emphasise
an understanding of and relationship with the communities served. Commanders should
be provided with advanced, ongoing human rights-compliant training. Properly trained
leadership is key for operational decision-making consistent with the aim of protecting and
promoting the rights to protest. Leadership should, therefore, exemplify professionalism.
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This requires the persons in charge of the operations – either members of policing
institutions or other representatives from the State – to fully understand the law and the
requirements of human rights-compliant policing. Put simply by Sir Denis O’Connor, an
independent director of the Board of the College of Policing in the United Kingdom and
former Chief Constable, leadership training should emphasise: “we’re for the law, and the
law enables protest.”
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Ideally, leadership should learn from experts in both the fields of policing protest and human
rights. Thus, policing institutions should involve human rights experts in their training
process. It is crucial that commanders on the ground have a thorough understanding
of human rights requirements so that they may communicate those requirements to the
individual officers under their command. Commander training should be ongoing and
include the use of scenarios designed to flesh out existing problems and identify specific
tactics and approaches that lead to violence and other human rights violations.
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In summary, the legal framework, institutional culture, training, and practice should
consistently set the goal of protecting human rights. In this manner, the commitment to
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protecting the rights of all those involved in or affected by a protest will “flow from national
policy to operationalization.”
77

RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

States should enact, adopt, and implement legislation, administrative regulations,
protocols, and policies for the protection and promotion of the rights to protest.

»»

Laws, regulations, policies, and decision-making processes should make clear that
protests are protected even if they are not fully compliant with any extant “formal”
requirements such as notification. The legal framework should also indicate that
actions of individual protesters or a sub-group participating in a protest do not render
the protest itself or other individual or sub-group participants “illegal” – even where
such actions may be violent.

»»

The legal framework protecting the rights to protest and relevant police and security
sector policies should expressly indicate that violation of the right to property by some
protest participants does not justify punitive or repressive actions (such as the use of
force) against other individuals or groups participating in a protest.

»»

Each step of a policing institution’s decision-making process should incorporate
the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution, accountability, and
non discrimination.

»»

Political authorities and policing institutions should establish a clear chain of command
which incorporates multiple points of review and assessment and creates effective
accountability mechanisms.

»»

Political authorities should provide policing and security institutions with the resources
and training necessary to ensure a rights-protective approach. Effective training should
be ongoing; include nuanced scenarios highlighting the principles of legality, precaution,
necessity, proportionality, accountability, and non-discrimination; and include case
study scenarios and strategies for resolving documented challenges.

»»

The involvement of armed forces in public security – including protest – should be
prohibited in all circumstances. To the extent that armed forces are deployed in context of
protest, their conduct must be subjected to the same standards as policing institutions.
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B. NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

All people have an inalienable right to assemble. The state must protect and promote
all forms of assembly by any individual “without discrimination on the basis of any
prohibited ground.” For groups, communities, sectors, and individuals “who have
historically experienced discrimination” or experience current marginalisation or other
disadvantage, police and security institutions must take affirmative actions to ensure
equal protection and rectify any past discriminatory dynamics.
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•

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has affirmed that
the freedom to organise and participate in public assemblies must be guaranteed to:
individuals, groups, unregistered associations, legal entities, and corporate bodies;
members of minority ethnic, national, sexual, and religious groups; nationals and nonnationals (including stateless persons, refugees, foreign nationals, asylum seekers,
migrants, and tourists); children, women, and men; law-enforcement personnel; and
persons without full legal capacity, including persons with mental illnesses.
81

•

Policing institutions should be representative of the communities they serve. Thus,
“[s]tates should promote diversity in law enforcement, so that communities see
themselves in police. This requires a sufficiently representative body with the inclusion
of women and minority [sic] groups.” While not a guarantee in itself, policing and
security institutions representative of the communities served are likely to be more
successful in building relationships of trust with protest participants, allowing them to
better facilitate and promote rights to protest.
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GOOD PRACTICES
In many societies, certain communities and groups have been subjected to historical
discrimination on the basis of various characteristics including ethnic, racial, and religious
identities. In such contexts, the relationship between policing and security officials and
these communities is often strained, tense, or overtly antagonistic. Discriminatory policies
and practices of the state and its policing and security institutions have led to community
distrust. In some countries, the strained or otherwise negative relationship between
policing officials and communities is widespread, painful, and entrenched. As has been
widely reported in countries such as the United States, disproportionate use of force and
lethal force by policing institutions against certain communities has garnered intense
public criticism.
Other groups and individuals have also been discriminated against in various contexts by
policing and security institutions based on gender, sexual orientation, national identity, and
political opinion. Vulnerable individuals such as children, older people, disabled people,
78
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pregnant people, and transgender people have also been subjected to discrimination by
the state. Some individuals may also become susceptible to discriminatory state action
because of vulnerabilities caused by transitions (for example, in gender expression or
place of residence), homelessness or unemployment, engagement in certain kinds of work
such as informal labour or sex work, or use of drugs or struggles with addiction. These
individuals are treated differently by states, often with particular animosity and even
violence. Marginalisation, discrimination, and other violations of human rights often go
hand in hand.
84

The lack of trust between police departments and communities is often a symptom of
broader systematic discrimination and violence by the state and society, which fuels a lack of
engagement between police and communities and encourages suspicion and antagonism.
As part of this dynamic, policing institutions are often perceived by communities to be
another problematic arm of the state involved in discrimination that harms or ignores
the needs of certain communities. Policing officials sometimes initiate and perpetuate
this environment of distrust through disrespectful and aggressive engagement with the
communities they serve, abusing their authority through uneven enforcement and biased
policing. Trust requires regular, consistent, reasonable, and respectful behaviour. To
build trust in the context of protest, policing institutions must show common decency
and respect while demonstrating their compliance with the law and with agreements and
promises made to protesters.
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ISRAEL: OR COMMISSION. In October 2000, mass
demonstrations and riots took place in towns and
villages in northern Israel. Palestinian citizens of those
towns were protesting in solidarity with Palestinians
in the occupied territories. The police used rubbercoated bullets and live ammunition to disperse the
protesters, causing the death of twelve Palestinians
and injury to hundreds more. Following these events,
a state commission of enquiry was established. The
commission presented its conclusions in 2003 and
determined, among other things, that the events and
their fatal consequences were the product of longterm discrimination against the Palestinian citizens of
Israel. The report describes the negative and hostile
attitude of the police towards Palestinian citizens
of Israel and how police often perceive them as the
enemy. One of the recommendations made by the
commission was that the police take steps to change
this attitude towards this minority group.
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The distrust and, in some cases, animosity engendered between some communities and
policing officials can lead to an escalation in tactics and violations of the rights to protest
– including the right to life and the right to personal liberty and security. In such a context,
the conditions are pre-set for distrust, escalation, overreaction, and the use of force.
To avoid this, policing institutions must develop skills for engaging with communities in
a productive manner that recognises the duty to serve and the complex power dynamics
between police and different groups. Dialogue and community programming, when
implemented effectively, can assist in these efforts but are rarely sufficient. A serious
reflection on institutional reform is needed to ensure that discriminatory practices and
attitudes are prioritised, addressed, and remedied.
Practice 5: Ensure that policing institutions are representative of the communities
they serve
Police institutions tend to be better able to serve communities when they recruit and retain
officers who are representative of the community. Security and policing directors are
generally in agreement that better recruitment is essential to improving police-community
relations.
87

However, a representative policing institution is not a sufficient solution to establishing
community relations. Members of the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States
have indicated that while African-American police officers are, on occasion, deployed
in protest contexts, this often does not prevent violence and discrimination. Similar
sentiments are expressed by relatives of young black people killed by the police in Brazil.
However, such deployment can favour an understanding of the community context
if coupled with training and a culture of non-discrimination and engagement. The less
representative a police department is of the community, the more trust tends to erode;
this, in turn, makes it harder for police departments to recruit from the sections of the
community that are not represented.
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Policing institutions continue to be overwhelmingly male. In the United States in 2016, for
example, 87.9 per cent of law enforcement officers were men. Clearly, such a composition
is not representative of society and so recruitment of female policing officials should be
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a priority. This is especially important in the context of protests where body searches
should be conducted by an officer of the same gender as the protester.
93

Achieving a representative policing institution requires taking significant intentional steps
to change established patterns that rely on fixed pipelines for recruitment and result in a
insufficiently diverse applicant pool.
NORTHERN IRELAND: REPRESENTATIVE POLICING. In Northern Ireland, a long
history of ethnic violence between Protestants and Catholics fuelled tensions
between the Catholic community and the almost exclusively Protestant police
officers. More representative policing and concrete steps in recruitment were
key parts of the peace process. In 2001, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the
predecessor of the current police force, the PSNI) was comprised of 8.3 per cent
Catholic officers but by 2010 this figure had grown to 29.38 per cent. Police
Superintendent of the Police Services of Northern Ireland, Nigel Goddard, explains
that having “Catholic officers policing Catholic neighbourhoods matters a lot for
how the police are seen.” One of the key strategies used to increase the number
of Catholic officers in the PSNI was to combine all applicants for a given number
of openings into a single pool from which “an equal number of Protestants and
Catholics were then drawn for appointment.”
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Providing clear and real routes of advancement through mentorship and opportunities to
pursue advanced degrees can make positions appealing to individuals from populations
with no established pipelines to policing institutions. Once young women and men see
members of their community as officials, and in leadership positions, recruitment becomes
easier and community engagement improves. In the words of Former Atlanta Police Chief
Turner: “The best recruiters are our officers. Their friends, their family members. They
think the way they think, and they look the way they look. … It becomes easier because you
have a history.”
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Practice 6: Incorporate non-discrimination and equality principles into departmental
culture and officer training
Comprehensive, effective and ongoing non-discrimination and equality training is vital for
the protection and promotion of the rights to protest. Often training tends to emphasise
security skills and tactics, failing to sufficiently incorporate critical human rights strategies
relevant in the protest context. While some states have taken significant steps to incorporate
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general human rights training into police training curriculum, emphasising proportionality
and necessity in decision-making and practice, there has been less explicit and systematic
attention to training policing units and leadership on how to ensure non-discrimination
and respect for equality in policing public events.
The typical “neutral” approach to training and tactics can fail to recognise relevant historical
dynamics and current realities of social inequality and how those dynamics inevitably
impact policing. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, “neutral” interventions may have
discriminatory impacts. Too few policies and practices contemplate affirmative measures
aimed at addressing discrimination. A good practice would incorporate effective training
on (and strategies for addressing) implicit bias and dynamics of distrust born of historical
and institutional patterns of inequality.

SOUTH AFRICA: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT IN POLICING GATHERINGS.
The South African Police Services (SAPS) has issued a national instruction requiring
the police services to engage with community stakeholders in gatherings in order
to promote public safety. The police services are required to play a proactive role
in “identifying and diffusing any possible conflict before it escalates to violence”.
As a result, the police services have a duty to communicate and engage with the
community, the organisers, and participants of protests. In practice, however, the
police services often fail to comply with this instruction and to adequately engage
with protesters at gatherings while dispersing them. Additionally, pre-event
engagement is often used to intimidate rather than communicate with protesters.
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UNITED KINGDOM: COMMUNITY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS. One practice
promoted by the College of Policing in the United Kingdom calls for Community
Impact Assessments (CIA) to inform the assessment of risk and decisions on
strategies. CIAs require an assessment of the “history which may be relevant to
the operation or community”, and takes account of the “unique and current nature
of the communities being assessed”. In addition to considering the existing
dynamics and vulnerabilities of certain communities, the CIA asks the police to
identify the impact on “future issues, including how or when the incident may
evolve and what the community impacts and perceptions may be.”
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Practice 7: Acknowledge and address the power imbalance in the coercive
relationship between policing institutions and communities to promote
meaningful co-operation
Attempts to repair or build community relationships through engagement or dialogue
have not always been successful. Imani Robinson, a London-based activist and organiser,
National Instruction 4 of 2014 Public Order Policing: Crowd Management during Public Gatherings and Demonstrations (hereinafter referred to as “National Instruction 4”).
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explains the perspective that “policing by consent is a false narrative because policing is a
coercive interaction.” According to this view, policing by consent is not a realistic description
of the relationship between police officials and certain communities or groups. Robinson
points to everyday interactions with police as providing evidence to the community of their
vulnerability to policing institutions. For Robinson, failing to recognise this reality further
harms relations between communities and policing institutions.
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In stop and search procedures, for example, officers often approach persons of colour
making demands and interrogating the individual. Only when the person questions the
officer’s tactics will the officer respond that he or she had merely asked a question.
In general, stop and search procedures are a common tactic used to harass different
marginalised groups, usually without any grounds for carrying out such a procedure.
Recently, in Argentina, police have started stopping buses transporting protesters in order
to search all passengers, which has the additional effect of delaying their arrival at a protest.
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This is an example of a common abuse of power which contributes to a lack of trust and
a sense that police interactions are inherently coercive. Thus, efforts to build community
relationships are likely to be successful only when this dynamic is acknowledged and
addressed by the purveyors of power: the policing institutions.
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The ways in which majority white assemblies are viewed by policing institutions as opposed
to assemblies comprised of people of colour is part of this history of police discrimination.
For example, in the UK, academic Dr Adam Elliott-Cooper observed that officer presence
at a student protest comprised of mainly white students was “so low that [the group of
protesters] were able to walk into the offices of the conservative party and occupy it with
ease. This can be compared to the Notting Hill Carnival, which is the second-largest carnival
in the world and is African Caribbean. This event takes place every year and it has a very
heavy police presence.” Throughout Latin America, workers and marginalised groups also
suffer unequal and discriminatory responses in the context of protests. This inequality
in responses by security services reinforces the lack of trust that these communities have
towards members of the security services.
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By receiving and reflecting on social feedback regarding past and current situations,
policing institutions can better work towards increasing legitimacy and public trust.
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ARGENTINA: TRAINING POLICE IN HUMAN RIGHTS – ADVANCES
AND SETBACKS. In 2011, the new National Ministry of Security established a
democratic security system that understood protests as part of socio-political
dynamics and not as an obstacle to democracy or public order. Towards that end,
Administrative resolution 199 of 2011 reformed the police educational system.
It established guidelines for a new training and professional intervention model
that incorporated a human rights and conflict management perspective in initial
training, continuous training, and higher education. The resolution establishes
that all training programs at all levels must be approved by the Ministry of
Security as a political authority. The training includes modules with a humanistic
profile taught by non-security professionals intended to counteract the traditional
training provided to police officers.
113

However, since 2016, there have been a number of setbacks. In the officers’
school “Juan Angel Pirker”, the training program was revised: the module on
“Constitutional Aspects and Human Rights” was shortened from a four-month
course to a one or two month seminar. There were also ten non-security sector
teachers who were dismissed without justification, raising the concern that the
institution was reverting to the more traditional and security-focused training
approach that fails to recognise the coercive dynamics inherent in policing.

In stop and search procedures, for example, officers often
approach persons of colour making demands and interrogating
the individual. Only when the person questions the officer’s
tactics will the officer respond that he or she had merely asked
a question. In general, stop and search procedures are a
common tactic used to harass different marginalised groups,
usually without any grounds for carrying out such a procedure.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Police deployment should consider the rights and different needs of members of the
communities they serve, including marginalised groups, and address them in the design
and implementation of policing operations.

»»

In the case of a lawful body search, the law enforcement officer in charge should be of
the same gender as the self-identified gender of the person being searched.

»»

States and policing institutions must take affirmative steps to recruit police officers who
are representative of the different social sectors and groups in the communities that
they serve. They should prioritise members of marginalised groups and those subject
to historical discrimination. Policing institutions should also aim to be more broadly
representative of community attributes such as race, gender, ethnic or social origin,
colour, age, disability, religion, belief, culture, language, education, geographic location,
economic and social status, and other relevant characteristics. This may include
enacting legislation or adopting policies allowing for the affirmative measures needed
to overcome established patterns of discrimination.

»»

Policing institutions must ensure equality and non-discrimination among their officers
and staff in assignments, duties, promotions and other benefits regardless of any of
the attributes listed above.

»»

Recruitment, hiring, and promotion criteria should be periodically reviewed to ensure
that barriers to entry and advancement for members of different social sectors and
marginalised groups are removed. Departments should take affirmative steps to ensure
diversity in leadership.

»»

Training on structural inequality and implicit bias should be comprehensive, ongoing,
and delivered by experts in the field.

»»

Policing and security institutions should approach community engagement with
an understanding of the coercive nature of policing and the social context of police
and community engagement. Communities should not be obligated or compelled to
engage with policing and security institutions in dialogue-building programs, and an
unwillingness to engage should never be a justification for non-service, escalation, or
violence by policing institutions.
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C. NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International law establishes that “[e]very person has the inalienable right to take part
in peaceful assemblies.”
114

•

Regimes that require authorisation from the state before assemblies or protests are in
violation of international law and the rights to protest. The right to assemble and speak
cannot be dependent on the permission of the state. As the OSCE has explained, “[i]n
an open society, many types of assembly do not warrant any form of official regulation.
Where notification systems are in place, prior notification may only be requested
where its purpose is to enable the state to put in place necessary arrangements to
facilitate freedom of assembly and to protect public order, public safety, and the rights
and freedoms of others. Any such legal provision should require the organizer of an
assembly to submit a notice of intent rather than a request for permission.”
115

•

Similarly, the ACHPR has stated that, “[r]ecognising the important expressive role that
spontaneous assembly can play in a democracy, law enforcement agencies must have
in place processes and procedures to ensure the facilitation of spontaneous assemblies,
including in relation to known or scheduled political or social events, commemorative
days, and in anticipation of decisions made by courts, parliaments and other state
authorities. Lack of prior notification of an assembly does not render an assembly
unlawful and should not form the sole basis of a decision by law enforcement officials
to disperse an assembly.”
116

GOOD PRACTICES
The right to assembly and speech imposes limits on the kinds of burdens and requirements
the government (including policing institutions) are permitted to place on those wishing to
exercise their fundamental rights. In fact, public protests “should be regarded as equally
legitimate uses of public space as the more routine purposes for which public space is used
(such as commercial activity or for pedestrian and vehicular traffic.)” International law
prohibits systems that require official authorisation and limit the ways in which notification
systems can operate.
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While failure to notify authorities of a protest does not render a protest illegal or authorise
its dispersion, many states still choose to have prior notification systems. Importantly, “the
purpose of prior notification should be to afford authorities the opportunity to facilitate the
exercise of the right as well as to take measures to protect public safety and the rights of
others . . . [and] a notification procedure should be subject to a proportionality assessment,
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free of charge, and widely accessible.” Nevertheless, contrary to international standards,
notification is used, in some circumstances, to place excessive restrictions on the exercise
of the rights to protest.
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Practice 8: Protect and promote the rights of protesters in the absence of notification
Prior notification systems must reflect a “presumption in favour of assemblies” and
must not be used as an authorisation system. There are assemblies that are inherently
unable to participate in notification systems due to their nature. These assemblies include
spontaneous assemblies or “flash mobs” and those that are organised as a way to resist
an action by the state, or even address the police itself. Regardless of the nature of the
protest, protesters who have notified authorities and those who have not should be equally
protected and the rights to protest should be equally promoted.
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There are a number of legitimate reasons why assembly organisers may not want to
participate in a notification system or otherwise engage with state representatives prior
to a protest. This might especially be the case when protests are targeting the police or
other state agencies. Organisers have expressed concerns that permission requirements
and pre-event communications have been used by authorities in their jurisdictions as a
way to impose unjustifiable limitations on the rights to protest. In addition, it is important
to note that notification systems work best in cultures, or in those circumstances where a
high level of organisation on part of protest movements is the norm. In political cultures
or circumstances where protest is predominantly spontaneous or reactive, notification
systems may not be very useful.
The lack of notification or co-operation with pre-event discussions cannot be used as an
excuse to label an assembly “illegitimate” or “unlawful”. Failure to submit prior notification
does not justify limiting the rights to protest or legitimise the use of force. For example,
Colombia has a National Police Code (which has recently been declared unconstitutional
but remains in effect until 19 June 2019) which requires that prior notification is submitted
and signed by at least three people. This is an example of an overly restrictive regime, not
only because it compels notification but because of the requirement that three individuals
sign and provide their personal information to the state in order to exercise their rights to
protest. The Colombian Congress is set to pass a new law to regulate the right to protest
and the Constitutional Court has affirmed that the State cannot deny or prevent a meeting,
demonstration or protest for failure to meet the regulations, but must take alternative
measures to ensure compliance.
121

THE AFRICAN POLICING CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT FORUM & THE DANISH CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DOMESTIC ADHERENCE TO
CONTINENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN THE PRACTICE OF POLICING ASSEMBLIES IN AFRICA 8, (2017).

118

119

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 28.

120

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL DUTCH SECTION, POLICING ASSEMBLIES 15 (2014).

121

CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, supra note 45, at 12.

45

COLOMBIA: THE NEW PROTEST LAW AND THE CRIMINALISATION OF
SPONTANEOUS PROTEST. Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the
unconstitutionality of the National Police Code, the Court established parameters
for the Congress in regulating the right to protest. One parameter was related to
the duty of notification and its consequences. In general, the Court stated that
there can be no consequences for failure to comply with notification requirements.
However, where protesters block a road or street without notification they may
be subject to criminal conviction, fines, and terms of imprisonment pursuant to
Colombia’s Criminal Code. Such punitive sanctions violate the rights to protest,
particularly the ability to hold spontaneous assemblies.
In addition, requiring prior notification in order for an assembly to be considered as
“legitimate” further disenfranchises already marginalised groups. For example, Corey
Stoughton of Liberty observed that protests by members of marginalised and underresourced communities may be more spontaneous and less likely to engage in prior
notification or permit systems. As she explained, certain communities “don’t have
information about those processes and even if they do they don’t have the level of trust that’s
required to believe that those processes will work for them and be worth the investment of
time it takes to engage in [them].” Clear information on whether notification systems are
in place and, if so, how they work may assist in facilitating relationships of trust between
policing institutions and communities.
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Requiring prior notification for assemblies can also contribute to an escalating policing
presence based on the assumption that a protest is “unauthorized”. For example, in
Chile, the notification system functions as an authorisation system that also imposes
many stipulations, including approved routes and speakers. Any deviation from these
stipulations is seen as a reason for police to respond to the entire protest with whatever
force they deem necessary. Once the policing institution intervenes to compel compliance
with the technical terms of the agreement or authorisation, the stage is set for escalation
in tensions and tactics.
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Mass and arbitrary arrests during an event violate fundamental
rights and are likely to escalate tensions and undermine public
trust in police.
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KENYA: BANNING PROTESTS IN THE LEAD UP TO PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS. The Minister for Interior purported to ban protests in the cities of
Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu in the lead-up to Kenya’s Presidential elections of
26 October 2017. The Supreme Court had annulled the results of the election that
took place on 8 August 2017 and three weeks of protests followed leading up to
the imposition of the ban.
The ban was an attempt by the Cabinet Secretary to translate the notification
requirement under Section 5 of the Public Order Act into a requirement of
authorisation. Section 5(4) only permits the police to prohibit a public meeting or
procession if there is already an existent notice for a rival meeting at the same time
and venue. In the alternative, it was an over-reach in the interpretation of Section
5(8)(b) of “clear, present or imminent danger of a breach of the peace or public
order” in a manner that displayed political bias, particularly because supporters
of the President who mounted protests against the Judiciary for annulling the
August election did not face a similar ban.
The cabinet secretary suggested that the protection of public property was
paramount to the decision to ban the protests and even proposed that the Chief
Operating Officer of the National Super Alliance (NASA, the Opposition Coalition)
be charged with destruction of property for the damage caused in past protests.
ARGENTINA: PREVENTIVE DIALOGUE IN “NI UNA MENOS”. A pre-event
dialogue between organisers and officials in advance of a march on Women’s Day
helped to promote and facilitate the event. After several episodes of repression
and criminalisation following a demonstration for women rights in the city of
Buenos Aires on 3 June 2017, the organisers (movement “Ni una Menos”) arranged
a series of meetings with political authorities in order to establish an agreement
on the presence and duties of policing institutions during the march planned for
8 March, Women’s Day. Other state agencies were involved in the meetings and
were present during the march to oversee police activity. The protest proceeded
peacefully without the active intervention of the police.
Practice 9: Ensure that where notification systems are in place, they are simple, quick,
widely accessible, free, and do not have a chilling effect on the rights to protest
Where notification systems are used, they should be quick, efficient, and easy to access
and use. This helps ensure that notification systems do not become a barrier to the free
exercise of the right to assemble. Notification should be allowed in multiple urban and
rural locations, have concise forms in multiple languages, and allow multiple options for
submissions. Some jurisdictions, for example, take submissions through the internet and
social media. While the feasibility of such a system will depend on the wider infrastructure
and resources available to the population, any mechanism that makes the process more
126

127

128

126

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 28.

127

GENEVA ACAD. OF INT’L. LAW AND HUM. RTS., supra note 124.

128

Id.

47

accessible is a welcome development. Furthermore, the process must be free as individuals
cannot be required to pay to engage in the exercise of their rights. Many complaints
regarding the permitting systems in England pertain to police asking organisers to pay fees
or insurance charges, creating a chilling effect for people seeking to exercise their rights.
This is impermissible under both international and English law.
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It is not necessary for the police to administer a notification system; the system should
ideally be managed by civil authorities. The state may need to provide additional services,
free of charge, including traffic officers and emergency assistance not under the authority
of policing institutions (such as paramedics or fire assistance), and entrust a separate
civilian authority to facilitate their provision. If the notification system is administered by
a policing institution, then the police bear the duty to inform emergency services and ask
them to be present.
A notification should only need to include the date, estimated time, and location of the
assembly. Where appropriate, the organiser’s contact information may be required
(though not mandatory) to facilitate engagement and communication prior to and during
the event. A response from authorities should not be required for the assembly to proceed
as planned. If restrictions are placed on an event with respect to location, route, time,
place, or target, there must be an urgent appeal process in place for independent review
and oversight. For example, in Hungary, in case of a ban imposed by the police upon
notification, the organiser may challenge that restriction before the court. The court’s
decision, with no appeal, is required in three calendar days.

INDIA: “PERMITTING, NOT NOTIFYING”. On paper, a no-objection certificate
from the relevant state police institution is required to organise a protest. However,
these certificates are often denied. As a result, in practice, the notification system
operates as an authorisation system. Further, the system is primarily used for
surveilling, tracking, and targeting protesters and groups such as unions.
EGYPT: PERMISSION DISGUISED AS NOTIFICATION. In Egypt, under the
protest and assemblies law passed in 2013, organisers are required to submit a
paper notification to their nearest police precinct. In the vast majority of the cases,
the protest permission is “denied” by the police citing national security concerns.
Despite the wording of the law only referring to a notification requirement, the
police regularly use the language of authorisation and permission – even in
media statements.
ISRAEL: PAYING USD25 THOUSAND TO PROTEST. In a recent protest against
the Israeli government’s intention to deport thousands of African refugees to
Rwanda, the protest organisers – a group of students and social activists – were
compelled to pay 100 thousand NIS (equivalent to USD25 thousand) for security
expenses to exercise their rights to protest.
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Interview with Corey Stoughton, Advocacy Director, Liberty, in London, Eng. (Dec. 13, 2017).
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ARGENTINA: “LACK OF PERMISSION”
AS AN EXCUSE TO SUPPRESS AN
“ITINERANT SCHOOL”. Following
aggressive political rhetoric towards
teachers’ unions, teachers decided
to erect an “itinerant school” in front
of Argentina’s National Congress:
an installation that would not block
entrance or egress nor transit, and which
would be used for various educational
and artistic activities.
During the night of 9 April 2017, while a
group of teachers were preparing to set
up the structure for the school, both the
Federal and City of Buenos Aires police
deployed law enforcement officials.
Using pepper spray and batons, the
law enforcement officials injured at
least two people. Two others were
arrested and charged with assault and
resisting arrest.

ALEJANDRO PAGNI /GETTY IMAGES

Officials justified the operation by
alleging that the protesters had failed
to get permission. In this case, an
administrative procedure was used to
limit the exercise of a constitutional
right, resulting in the violation of the
right to protest and the repression and
persecution of these teachers.

UNITED KINGDOM: PAYING TO PROTEST. Some policing institutions in the
United Kingdom have sought to treat organised protests in the same way they
would other privately organised events, such as festivals or sporting events. This
places the responsibility on the protest organisers to apply and pay for traffic
management orders and to provide for security at their event, creating a chilling
effect on the rights to protest. This security can either be privately arranged or
provided by the police at a cost to the organisers.
Under the Public Order Act 1986, protest organisers are required to notify the police
in advance of marches, and the police can impose conditions which, if not complied
with, can result in criminal charges. Police have used notification by protesters as
an opportunity to make marches unavoidably unlawful if traffic management plans
and security are not put in place by protesters, at their own cost.
In 2015, Liberty assisted a campaign pressure group working on climate
change. The Metropolitan Police demanded that they organise their own traffic
management and policing for a march through London. After publicity and the
threat of litigation, the police backed down, but other policing institutions have
continued to argue that they have no obligation to facilitate protest. This approach
is contrary to international law and standards in that it requires payment for the
exercise of a fundamental right.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Notification systems should not serve as a precondition to protest and assembly and
should not be used as authorisation systems.

»»

If a notification system is in place, it should be used to facilitate dialogue and to help
plan for better policing.

»»

The authorities in charge of receiving notifications should ideally not be
policing institutions.

»»

If there is a notification system in place, the process should not be onerous or
bureaucratic, and the mechanisms should be simple, quick, widely accessible, and
free. Mechanisms should be easily accessible either online or in person at multiple
urban and rural locations.
131

132

»»

Organisers should not be required to notify authorities for extended periods in advance
before an event, and the state cannot prohibit spontaneous protests or disperse
them due to a lack of notification. The lack of notification or co-operation in pre-event
meetings cannot be used as an excuse to label an assembly as “illegal” or “illegitimate”
and is not a valid argument to disperse or criminalise protesters.

»»

The failure to notify does not enable the dispersion of a protest or the criminalisation
of protesters, which may result in fines or imprisonment. In the case of spontaneous
protests, a decision to disband the protest because of the absence of prior notification
amounts to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of assembly.
133

134

»»

If there are restrictions placed on an event, the restrictions must be reasonable and not
overly burdensome, they must not prevent protesters from effectively exercising their
rights to protest, and they must not be selectively enforced or otherwise applied in a
discriminatory manner. Urgent internal and external appeal processes must be in place
to guarantee independent review of the legality of any restrictions imposed.

»»

The names and private, identifying information of organisers should not be required
by notification systems. Information gathered through the notification process must
only be aimed at helping policing institutions prepare and organise the public space to
facilitate and protect the event.
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OSCE Guidelines, supra note 26, at p.18. As stated by the OSCE: “Where legislation requires advance notification, the law should
explicitly provide for an exception from the requirement where giving advance notice is impracticable. Such an exception would only
apply in circumstances where the legally established deadline cannot be met. The authorities should always protect and facilitate any
spontaneous assembly so long as it is peaceful in nature.”
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D. POLICE TRAINING
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International legal standards require that states ensure members of policing institutions
have the “training and instructions necessary to engage in the context of assemblies
wherever possible without recourse to any use of force.” Law enforcement training
“should include pre- and in-service instruction in both classroom and scenariobased settings.”
135
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•

Members of policing institutions must have the professional skills for handling
assemblies. This applies to both those in charge of planning (how best to engage in the
context of an assembly, establish a dialogue with organisers, prevent problems from
occurring, anticipate risks and avoid or prepare for them, etc.), and officials policing the
event (how to communicate with participants to reduce tension, negotiate, peacefully
settle conflicts, and assist people in need, etc.).
137

•

All law enforcement officials must receive ongoing and continuous training on policing
assemblies, with advanced training being made available to any unit specifically tasked
with policing assemblies.
138

•

The IACHR has stated that members of security institutions must have clearly defined
rules governing conduct; training; the use of equipment, communication devices, and
vehicles; and personal defence and non-lethal deterrence to better equip them to
perform their tasks without infringing upon other human rights.
139

•

Law enforcement officials should be trained to differentiate between individual and
group behaviour, and to identify and remove specific persons acting in an unlawful or
violent manner while continuing to facilitate the enjoyment of the right to assemble
freely with others for all other persons.
140

GOOD PRACTICES
Comprehensive, ongoing, and effective training is a key part of responsible protection and
promotion of the rights to protest. Policing institutions have a duty to ensure that officers
who are acting in the community as agents are supplied not only with adequate equipment
and knowledge of security tactics but with the proper skills to protect and promote the
rights of the members of the community in which they serve.
Officers must receive instruction and training on how to implement their duties in an
appropriate and proportional manner. Training should prioritise de-escalation and conflict
135

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 67(a).
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Amnesty International, Use of Force – Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms
by law enforcement officials at page 151. The ACHPR Guidelines state, at para 21.3.4, that law enforcement officials must receive
training on the lawful, proportionate, and necessary use of force and on alternatives to the use of force, such as understanding crowd
behaviour and techniques in crowd facilitation and management, de escalation, a graduated response to tension or violence, and on
first aid.
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resolution. Scenario and skill-based training will better prepare officers and commanders
and reduce the likelihood that they are taken by surprise and misjudge a situation.
Practice 10: Ensure that all personnel involved in protests receive comprehensive,
effective, and ongoing training on human rights-compliant principles and practices
A common theme that emerged during interviews with experts and police officials in multiple
jurisdictions across the globe was that officers at all levels need more effective and targeted
training in order to effectively facilitate assemblies. Commanders, experts, academics, and
civil society members all agreed that providing more comprehensive training would vastly
improve human rights-compliant policing. Training must be thorough, effective, and
ongoing to ensure officers emerge from programs with the necessary skills.
141

Oftentimes the only training officers receive, if any, is worst-case scenario training – and
even this is frequently inadequate for handling the events these tactics anticipate. As Igor
Burmistrov, a police officer and Russian policing expert, explained in relation to Russian
policing institutions: “all training is reduced to the use of force, firing and pounding.” When
officers are only trained for a worst-case scenario, instead of on how to best protect and
promote an assembly, this can lead to a defensive-aggressive approach to assemblies.
This training predisposes officers to regularly intervene and increases the chance that
disproportionate and excessive force will be used during assemblies.
142
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144
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Training also tends to be infrequent, limited to a once a year course of a few hours, involving
a few drills on how to put on crowd-control equipment or how to extract someone from
a crowd. These sessions tend to take place only during basic training or sporadically
throughout an officer’s career. In the end, officers are left with a limited skill set; not
trained on how to accurately evaluate a situation and unprepared to de-escalate tense
and difficult situations.
Good practice dictates that officers are effectively instructed and trained on the effective
protection and promotion of an assembly. In fact, police directors generally agree training
is paramount. In the words of Igor Burmistov, “at the heart of everything is training. It
is all about learning, learning and learning.” Effective training in the overall facilitation
of a protest includes the use of: appropriate tactics to ensure protection of human
rights, equipment that protects protesters in the least invasive manner, restrained and
proportional engagement, and a non-discriminatory approach towards individuals and
marginalised communities.
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See Interview with Sir Denis O’Connor, Affiliated Lecturer, Cambridge University Institute of Criminology, in London, Eng. (Dec. 14,
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One challenge noted by proponents is that training requires significant investments of both
time and money. Some jurisdictions, confronted with limited resources, have tackled this
issue by creating specialised “public order squads”, although the limitation of resources is
not the only motivation for the creation of specialised teams. In South Africa and England,
these squads are highly trained and have the ability to be sent to different departments
around the country as the need arises. While many commanders and policing experts view
the creation of these squads as a positive development, their ability to promote and protect
the rights to protest depends on what their training emphasises and how much training is
focused on engagement, and de-escalation and non-escalation tactics. Specialised public
order squads can develop into militarised units if their training is a more specialised form of
“worst-case scenario” training. If the specialised units resemble dialogue police (discussed
more in Practice 16 below), with an emphasis on communication and de-escalation, then
focusing training on specialised units can better protect and promote the rights to protest.
Practice 11: Mandate that training focuses on protecting and promoting the rights
to protest
The initial training of members of policing institutions contributes to the foundation
for officers’ subsequent practice, and conditions the skills new recruits carry with them
from the academy to practice. To acculturate officers to their critical role in protecting
and promoting the rights to protest, training should emphasise human rights principles
and provide practical real-world examples of human rights-compliant strategies. Training
should veer away from themes of crowd-control, restraint and punishment, and “military
swagger”. To the extent possible, training materials should be made publicly available.
147

Chief Superintendent Owen West of the West Yorkshire Police Department in the United
Kingdom observed the impact that “public order” training can have on officers. He noted
that trainers often over-emphasise weapons, tasers, and pepper spray, which then impacts
the mentality officers adopt in the context of a protest. In other words, what is taught
in training and what is emphasised matters in how officers then approach the event.
Consequently, new recruits should be taught non-violent forms of intervention that include
non-escalation and effective de-escalation techniques – only using force as a last resort in
exceptional situations – with the goal of protecting and promoting the rights to protest and
the physical integrity of participants and bystanders. Different experts raised the need to
incorporate expertise from sources beyond the security sector to ensure training methods
are informed by the best available information and expertise (e.g. evidence-based social
science in the field of “protest policing” and studies on the dynamics of protest from the
field of crowd psychology).
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Some policing institutions have made human rights case law part of their training as a way
of bringing real-world scenarios into the classroom. The Police Service of Northern Ireland
explicitly incorporated human rights law and principles. Officers are taught the principles
of necessity and proportionality through discussion and case studies, which are often
pulled from European Court of Human Rights case law. Emphasis is placed on changing
147
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the scenarios regularly so the exercise does not become rote, and the scenarios are used
to translate principles into operational standards.
151

According to Sir Denis O’Connor, former Chief Inspector of Constabulary and former police
commander, who oversaw police reform during a period of austerity, implementing
training of this kind requires an initial investment. It requires investing in a new paradigm
in which emphasis is placed on prevention, precaution and more dynamic skills of
engagement and facilitation. In the end, the resulting culture of human rights protection
and promotion will produce long-term benefits.
152

ARGENTINA: PROGRAM ON THE REASONABLE USE OF FORCE AND
FIREARMS. In 2012, the National Ministry of Security created the Program on the
Reasonable Use of Force and Firearms, as part of the professionalisation and
modernisation of policing policies.
153

One of the key aims of the Program was to promote the welfare of police officers
by providing better training on reducing the use of force. To this end, officers were
evaluated on their performance in the use of force and firearms. New policies
and practices in compliance with international standards, as well as new training
courses, were implemented to create a system of supervision and oversight to
ensure effective implementation.
In 2018, following an executive decree and an Administrative Decision, the Program
was discontinued. While some of its functions are retained in other programmes,
this repeal is a setback for protection of the rights to protest. The Ministry has lost
an important mechanism for monitoring police performance.

Practice 12: Require that training emphasises non-violent forms of intervention,
including non-escalation and effective de-escalation techniques
Good practice requires that training emphasises non-violent forms of intervention and “de
escalation tactics based on communication, negotiation and engagement.” Numerous
jurisdictions have prioritised de-escalation through the training of specialised dialogue
officials – police or not – who are deployed during assemblies, the first level of engagement
with a crowd (discussed in more detail in Practice 16). The skills taught to and used by
dialogue officials can be seen by some as at odds with traditional police practices. For
example, police commanders in England (where policing institutions use dialogue officials
to promote communication) reported hostility between policing units and dialogue officials.
Policing units – trained in the use of crowd-control weapons and equipment and focused
on the use of force – referred to dialogue officials as ‘not real police’ because they were
154
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there to talk with protesters and not empowered to use force or to make arrests. This
mentality begins in training and might be addressed through institution-wide training that
emphasises the facilitative role that officers should play during an assembly.
Finally, some police monitoring groups in the UK have raised concerns that dialogue officials
fulfil a dual or secondary function of intelligence gathering. Deploying dialogue officers
to carry out intelligence-gathering undermines the primary purpose of their deployment
as it weakens the trust between protesters and dialogue officers, and influences public
perceptions of their legitimacy.
155

Some policing institutions have made human rights case
law part of their training as a way of bringing real-world
scenarios into the classroom.

UNITED KINGDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING. After a number of highprofile and poorly managed protests in 2009, the United Kingdom decided
to change its police training to address some of the deficiencies that led to
mismanagement. Over the next two years, trainers (including a human rights
lawyer and experts in assembly policing) travelled around the country to conduct
comprehensive training at different departments. The philosophy taught became
“policing by consent” with the goal of facilitating the right of free speech. Special
focus was placed on the legal requirements of facilitation. Given the fact that the
primary role of policing institutions and officers is to enforce the law, emphasising
the obligation to facilitate as a legal obligation proved most effective. Highlighting
that every assembly must be considered lawful was key.
156

The training focused on silver commanders, the mid-level supervisors, who were
the ones controlling the action on the ground. This way the decision-making officers
were the ones who best understood the role of police in assembly management.
When the commanders on the ground give orders that comply with human rights
standards, compliance trickles down to the officers carrying out those orders.
Overall, this change in training was seen to have a positive impact on the approach
taken by police managing assemblies, resulting in a facilitative approach.
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Good practice requires that training emphasises non-violent
forms of intervention and “de escalation tactics based on
communication, negotiation and engagement.” 154

RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Training should prepare officers to exercise good judgment and engage in balanced
decision-making aimed at protecting and promoting the rights to protest.

»»

The protection and promotion of the rights to protest must be part of basic training and
academy training and should include real-life scenarios and exercises that rely on past
cases to identify both poor decision-making and unlawful conduct.

»»

Training programmes should be periodically reviewed by teams comprised of
independent persons from different disciplines, including human rights, law, sociology,
and psychology.

»»

Training and instruction need to be implemented in a manner that develops skills
early in an officer’s career and continues regularly to ensure their maintenance and
development. Skills should include an approach towards human rights protection and
facilitation.

»»

Non-discrimination and equality principles should be incorporated into officer training
and supervision, and officers should receive comprehensive and ongoing instruction
and training on structural inequality and implicit bias.

»»

Policing units trained specially for deployment in protest contexts must be trained on
communication, dialogue and engagement, the principles that guide the graduated use
of force, and the protection of life and bodily integrity.

»»

Special emphasis should be placed on training operational-level commanders on
human rights standards and the reasonable use of force.

»»

For a full set of recommendations on training on the use of crowd-control weapons/
equipment in the context of protests, see pages 92-93 of Lethal in Disguise: The Health
Consequences of Crowd-Control Weapons (2016).

»»

Performance evaluations of police officials should be based on skills and principles
taught during assembly policing training and reflect human rights principles.
56

3

TACTICS AND THE
USE OF FORCE

Policing institutions must be cognisant of the
effect that their presence, presentation, and
tactics have on the dynamics of a protest and
crowd behaviour.

57

OVERVIEW
This section analyses tactics used by states and their policing institutions in the context of
protests, including: non-violent forms of intervention, de-escalation and non-escalation
techniques, genuine engagement and recourse to specially-trained dialogue officials, the
reasonable and graduated use of force, data tracking and monitoring, and the protection
of the privacy rights of protesters.

A. DE-ESCALATION AND NON-ESCALATION
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

States and policing institutions are obligated by international law to “facilitate the
exercise of the right to peaceful assembly.” To that end, tactics used by police should
emphasise non-violent intervention, non-escalation and de-escalation, and promote
communication and engagement. Communication involves genuine dialogue and also
nonverbal presentation. This includes the appearance of officers, “the presence or use
of certain [crowd-control] equipment and the body language of officials”, and other
elements that “may be perceived by organizers and participants as intimidation.”
157

158

159

160

•

The physical appearance of the police during the assembly should not contribute to
creating or increasing existing tensions. The IACHR has stated that it is imperative for
law enforcement officials to identify themselves as such and carry visible badges that
show their name or identification number, with the goal of avoiding confusion and
insecurity. At the same time, the ACHPR has stated that in the deployment of officials
to an assembly, law enforcement agencies must take into account the potential adverse
influence that the visible appearance of law enforcement officials, deployment tactics,
and equipping of officials at an assembly can have on the way in which an assembly
develops.
161

162

163

•

Operational commanders must give priority to de-escalation tactics that favour the
presumption of the right to assemble freely with others – such as open communication,
negotiation and dialogue with assembly organisers and participants.
164

•

The ACHPR has stated that the dispersal of assemblies should be a measure of last
resort and law enforcement officials must act on the presumption that, although they
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have the power to intervene in an assembly, they should only do so in circumstances in
which it is legal, necessary, proportionate, and non-discriminatory to do so.
165

•

States must also take measures to create a protest environment that is the least likely to
lead to escalation. The IACHR has stated that the competent institutions of the state have
a duty to design operating plans and procedures to facilitate the exercise of the right
of assembly. This includes everything required for the activities in the assembly to take
place, such as rerouting pedestrian and vehicular traffic in a certain area and escorting
those participating in the gathering or demonstration to guarantee their safety.
166

GOOD PRACTICES
Assemblies are fundamentally about group interactions. How these groups, the assembled
and police officials, interact shapes the outcome of the event. In order to protect and
promote the rights to protest, policing in the context of protests does not merely mean
observing and reacting to protesters. Policing institutions must be cognisant of the effect
that their presence, presentation, and tactics have on the dynamics of a protest and
crowd behaviour. When police are seen to be threatening, aggressive, or indiscriminate
in their tactics, their very presence may be intimidating and can become a trigger for
increased tensions. On the other hand, good facilitation tactics, gear, police presence,
presentation, and conduct can support building public trust and promoting non-escalation
or de-escalation. Effective communication is key as it minimises unexpected situations and
allows protesters to scrutinise and understand police reasoning and use of tactics. The
use of dialogue officials, regulating the visibility of police and crowd-control equipment
and weapons, and avoiding the unnecessary use of force are all practices that have been
successfully used around the world. However, the need to regulate police visibility in the
context of protests is not a green-light for indiscriminate undercover policing – this would
further undermine trust between policing institutions and protesters and raise concerns
about privacy and freedom of expression.
167
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Practice 13: Regulate police presence and visibility in the context of protests, subject
to the obligation to protect the rights of protesters
The very presence of police at an event has an impact on protesters. This impact depends on
a variety of factors that shape how police presence is understood – including presentation,
approach, numbers, and past events involving the police. Organisers and activists
interviewed for this report, especially those representing traditionally discriminated against
communities or groups, spoke about the unsettling and intimidating experience that an

ACHPR Guidelines, supra note 36, at ¶ 22.1. Further, at para 22.5, it states: “The authority to issue an order for dispersal should be
limited to operational commanders who are present at the operation or to well-informed officers on the ground. Such orders should
only be given in situations where there is a serious, widespread and imminent threat to the safety of persons, of substantial damage
to property, or to the rights and freedoms of others, providing that all reasonable attempts have been made to minimise the harm.”
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overwhelming police presence has on festivals or demonstrations (even when organisers
indicated there were no real threats to life or property).
169

When there is no threat of violence, visibly disproportionate police presence is likely to
have an escalating or provocative effect, or a chilling effect on expressing opinions and
participating freely. Police planning for such events should take into account how police
presence is understood, and whether the same aims of protecting and promoting the rights
to protest could be achieved through greater reliance on dialogue officials and emergency
services (e.g. paramedics or fire services). Additionally, when police are present in large
groups, regulating their presence around protesters might help avoid direct contact and
intimidation that may have an escalating effect. This regulation should also take into
account that in certain circumstances a visible police presence is necessary to protect the
rights of protesters, particularly in instances where there are aggressive or antagonistic
counter-protesters.
170

Practice 14: Direct that members of policing institutions attend events in regular
police uniforms, limiting the visibility of weapons and equipment
The appearance of members of policing institutions impacts how a crowd perceives the
police and therefore the way crowds might react to police behaviour and presence. An
unjustifiably threatening or intimidating presentation, especially the display of crowdcontrol equipment and weapons, is likely to escalate tensions. Open and unthreatening
appearances may ease tensions and assist with facilitation and engagement.
171
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According to the research of Professor Clifford Stott, a leading expert in the field of
crowd psychology, collective actions within crowds can be characterised as reactions
to the perceived illegitimacy of law enforcement actions. The display of crowd-control
equipment and weapons merely as a deterrence can be viewed by crowd participants as
an act of unjustified and indiscriminate provocation on the part of the police. This creates
a situation where the crowd unites in opposition to the police and amplifies distrust and
tension. This idea is reinforced by the fact that across the spectrum of stakeholders in
the protection and promotion of the rights to protest, most of the interviewees for this
report agreed that officer presence in crowd-control equipment should be used sparingly
– if at all. One common solution to address this dilemma is to lead with officers skilled in
dialogue and have the outfitted officers, or just the equipment, nearby (but out of sight)
so that they are easily deployable but not perceived as a threatening presence. This tactic
was used successfully in the 2004 European Football Championships in Portugal and the
approach underpins crowd policing in the UK, Sweden and Denmark.
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Beyond crowd-control equipment, police behaviour – particularly how they approach and
talk to protesters – carries a message to the community. Former Vancouver Deputy Police
Chief LePard made a conscious effort to use a “‘meet and greet’ strategy”. “Instead of using
Interview with Imani Robinson, Activist and Organizer, Black Lives Matter, in London Eng. (Dec. 15, 2017); Interview with Dr. Adam
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[crowd-control] officers in Darth Vader outfits, we aim to be totally engaged with the crowd.
We were out there high-fiving, shaking hands, asking people how they’re doing, and telling
the crowd that ‘We are here to keep you safe’.”
175

Communicating the intent to promote and protect a protesters rights to protest through
words and body language is part of effective presentation with the goal of de-escalation.
During the 2010 Winter Olympics the Vancouver police department kept officers out of
crowd-control equipment and gave clear instructions not to engage with force, even if
provoked by a small number of individuals. At one of the first events during the Olympic
Games, when some individuals behaved provocatively by throwing rocks and sticks and
spitting at officers who were in regular uniforms, officers obeyed the command not to
respond. Police did not use force and no protesters were arrested or injured. The police
were seen to be reasonable, restrained, and after that night, in the words of Deputy Chief
LePard: “the crowds were totally with us.”
176

Practice 15: Prohibit the use of indiscriminate tactics and strategies
Certain tactics and strategies that policing institutions regularly rely upon to establish or
regain control do not allow officers to differentiate between individuals who present a real
threat to others. This is, in itself, contrary to individual and collective rights as it involves
treating a protest as one homogenous group – often enabling its dispersion.
In addition to being contrary to international standards on the use of force, research into
police conduct and crowd behaviour has proven indiscriminate tactics to be ineffective
and shown that “undifferentiated police intervention can instigate unification of crowd
members against them.” When police contain entire groups of protesters, carry out mass
arrests, discharge water cannons or tear gas, mobilise mounted police, or release dogs,
then all participants become a target. These actions do not consider the rights of children,
older people, or others with specific needs. By relying on indiscriminate tactics policing
institutions act irrationally and disproportionately, losing legitimacy and public trust.
177

EGYPT: THE “PILOT” GAME AND THE BARBED-WIRE TUNNEL. On 8 February
2015, on the occasion of the first football game since 2013 where fans were allowed
back into stadia after a two-year suspension, restrictive interim regulations were
placed on the number of supporters allowed to attend the “pilot” game. The game
was scheduled to take place in a small stadium with only 10,000 tickets for sale.
The policing institution introduced a highly problematic “technique”: a barb-wire
tunnel that was used as the entrance between the outside gates of the stadium
and the grounds, to ensure that only ticketed fans entered. The barb-wired tunnel,
or cage as some witnesses called it, was demeaning and suffocating and people
started climbing out of the overcrowded tunnel. The police officials fired tear gas
canisters into the tunnel, resulting in a stampede and the death of 20 football fans.
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INDIA: USE OF PELLET GUNS IN KASHMIR. The indiscriminate nature of pellet
guns (or bird shot) has and continues to result in serious injuries to participants
and bystanders, including children and teenagers. The use of this weapon has
blinded more than a 1000 people in protest contexts in India. Pellet guns were
first introduced after the “summer unrest of 2010” where protests erupted
due to human rights abuses by the Indian Army in Kashmir and in which 117
unarmed people, mostly youths, were killed by members of policing and security
institutions. The Union Home Ministry then established a high-level committee
that recommended the use of pellet guns as a mode of crowd-control in Kashmir.
On 12 July 2016, 15-year-old Insha Mushtaq was hit by a hail of over 100 pellets
while observing a protest from her family’s balcony. She permanently lost her
vision. This is not an isolated incident as many other boys and girls have been
victim to the indiscriminate use of this crowd-control weapon. Insha has become
a symbol of the misuse of crowd-control weapons in Kashmir by Indian policing
and security institutions.
Containment, in its various guises, is a particularly problematic tactic. The tactic involves
a cordon of police officers, often in crowd-control equipment, surrounding a group
of protesters to restrict or prevent their movement. If it is used, it should be limited to
circumstances where separating crowds is necessary for preventing an imminent risk of
harm to others – and there must always be a route open for participants to exit. However,
when the tactic is used inappropriately it infringes peoples’ right to liberty and security of
person. Many of the criticisms of containment stem from the excessive use of the tactic
against protesters; the practice of holding protesters for extended periods of time without
access to restrooms, food, or medication; and the common practice of arresting contained
protesters en masse.
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RUSSIA: BOLOTNAYA SQUARE.
In 2012 during a mass protest
of over fifty thousand people in
Bolotnaya Square, Moscow, 12,759
police officers were deployed. Police
carried out mass arrests and used
violent tactics during the event.
Several protesters were criminally
charged and more than thirty people
were convicted – many of whom
were imprisoned. The criminal cases
are still ongoing.
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UNITED STATES: THE INAUGURATION
DAY PROTESTS. During the 20 January
2017 Inauguration Day protests police
indiscriminately arrested 230 protesters,
including bystanders. Officers contained
more than 200 protesters, many of
whom had broken no laws, trapping
them without giving an order to disperse
and detaining them for several hours
before formally arresting them. Police
officers also deployed tear gas, pellet
guns, concussion grenades, flash-bang
grenades, and smoke flares, and they
indiscriminately fired pepper spray in
thirty-foot plumes. The ACLU of the District
of Columbia sued the Metropolitan
Police Department, alleging that officers
used excessive force; arrested innocent
people; detained them for up to sixteen
hours without access to food, water, and
bathroom facilities; and subjected some
detainees to body cavity searches.

Mass and arbitrary arrests during an event violate fundamental rights and are likely to
escalate tensions and undermine public trust in police. When entire groups are arrested,
there rarely is a legitimate justification. Mass arrests send a message that everyone is
suspect because of their group membership or their presence at an event. This can have a
chilling effect on people exercising their rights. Predictably, this message sets the stage for
escalation in tensions and tactics and may quickly lead to violence.

Research into police conduct and crowd behaviour has
proven indiscriminate tactics to be ineffective and shown that
“undifferentiated police intervention can instigate unification of
crowd members against them.”

63

ARGENTINA: ARRESTS ON WOMEN’S DAY. On 8 March 2017 during the
Women’s Day march, police beat protesters indiscriminately and deployed
hydrant trucks and pepper spray. The police claimed the tactics were justified to
bring an end to a small fire that had been set by a number of individuals in front
of the cathedral in the City of Buenos Aires. Police arrested twenty demonstrators,
mainly women, who (according to subsequent criminal investigations) were not
involved in the incidents. The detainees were mistreated under police control;
prohibited from communicating with friends, family or attorneys; and subjected
to degrading body cavity searches.
A pre-event plan on graduated use of tactics is key for effective decision-making. Planning
for an event must include identifying the negative impact of indiscriminate strategies.
Containment strategies should not be used before protesters are notified and given the
opportunity to move or disperse (or before other targeted interventions are attempted).
Numerous investigations of protests that resulted in serious injuries or deaths at the
hands of police fault members of policing institutions for failing to take opportunities to
de-escalate the situation. Examples of this can be seen in the Marikana Massacre in South
Africa and in the Mark Duggan protests in England. In both cases, investigators noted
repeated missed opportunities for de-escalation that might have prevented the tragedies
that followed. In the above-mentioned case in Buenos Aires the judicial investigation
revealed that the police needed, but were not equipped with, megaphones to communicate
with protesters before resorting to the use of force (water cannons, pepper spray, and
mass arrests). The police also ran out of fire extinguishers to manage the small fires set up
by a group of protesters.
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Another factor that can influence the escalation of force is when the police officials are
deployed without sufficient rest. This was discussed during the trial for a double homicide
in the context of protest in Argentina in 2002, where police officers that had been on duty
for over 36 hours were deployed.
182

A pre-event plan on graduated use of tactics is key for effective
decision-making. Planning for an event must include identifying
the negative impact of indiscriminate strategies.

See MARIKANA COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ARISING
OUT OF THE TRAGIC INCIDENTS AT THE LONMIN MINE IN MARIKANA, IN THE NORTHWEST PROVINCE (2015); ADAPTING TO Protest,
supra note 51.
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Evidence from the trial for the murder of Maximiliano Kosteki and Darío Santillán, occurred 26 June 2002 in the province of Buenos
Aires, Argentina.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

The manner in which policing institutions act in the context of protests impacts the
dynamics of protest and must be taken into account and understood by commanders
and officers. Police operations must be designed with this understanding, anticipating
the likely impact of police behaviour on protesters and bystanders.

»»

The presence and visibility of policing institutions at an event should be determined
during the operational design stage prior to the protest and should be dependent on a
thorough analysis of the conditions expected during deployment. Visibly overwhelming
or disproportionate deployments may escalate tensions and should be subject to the
principles of necessity, proportionality, and precaution. In other circumstances, shows
of force may de-escalate tensions.

»»

The presence of policing institutions at protests should not evidence discriminatory
treatment. The assessment of risk must be evidence-based.

»»

Public space, and private space used by the general public or used for a protest, must
be organised to facilitate the exercise of the rights of protesters and include entrance
and exit or egress.

»»

Police should be well-rested and their well-being must be promoted, including sufficient
access to water, food, suitable clothing, and ablutions.

»»

Policing officials under investigation for serious misconduct or criminality relating to
the use of force should be prohibited from engaging in any operation in the context of
protests, until such time as charges are dropped or the official in question is cleared
of wrongdoing.

»»

Police officials should dress in regular uniform with visible name tags on display and
the visibility of crowd-control equipment and weapons should be determined during
the operational design stage. Crowd-control equipment and weapons should only
be deployed when it becomes necessary and only used to defend the life and bodily
integrity of protesters, bystanders, or policing officials.

»»

Any decision to escalate force should be traceable through a chain of command that is
clear in advance, documented, and makes it possible to attribute specific decisions to
use force to a designated commander.
65

B. GENUINE ENGAGEMENT, DIALOGUE, AND THE PROMOTION OF
JOURNALISTIC ACTIVITY
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International standards indicate that the “proper facilitation of assemblies also benefits
from effective communication and collaboration among all relevant parties.” Dialogue
and exchange of information between state institutions and “where identifiable,
assembly organizers before, during and after an assembly enable a protective and
facilitative approach to be taken, helping to diffuse tension and prevent escalation.”
Policing institutions or other state representatives should have “an accessible point of
contact” available “before, during and after an assembly”. The point of contact officer
must be “trained in communication and conflict management.”
183
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•

The ACHPR has stated that law enforcement officials must make every effort to
communicate with assembly organisers and/or participants as soon as practicable
after notification of intention to hold an assembly is given or knowledge is gained of
an intended assembly. Officials must be able to evidence their attempts to engage in
such communication
185

•

During an assembly, law enforcement agencies should attempt to engage in continuous
dialogue and negotiation with assembly organisers and participants to proactively
address any issues that may arise, and should maintain open communication with all
relevant stakeholders.
186

•

As stated by the OSCE, “[t]he role of the media as a public watchdog is to impart
information and ideas on matters of public interest – information that the public also
has a right to receive. Media reports can thus provide an otherwise absent element of
public accountability for both organisers of assemblies and law-enforcement officials.
Media professionals should, therefore, be guaranteed as much access as is possible to
an assembly and to any related policing operation.”
187

•

NGOs and civil society organisations also play a crucial watchdog role in any democracy
and must, therefore, be permitted to freely observe public assemblies.
188

•

If an assembly is dispersed, observers of an assembly (including journalists) must not
be prevented from observing and recording the dispersal operation.
189

Joint report, supra note 1, at ¶ 38. The IACHR recommends designating spaces for communication and dialogue ahead of the
demonstration, and for state authorities to engage and liaise with protesters to coordinate protest activities and public security operations to avoid conflict situations. See IACHR, supra note 166, at ¶ 68(e). See, also, ACHPR Guidelines, supra note 36, at ¶ 6.3, which
states that law enforcement agencies must allow for and facilitate the involvement of third parties – such as national human rights
institutions and civil society organisations – in dialogue and mediation with assembly organisers prior, during and after assemblies,
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•

According to the ACHPR Guidelines, “[a]ll persons have the right to record an assembly,
including the right to record the law enforcement presence and action. This right must
be protected by law with disciplinary procedures in place for law enforcement officials
who seize or damage any equipment, except where such seizure is authorised by an
independent judicial authority. Disciplinary procedures refers to internal disciplinary
sanctions effected through policing procedures, as well as external criminal procedures.”
190

GOOD PRACTICES
Genuine engagement and open communication are an essential component of the
protection and promotion of the rights to protest. When state institutions and protesters
are able to understand each other’s aims and reasoning they are less likely to resort to
violence, act arbitrarily, or act out of confusion or fear. However, a lack of dialogue or a
reluctance from protesters to engage in dialogue with police officials does not justify the
use of more restrictive tactics.
191

Effective engagement requires having civil or police officers trained in communication,
easily identifiable to the people (outfitted in recognisable clothing) and focused on sharing
key information with protesters. To create a channel of effective dialogue, the exchange
should not be limited to the formal aspects of the protest but also to any demands the
protesters may have. The interlocutors of the state must be in a position to channel these
demands to the offices that may be able to offer a political response.
Direct communication with organisers is not the only tool or practice for promoting
openness and engagement with the public. Some policing institutions have systematised
processes in place to facilitate and promote access by the media (traditional and citizen
journalists), a practice that evinces trust in the public and confidence in their own internal
policies and procedures. Transparency and engagement can be promoted through sharing
of information via social media, traditional media, independent monitors, or designated
point of contact officers. Importantly, this should not be limited to traditional media. Citizen
journalism, or “independent reporting, often by amateurs on the scene of an event, which
is disseminated globally through modern media, most often the Internet”, is legitimate
and should be unobstructed by policing institutions. This includes the right to “record
back”, a person’s right to record “an interaction in which he or she is being recorded by the
state agent”.
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Pre-, during, and, post-event communication with assembly organisers is a good tactic to
increase the protection and promotion of the rights to protest. However, engagement with
the police should be optional and at the discretion of organisers. Some organisers have
experienced misuse of this tactic, with law enforcement using the pre-event communication
as a way to impose limitations and overly burdensome requirements on organisers and
participants – or even as an opportunity to initiate illegal surveillance actions against
organisations or communities. If organisers do not wish to communicate beforehand or
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during an event, as is at times the case when a protest is directed at policing institutions,
that decision should be respected.
SOUTH AFRICA: MEDIA LIAISON BY POLICE OFFICIALS. Standing Order 156
in the South African Police Service provides guidance on how the police service
should engage with the media when exercising their duties. The order provides that
police officials have a duty to treat media officials with dignity and courtesy and the
media may not be prohibited from taking photographs or making visual recordings.
However, the definition of media officials in the order does not include citizen
journalists. Further, the order is not always adequately implemented by police
officials. Journalists are often prevented from covering protests or manhandled
by police officials. For example, journalists were intimidated and harassed by
the police as well as some protesters during #FeesMustFall movement’s protest
outside the South African Union buildings in 2015.
Practice 16: Designate dialogue officials or employ other mechanisms to ensure
effective communication with protesters
When protesters and state interlocutors discuss what will occur before, during, and
after the protest and are able to communicate prior to the assembly about their mutual
expectations, policing institutions are better able to protect and promote rights. In West
Yorkshire, England, Chief Superintendent West makes it a point to meet with organisers
in the community when he is informed that an assembly will take place. He walks them
through the selected route or area and outlines the police department’s role and strategy
during the event, and the logistics for the day. For Chief Superintendent West, this
meeting ideally results in a “Memorandum of Understanding” that all parties will sign so
that organisers and participants are aware of how the department plans on managing
the event. This is often referred to as the “no surprises” approach, a strategy intended
to ensure that all parties can reasonably anticipate how the other will act. Superintendent
Nigel Goddard from Northern Ireland also recognises the importance of transparency
and communication with assembly participants even without a pre-event exchange and
agreement. When discussing working with large assemblies, he explains that “the key is
communication. If you get the process across and let [the protesters] see you as being
fair, then they will see your actions as legitimate.” Ultimately, people tend to feel more
comfortable with a police presence when they are aware of their policies and tactics.
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ISRAEL: THE SOCIAL JUSTICE DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE “POLICE
MEDIATOR”. During the Social Justice Demonstrations in 2012, thousands
of protesters marched through Tel Aviv, blocking main traffic arteries for
long periods of time. The police recruited a “police mediator” who facilitated
communication between the organisers and the police. The police allowed the
march to proceed and there were no arrests, little police violence, and no use of
crowd-control measures.
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UNITED STATES: THE ALTON
STERLING PROTESTS IN BATON
ROUGE. After the July 2016 police
shooting of Alton Sterling in Louisiana,
police used excessive force, physical
and verbal abuse, and wrongful arrests
to disperse protesters who were
gathered peacefully in Baton Rouge
to speak out against the police killing.
Eyewitness accounts indicate that
police in crowd-control equipment
with assault rifles lunged and grabbed
at peacefully assembled people and
threw them to the ground. Police used
mace, taser charges, and pepper spray
on non-violent protesters and kept
live automatic weapons trained on
peaceful crowds. Police officers gave
contradictory and confusing orders
to protesters, then arrested them for
non-compliance. Police arrested nearly
200 people including journalists and
legal observers – some for failure to
disperse, even though they were not

MARK WALLHEISER / STRINGER

given adequate notice or opportunity
to leave. Police also forced protesters
from public forum spaces including
sidewalks, neutral ground, and public
property. The ACLU of Louisiana filed a
lawsuit against the Baton Rouge Police
Department seeking an emergency
order to ensure that the police in Baton
Rouge obey the Constitution.

Communicating with organisers and protesters is a skill in
which officials must be thoroughly trained.

Communicating with organisers and protesters is a skill in which officials must be thoroughly
trained. To ensure institutional capacity for effective communication, political authorities
and policing institutions have begun to employ dialogue officials – police officials or civil
servants –in the context of protests. Dialogue officials are specialised units of officers
trained in communication and in de-escalation. The primary role of these officers is to
engage with the public, identify potential risks to the exercise of rights, and avoid conflict
through ongoing dialogue. They do not have the power to arrest or to use force, making
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them less threatening and more approachable. These officers wear special vests to indicate
their function and also to be visibly distinct from other officers so that protesters can
identify them. The use of dialogue officials began in Sweden and has since made its way to
numerous other jurisdictions, including England, Germany, Portugal, Ukraine, Argentina,
and Canada.
Practice 17: Protect and promote journalistic activity to increase transparency,
promote genuine communication, and ensure accountability
The work of journalists and photojournalists is fundamental to the exercise of rights by
protesters. Media coverage and social networks can function as loudspeakers, amplifying
and facilitating public expression. Attendance at events by journalists and photojournalists
operates as a form of oversight and control of state action. Sometimes, the mere presence
of cameras can discourage law enforcement officials from resorting to violence. When
repressive practices do occur, the journalistic record provides an independent portrayal of
events and promotes accountability and transparency.
199

Journalists also play an important role for policing institutions as a key influencer of public
confidence in policing. Journalistic activity records and reports police activity to the public.
Savvy policing institutions, aware of this reality, see the value of ensuring accurate and
complete reporting – which in turn can also deter misleading or false allegations against
the police.
In Northern Ireland, as part of an effort to increase trust, police commanders began to
change the way in which they dealt with journalistic activity in protests in the early 2000s.
Policing expert and former Commander Stephen White explains that police should “[b]
e transparent. If you have made a sensible, reasonable plan then there is no downside
to bringing the media in, so people know you are being sensible and reasonable in your
approach.” When police conduct is seen as fair, it is seen as legitimate; this builds trust
and prevents misunderstanding and miscommunication that can lead to escalation of
tensions and even violence.
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More open engagement with the media has become part of the British Model. In a report
reviewing police practices and recommending changes for assembly management, Her
Majesty’s Chief Inspector of the Constabulary called attention to the reality that (regardless
of what the police may wish were the case) there is a “high volume of publicly sourced
footage of the protests, [as a result], individual and collective police actions are under
enormous public scrutiny.” To advance accurate reporting and allow the public to
understand police behaviour and strategies, the following ideas were suggested: “an
improved police event website; embedding journalists with frontline police; police briefing
at the scene, to provide information that is contextualized by what is happening on the
ground; and making frontline officers experience available after the event.”
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Protecting and promoting journalistic activity, not just the traditional media, is an essential
element of transparency and open engagement. This means that citizen journalism and
“recording back” must not be obstructed or prevented. States have attempted to place
limits on peoples right to record public events and police conduct by enacting legislation
or retaliating through threats, arrests, and the use of force when people record public
officials. For example, in 2015 Spain enacted Citizen Security Law which imposes serious
fines (as much as €30 thousand) for the unauthorised publication or dissemination of
damaging photos of the police.
205

States around the world have shut off or slowed down internet access or cellular services
(including shutting off texting functions and blocking communications applications like
WhatsApp and Telegram) during events in an effort to frustrate access to and sharing of
information. In extreme cases, states have shut down the internet. Policing institutions
have also retaliated against individuals for exercising their right to record by conducting
searches and seizures; pushing and striking protesters and bystanders; confiscating
smartphones, tablets, cameras, or other recording devices, and deleting the recording;
and arresting individuals.
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These practices undermine not only the freedom of expression and basic security of
protesters and the public at large but impoverish public debate and frustrate democratic
accountability. As one judge in a case involving the right to record and police retaliation in
the United States put it: “officers are public officials carrying out public functions, and the
First Amendment requires them to bear bystanders recording their actions. This is vital to
promote access that fosters free discussion of governmental actions, especially when that
discussion benefits not only citizens but the officers themselves.”
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ARGENTINA: THE CASE OF DANTE BARISONE. In December 2017, a large
protest was held in Buenos Aires in opposition to changes in the pension and
retirement system. Journalists and attendees recorded (through videos and
photographs) police actions during the event. Federal Police agent Dante Barisone
was recorded running over a pedestrian during the protest with his police
motorcycle. A judicial investigation into his conduct is currently underway.
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IRELAND: THE JOBSTOWN TRIAL. On 15 November 2014, a protest against
water charges in Jobstown, Dublin involved a Government Minister and her assistant
being blocked from leaving a public event for a number of hours. Subsequently
six protesters, including a TD (member of parliament) were arrested and charged
with the offence of false imprisonment. During their trial on these charges, which
lasted for eight weeks, all the accused men were acquitted. The viewing of video
footage from police sources and from protesters was seen as having a significant
impact on the case.

RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

State officials involved in promoting and protecting the rights to protest should undergo
specialised, comprehensive, and ongoing training on communication and engagement
strategies.

»»

Where possible, the first step in planning for an event should be to establish clear lines
of communication between protesters and the state.

»»

Recourse to specialised dialogue officials in the context of protests can be an effective
practice, especially when dialogue officials are exclusively focused on communication
and do not carry out policing functions (i.e. making arrests or using force).

»»

Dialogue officials should aim to establish agreements regarding the formal aspects of
the protest (route, time, etc.). If the protest includes the relaying of demands, dialogue
officials should open a line of communication to ensure that the demands are heard by
relevant state institutions or private parties.

»»

The right to journalistic activity and the right to record policing operations in the context
of protests must be protected and promoted. No special or traditional journalistic
credentials should be required to allow journalistic activity in the context of protests.

»»

Journalistic or photographic tools and materials (including smartphones, tablets,
microphones, and cameras) should not be confiscated or erased and their use should
not be obstructed.

»»

Internet access should not be blocked and mobile communications should not be
monitored, intercepted, or limited. The use of mobile triangulation technologies such
as Stingrays should be prohibited and specific applications, such as WhatsApp and
Telegram, should not be blocked.

»»

The rights of members of the media (including members of the independent media,
citizen journalists, bloggers, photographers, and independent monitors) should be
protected and promoted. These journalists should be informed of police strategies
through pre-event briefings or during event communications.
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C. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

The use of force during the management of assemblies is strictly constrained by
international human rights law. Force may only be used when “strictly unavoidable”
and, if used, it must comply with “the principles of legality, precaution, necessity,
proportionality, accountability, [and non-discrimination].”
209
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•

The UN Human Rights Council has called upon states “as a matter of priority, to ensure
that their domestic legislation and procedures are consistent with their international
obligations in relation to the use of force, in particular the principles of necessity and
proportionality.”
211

•

According to the ACHPR, the planning, preparation, and conduct of an assembly must
take operational, tactical, and other measures to avoid the use of force. Where force is
unavoidable, the harmful consequences of the use of force must be minimised. If the
use of force is necessary and proportionate, but the need for force could reasonably
have been prevented from arising in the first place by exercising all precautions in
planning and preparation for an assembly operation, operational commanders must
be held accountable.
212
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•

The use of any weapon requires extensive training and clear standards for the
appropriate use of that weapon. Firearms [armed with live ammunition] and
autonomous weapons “should not be used in the policing of assemblies under any
circumstances.”
214
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•

“There should be a focus on effective independent accountability mechanisms” and “[s]
tates must make their laws on the use of force publicly available” to assist the public in
understanding the extent of the police powers and the conditions for accountability.
216

217

•

209

The use of crowd-control weapons (CCWs) “must be subject to independent scientific
testing and approval, and used responsibly by well-trained law enforcement officials, as
See Joint Report, supra note 1 at 12.

Id. at ¶ 50. According to the ACHPR Guidelines, supra note 36, at ¶ 21.1.2: “The use of force is an exceptional measure. In carrying
out their duties, law enforcement officials shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent methods before resorting to the use of force and
firearms. Force and firearms may only be used if other means of achieving a legitimate law enforcement objective are ineffective or
unlikely to be successful. Law enforcement officials must, as far and for as long as possible, differentiate between peaceful assembly
participants and those who engage in violent acts. An assembly should be deemed peaceful if its organisers have expressed peaceful
intentions, and if the conduct of the assembly participants is generally peaceful. ‘Peaceful’ shall be interpreted to include conduct that
annoys or gives offence as well as conduct that temporarily hinders, impedes or obstructs the activities of third parties. Isolated acts
of violence do not render an assembly as a whole non-peaceful.” The OSCE has stated that: “If the force used is not authorised by law,
or more force was used than necessary in the circumstances, law enforcement personnel should face civil and/or criminal liability,
as well as disciplinary action. Law-enforcement personnel should also be held liable for failing to intervene where such intervention
might have prevented other officers from using excessive force.” OSCE Guidelines, supra note 36, at ¶ 5.6.

210

211
Human Rights Council, Resolution A/HRC/25/L.20, The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests 24 March 2014. para. 10.
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ACHPR Guidelines, supra note 26, at ¶ 21.1.1.
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Id. at ¶ 67(d).

Id. at ¶ 67(e)–(f). As stated in the ACHPR Guidelines, at para 21.2.4: “Firearms are not an appropriate tactical tool for the policing of
assemblies. Firearms must never be used to disperse an assembly. The indiscriminate discharge of firearms into a crowd is a violation
of the right to life.”
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2014 UNSR Report, supra note 8, at ¶ 123-124.
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Id, at ¶ 29.
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such weapons may have lethal or injurious effects if not used correctly or in compliance
with international law and human rights standards. States should work to establish and
implement international protocols for the training on and use of less-lethal weapons.”
“In particular, equipment should be assessed for accuracy, reliability and its ability to
minimize physical and psychological harm. Equipment should be procured only where
there is sufficient capacity to train officers effectively on its proper use”. Additionally,
the IACHR considers it advisable to implement systems of recording and control of
ammunitions.
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•

The UN Human Rights Council has urged states to pay particular attention to the safety
and protection of women and women human rights defenders from acts of intimidation
and harassment as well as gender-based violence, including sexual assault, in the
context of peaceful protests.
221

•

The requirement to protect life means that lethal force may not be used intentionally
merely to protect law and order or to serve other similar interests. For example, it may
not be used only to disperse protests, to arrest a suspected criminal, or to safeguard
other interests such as property. The primary aim must be to save life. In practice, this
means that only the protection of life can meet the proportionality requirement where
lethal force is used intentionally.
222

CURRENT PRACTICES
The lawful exercise of the use of force by policing institutions is a key component in
protecting and promoting the rights to protest. However, more often than not, cases
studies across different jurisdictions evidence abuses and misuses of force, including the
misuse of CCWs, by policing institutions. The use of force by policing institutions in the
context of protests remains of utmost concern due to the number of deaths and injuries
sustained by protesters at the hands of police officers.
The disproportionate use of force is a complex problem and is due to several factors,
including: limited and insufficient training; inadequate and outdated norms and protocols
for intervention; deficiencies in the preparation and design of operational plans; problems
in institutional design; the absence of functioning internal and external oversight
mechanisms; and, in some occasions, deficiencies in the crowd-control equipment and
weapons used.
Force in the context of protests should only be used to protect the right to life and the
physical integrity of protesters, bystanders, and police officers, and it must always comply
218

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 55.

Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 67(c). A dividing line cannot be draw between lethal and non-lethal weapons; as stated by the former
UNSR on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns: “[I]t must be remembered that almost any use of force
against the human person can under certain circumstances lead to loss of life or serious injury”. See United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, Note by the Secretary-General, A/69/265, 6 August 2014, at ¶ 69.
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IACHR, supra note 166, at ¶ 68(b).
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Human Rights Council, Resolution, supra note 211.

2014 UNSR Report, supra note 8, at ¶ 72. In this regard, the ACHPR Guidelines state, at para 21.1.4: “The intentional use of lethal
force by law enforcement officials and others is prohibited unless it is strictly unavoidable in order to protect life, thus making it proportionate, and all other means are insufficient to achieve that objective, thus making it necessary. Assessment of legality, necessity
and proportionality should be based on the relevant facts with a requirement for reasonable grounds, rather than mere suspicion or
presumption, of risk or harm.”
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with the principles of: legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution, non-discrimination
and accountability.
223

Proper training, tactics, and equipment are all needed to ensure that unlawful and
disproportionate force is not used. Precautionary measures should be taken during
preparation for an event to ensure the use of force does not become necessary. This
includes training officers to exercise good judgment and improve their communication
and de-escalation skills.
With the growing use of crowd-control weapons, there is a need for human rightscompliant regulation surrounding the procurement, development, testing, and use of
CCWs. The principle of precaution is undermined when there is no comprehensive and
effective regulatory framework in place. Any decision to use force must be made with full
consideration of the likely and possible consequences. Whether a particular command or
action complies with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination
depends on a full assessment of likely and possible consequences.
Practice 18: Ensure that extensive precautionary measures are in place when
planning for engagements in the context of protests
Whether the use of force is necessary, proportionate, and legal will often depend on
institutional design, community engagement, decisions made, and actions taken well
before the moment that force is used. There is no exhaustive list of required precautionary
measures but certain kinds are clearly relevant and useful. For example, engaging protest
organisers and protesters before or at the start of an event can often be an invaluable
precautionary measure. By both establishing clear lines of communication between
security institutions and organisers and establishing a mutual understanding of the goals
of the protest and how the protest will be managed, the dangers of miscommunication
and escalation can be mitigated. In the words of Chief Superintendent West, “if you have
talked yourself to death in a room with partners, then you have done as much as you
can.” In Latin America, “in most cases force is used without having attempted dialogue
with protesters.” When the use of force is greater than the minimum strictly necessary to
achieve a pressing and legitimate end, the use of force cannot be justified and falls foul of
the precaution principle.
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Another related key precautionary measure is accurate and effective risk assessment
and goal articulation by policing institutions. The more clearly the police leadership can
articulate their aims for an event and how particular plans and tactics are suited to those
defined aims, the less likely that circumstances will escalate to the use of force. Gary White,
a former police commander in Northern Ireland with extensive experience managing
protests and parades, spoke about the need to make sure a risk assessment takes place
before the event and before any decisions are made on what equipment should be used.
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UN Basic Principles, supra note 8.

See, e.g. Frumkin v Russia, App. No. 74568/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016) (finding that police use of force could have been prevented had the
department taken measures earlier on to engage with the protesters).
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Interview with Owen West, Chief Superintendent, West Yorkshire Police Force, in West Yorkshire, Eng. (Dec. 14, 2017).

CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES, supra note 45 at 24–26 (“There is nearly no experience in the region of political negotiations as a way to mediate conflicts”).
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Interview with Gary White, MBE, Senior Police Advisor, Saferworld, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 18, 2017).
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Superintendent Nigel Goddard, who manages the tactical support groups for the Police
Services of Northern Ireland and decides what special equipment should be used for any
given event, made a similar point. Superintendent Goddard typically co-ordinates with
the operational planning commander of the department tasked with managing the event.
The operational commander will set out the plan for the event, identify possible risks and
how to respond to them. Superintendent Goddard will then evaluate the risk assessment
and whether the particular piece of equipment is truly necessary or if the specifically
identified objective can be accomplished by other means. In short, explicitly defining
anticipated challenges allows for assessment at the command level. Such systematised
review is crucial for evaluating the necessity and proportionality of the means identified
for accomplishing the aims.
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Practice 19: Consider likely or possible consequences of each command decision
or tactic used to determine compliance with necessity, proportionality, and nondiscrimination principles
Unnecessary and disproportionate use of force is often the result of improper training and
a lack of understanding on the part of police or public authorities. Protesting, occupying
public places, and creating some amount of disorder is part of the exercise of fundamental
rights that policing institutions are obliged to protect and promote. Decisions may be made
to “restore order” without a previous assessment of what will be required to accomplish
that aim or what consequences will result. The College of Policing manual in the United
Kingdom, for example, instructs leadership to have “clarity of command decisions, including
the foreseeable levels of force that officers may use, e.g., officers directed to disperse a
crowd may individually use force to do so. Although those officers would have to justify
their use of force, the commander should also consider whether they foresaw the use of
force, whether use of force was necessary and whether any further clarity was required
regarding the level of force to be used.” Proportionality of a measure must be weighed in
the light of these likely consequences, as must preventive measures.
230

Similarly, the likely consequences of using certain CCWs must be evaluated to determine
whether the use of such weapons complies with necessity, proportionality, and nondiscrimination principles. Weighing non-discrimination from a gender perspective, the use
of some CCWs against protesters who are pregnant might be particularly life-threatening
to the pregnant person and foetus. The use of chemical agents is particularly dangerous
as various chemical agents, including tear gas and pepper spray, may cause miscarriages.
Chemical agents used as crowd-control weapons have been linked to miscarriages
since the late 1980s, and Physicians for Human Rights has called for more studies to be
conducted on the subject. More recently, a spike of miscarriages has been reported in
Bahrain after the government engaged in large-scale use of CCWs against its citizens. The
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Interview with Nigel Goddard, Superintendent, Police Services of Northern Ireland, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 20, 2017).

Id.; see also POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 175 at 56 (“The theory of graduated use-of-force in response to escalating disorder is based on what is both reasonable and proportionate to the threat. An appropriate response must be stressed at all
times, especially given the amount of media attention that focuses on police when disorder erupts during mass demonstrations, and
how this attention affects the public perception of the department.”).
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government of Chile briefly banned the use of chemical agents by police departments and
law enforcement agencies after a report linked the use of the weapon to miscarriages.
234

Alongside the detrimental health effects of CCWs, remotely piloted aircraft or drones
are increasingly deployed in the context of protests to discharge CCWs, such as tear gas.
These armed or weaponised drones often discharge CCWs from the air which predispose
their discharges, in the form of projectiles or canisters, to striking protesters in the upper
portions of their bodies or their heads, which can lead to death or serious injury. Accordingly,
the discharge of CCWs from armed drones may fall foul of the legality, necessity, and
proportionately principles governing the use of force. In the absence of legal certainty from
the international community on the interpretation of the principles of the use of force
relating to armed drones, their use should be prohibited in the context of protests.
235

Practice 20: Promote dialogue and the graduated use of force
Dispersal of assemblies collides with the exercise of the rights to protest and is often
performed through the use of force, usually in an indiscriminate manner. Making the
decision to disperse a crowd needs to be assessed in light of foreseeable consequences
and made with the utmost care. Superintendent Nigel Goddard of the PSNI spoke about
a particular event in Northern Ireland in 2012, when protesters decided to shut down
traffic by sitting in intersections. These sit-ins happened across the city, with different
commanders handling the various locations. One commander decided to end the sit-in. In
order to accomplish that aim, he used dogs and a marching shield line. As the dogs pushed
people back, one dog chased down and bit an elderly man. This is an example of how a
decision to end a sit-in escalated quickly, especially when the members of the security
service decided to use tools which indiscriminately harmed people present. A commander
in charge of another intersection decided not to disperse the crowd and instead decided
to speak with the leaders of the group. He negotiated to let the protesters occupy the
intersection for an hour, after which they would end the sit-in. The organisers agreed and
after the hour, the protesters dispersed peacefully and without incident.
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Rushing to a decision to disperse a crowd is something that happens repeatedly in response
to protests around the world and regularly leads to excessive force and violence by police
officers. For example, during a demonstration in Nochixtian, Mexico in June 2016, teachers
and their supporters blocked a road while protesting education reform. Police decided to
remove them and deployed 800 troops, never having attempted dialogue. This decision
and the commitment to carry it out led to the use of firearms and tear gas and cost ten
people their lives – all to clear a road. According to Louise Edwards, a human rights lawyer
working with the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum in South Africa, in order to avoid
escalations in violence it is “important for the officers on the ground to understand the
dynamic role a [protest] plays in a healthy democracy. Police officers should be willing
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Interview with Nigel Goddard, Superintendent, Police Services of Northern Ireland, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 20, 2017).
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to continue rolling negotiations and offer options – demonstrating flexibility – before
considering dispersal.”
239

Chief Doug LePard, former Deputy Chief of the Vancouver Police Department, emphasises
the need to understand the bigger picture in terms of tactics and force. Responding to
every minor violation of the law or act of disrespect can escalate tensions quickly. “Be
patient”, he says, and consider whether, for example, removing people from a space will
lead to more violence than waiting them out. This type of analysis is central to the principle
of precaution and needs to be part of the ongoing training for officers involved in the
context of protests so that it can be directly understood in relation to decision-making and
use of tactics.
ISRAEL: THE ETHIOPIAN COMMUNITY PROTEST. In 2015, a mass
demonstration against police violence and racism towards the Ethiopian
community was held in Tel Aviv. The protest lasted a few hours and proceeded
without much intervention by the police. As the protest neared its conclusion,
thousands of protesters gathered in the city’s main square. A large contingent of
heavily armed police officers were present in the square. Police were equipped
with water cannons, stun grenades, tear gas, and sponge bullets and had horses.
As the protesters came close to the municipality building the police began using
the tools and weapons at their disposal. Tensions and violence quickly escalated.
The use of stun grenades intensified the panic. Dozens of people were injured
and many of the protesters were arrested.

OMER MESSINGER / AP IMAGES

Interview with Louise Edwards, human rights lawyer at the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, in Johannesburg, South Africa
(Mar. 12, 2018).
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CANADA: BLACK LIVES MATTER
– TORONTO, 2016. The policing of
two Black Lives Matter - Toronto (BLMToronto) protests illustrates the need
for patience and dialogue prior to
deciding to disperse a protest. In the
summer of 2016, BLM-Toronto brought
Canada’s largest annual Pride Parade –
whose participants included Canadian
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and
numerous police officers in uniform –
to a standstill with a sit-in and demands
that uniformed police officers as well
as police floats and vehicles be barred
from the Parade. BLM-Toronto asserted that the police presence made members
of marginalised communities feel unsafe due to the troubled history between the
force and Toronto’s black community. Despite the substantial police presence
at the event, and a strong police desire to remain involved in the parade, police
rightly did not disperse the counter-protest. BLM-Toronto’s brief delay of the Pride
parade eventually resulted in a vote by Pride Toronto to ban police uniforms,
weapons, and vehicles from future parades. This also prompted a national
discussion on the meaning of pride events, the principle of equality, and the state
of policing in Canada.
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By contrast, a series of 2016 protests prior to Pride wherein BLM-Toronto
protested police violence by creating a tent city outside police headquarters
resulted in police forcibly removed tents from the surrounding public square out
of “safety concerns.” Group organisers were also surveilled and alleged that they
were attacked by police, including some organisers who were “punched, hit and
physically assaulted.” The result was to exacerbate distrust of the police in a
community attempting to voice concerns regarding its experiences, particularly
around the policing of its protests.
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See, e.g., Andrea Janus & Muriel Draaisma, “Pride Toronto Asks Police to Withdraw Application to March in Pride Parade”, CBC News
(2 April 2018), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/pride-toronto-asks-police-to-withdraw-application-tomarch-in-pride-parade-1.4602545>.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

The use of firearms and live ammunition in the context of protests, particularly automatic
firearms, should be prohibited.

»»

The use of CCWs which are indiscriminate in their nature, such as stun grenades and
tear gas, should not be used for dispersion or generally in the context of protests.

»»

The use of force is subject to the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality,
precaution, non-discrimination, and accountability, and should only be used in self
defence or in defence of others facing an imminent threat to life or serious injury.

»»

Wherever possible, the use of dialogue and communication should always precede the
use of force. Police commanders must be trained in dialogue and engagement and
should use these tactics before any decisions are made to resort to the use of force.

»»

To ensure a graduated, necessary, and proportionate deployment of force, policing
institutions may be provided with a range of tools that allow for such a response. This
may include CCWs but only when they have been independently and thoroughly tested,
are human rights-compliant, and where they are situationally appropriate.

»»

CCWs must not be misused or used as tools of intimidation.

»»

The use of armed or weaponised drones equipped to discharge CCWs must be
prohibited pending further investigations into their compliance with international
human rights law.

»»

Training on the use of crowd-control equipment and weapons should include: the
impact and harm caused by each weapon or piece of equipment; the likely perceptions
of and reaction to the use of each weapon, including the possible escalation in tensions;
whether less harmful means are available to achieve the particular aim, and if not,
whether the overall objective of the use of force is better achieved by not using the
provided equipment.

»»

Any arrests or detentions that occur in the context of protests should be performed by
police officials wearing appropriate uniforms and visible name tags. Prompt information
on the place of detention should be provided to interested persons and access to legal
services for the detainee must be ensured.

»»

Mass arrests are inherently indiscriminate and should be prohibited as they do not
comply with the principles of necessity, proportionality, and legality.

»»

Dogs and horses can be indiscriminate tools and their use should be prohibited in the
context of protests.

»»

In the event that people are injured or killed – or in any circumstance that requires
investigation – a clear chain of custody of evidence must be established. Commands
issued (including dispersal orders) must be documented, and all weapons used must
be seized for the purposes of investigation.
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INDIA: ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY. On 2 May 2018, Aligarh Muslim
University hosting ex Vice President of India, Mr. Hamid Ansari, witnessed a
gathering outside the campus of right-wing Hindutva groups shouting slogans
and threatening the students and faculty of the university with extreme violence.
These groups had a police escort. After these groups left, some students came
forward to file a complaint. The same police officers that provided an escort to the
Hindutva groups then charged at these students with batons and tear gas.

D. DATA TRACKING AND REPORTING
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

As part of states’ responsibility to ensure accountability “[s]tates must establish effective
reporting and review procedures to address any incident in relation to an assembly
during which a potentially unlawful use of force occurs.” Satisfying this requirement
includes gathering and reporting “relevant information, including statistics on when
and against whom force is used . . .”
244
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•

The ACHPR has specified that state parties should establish processes for the systematic
collection and public dissemination of disaggregated data and other information
about the policing of assemblies on an annual basis. This may include the number of
assemblies, the number of assemblies prohibited, the number of assemblies during
which law enforcement officials resorted to the use of force, the number of assemblies
dispersed, and information about persons injured or killed due to police action
during assemblies.
246

GOOD PRACTICES
No complete assessment of the practices of policing institutions is possible without key
information. What kind of force do police use? How often? Against whom? Such basic
questions can only be answered when policing institutions are obligated to record, track,
and report protest data. Even as state officials and leaders of policing institutions accept
the value of evidence-based policing and intelligence-driven strategy, key information
remains uncollected and unreported. Without accurate and comprehensive data, the
ability to develop better practices or hold officials accountable for violations of existing
standards is limited.
Policing institutions should be required by law to keep records of key use of force and
protest data. For example: the use of force during protests, the kinds of crowd-control
weapons and tactics used, the quantities of each type of weapon deployed, when the use of
a particular tactic and weapon results in injury or death to an individual, key demographic
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ACHPR Guidelines, supra note 36, at ¶ 8.5. The ACHPR Guidelines state further, at para 8.6: “The right to monitor the observance of
human rights in a given society includes the right to engage in active observation of an assembly and to collect, verify, and use information related to the assembly. All persons have the right to seek and receive information and to freedom of expression, and enjoy
the right to observe and independently monitor public assemblies without fear of reprisal. This includes civil society organisations,
human rights defenders, monitors, journalists and other media workers.”
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information of the targeted or injured individuals, and investigations of misconduct and
outcomes of those investigations. This information should be regularly compiled and made
available to the public in a timely manner.
Practice 21: Require that effective systems for reporting and monitoring the use of
force are established and the results are publicly available
An effective system of reporting requires that every use of force, including stop and search
procedures, regardless of whether it results in injury or death be reported and collated
as part of a centralised dataset. As the case study detailed below demonstrates, effective
reporting includes disaggregating the information to facilitate better understanding of
police practices. Policing institutions should track different categories of tools and crowdcontrol equipment, report on each instance of use, and indicate whether or not it resulted
in an injury or death. Related to the numbers on the use of force, reporting on internal
investigations should be part of use of force data reporting. The public should have access
to the number of complaints made against officers, the investigations into misconduct, the
outcomes of those investigations, whether internal disciplinary measures were pursued,
what kind of disciplinary measures were imposed, and whether external review or
prosecution followed. In order to assess the nature of police use of force, its effectiveness,
and compliance with human rights standards of existing policies and practices, the public
needs access to a nuanced set of statistics and specific data. Existing reporting requirements
should be regularly reviewed in order to identify failures or new avenues for improving
information gathering, allowing for genuine assessment and accountability.
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An effective system of reporting requires that every use of
force, including stop and search procedures, regardless
of whether it results in injury or death be reported and
collated as part of a centralised dataset.

See, e.g., POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, STATISTICS, https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/Statistics/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2018).
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NORTHERN IRELAND: RECORD KEEPING AND REPORTING. Following the
peace process in Northern Ireland and the establishment of the Police Services
of Northern Ireland, systemic and concerted steps were taken to ensure the
incorporation of human rights into every aspect of policing. The Policing Board
of Northern Ireland, an independent public body, was tasked with carrying out
this annual assessment and making public its findings and recommendations for
better compliance. In its annual report, the Board recommended that the PSNI
require reporting on use of force and the exercise of stop and search powers. The
Board’s reasoning was that only by having actual numbers on how discretionary
powers of the police are used can the department, the state, and society evaluate
the lawfulness of existing practices.
In compliance with the Policing Board’s recommendations, the PSNI provides a
whole set of statistics and information on police use of force, use of stop and
search powers, and set of complaints and disciplinary measures. Every six months,
the PSNI provides information on:
A. “Summary details of all cases that resulted in formal disciplinary hearings;
B. Details of all conduct leading to a Superintendent written warning;
C. Details of cases where disciplinary proceedings are not commenced or not
concluded because the officer in question retires, resigns, or otherwise
leaves the PSNI;
D. Details of PSNI Professional Standards’ current misconduct investigations
and disciplinary action taken as a result of completed investigations;
E. Details of any action taken by District Commanders under the PSNI tracking
and trending policy;
F. Details of all civil actions taken against the police;
G. Details of judicial review cases brought against the PSNI and any action
taken in response to adverse decisions.”
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This information is then analysed and reported to the public through the Annual
Human Rights Report. Additionally, the PSNI provides regular reports on statistics
on its webpage, providing numbers on stop and search and police use of force. As
the PSNI explains on its website, Recommendation 21 of the Policing Board Human
Rights Annual Report (2008) requires reporting of “statistics on all categories of
uses of force.” The chart from one such report (provided below) demonstrates the
detailed information collected and disclosed. The data includes not only the use
of specific tools, but also the number of times these weapons are drawn.
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NORTHERN IRELAND POLICING BOARD, supra note 151, at 77.
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STATISTICS, supra note 148.

POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, USE OF FORCE STATISTICS 1ST APRIL 2017 TO 30TH SEPTEMBER 2017 (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.psni.police.uk/globalassets/inside-the-psni/our-statistics/statistics-on-police-use-of-force/2017/september/use-of-force-1apr-2017---30-sept-2017-official-public.pdf.
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Police use of force between 1 April 2017 and 30 September 2017 compared to the
same period last year.

While the extent of reporting and publication on use of force and stop and seizure
powers by the PSNI is in many ways impressive and exceptional, some problems do
remain. For example, although the Policing Board recommended the inclusion of
certain demographic information about the individuals stopped and searched, the
recommendation has not been implemented. “No justification has been advanced
as to why the PSNI should continue to operate such a limited classification system
for ethnicity of persons stopped and searched. The length of time which the PSNI
has taken to take steps to align its classification system is disappointing.” A
review of the statistics provided on the PSNI website on stop and search powers
reveals that background and ethnicity of the individuals stopped is still not part of
the information reported to the public. Data on injuries resulting from the use
of each type of crowd-control weapon or tool is also lacking, making it difficult to
evaluate the kind of harm caused by each tool.
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POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, STOP AND SEARCH STATISTICS, https://www.psni.police.uk/inside-psni/Statistics/stopand-search-statistics/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).
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No complete assessment of the practices of policing
institutions is possible without key information. What kind
of force do police use? How often? Against whom?

RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Policing institutions should be required by law to keep records on the use of force;
numbers and types of weapons deployed; arrests, stops and searches conducted; and
the training that officers have received on the use of CCWs and equipment.

»»

A centralised system should be put in place to report on and register each instance a
CCW or a firearm is deployed, used, or drawn; whether it resulted in injury or death; and
the demographic information of the individuals against whom force was used. Such a
system enables determinations of individual responsibility and assists with assessing the
outcomes of policing operations, which fosters oversight and accountability.

»»

Comprehensive data and statistics should be provided to the public and data content
should be regularly evaluated and reviewed by an independent oversight body to improve
reporting, collection, and publication.

»»

Failure to report or keep adequate records, without justification, should constitute a
ground for service review, dismissal, or a disciplinary or criminal sanction.
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E. SURVEILLANCE AND NON-STATE ACTORS
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

The ACHPR states that any “documenting of assembly operations by law enforcement
officials must be regulated by national law in compliance with regional and international
human rights standards.” Recording and surveillance cannot be used “as a means to
harass or intimidate assembly participants, or to discourage persons or groups from
exercising their right to assemble freely with others.”
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•

International law and standards require that “[t]he collection of personal information
in relation to an assembly must not interfere impermissibly with privacy or other
rights” and must be regulated by national law that complies with human rights. The
ACHPR Guidelines state that any “retention and use [of information] should be limited
to circumstances where the use of force by law enforcement officials or their exercise of
the powers of arrest and detention is recorded; where a complaint about the conduct of
law enforcement officials is made; where recordings provide evidence of misconduct by
law enforcement officials; or where recordings provide evidence of a crime committed by
law enforcement officials or others. Recordings should be retained only for so long as is
necessary for the relevant purpose.”
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•

Regarding the infiltration of security agents dressed as civilians in protests, the UN Special
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association expressed
his deep concern “about the use of embedded undercover police officers in groups that
are non-violent and take peaceful direct action by exercising their right to freedom of
peaceful assembly.”
257

CURRENT PRACTICES
Surveillance of protests and protesters is an all too common practice. Surveillance in the
context of protests involves recording, collecting, retaining, and using personal information
on protesters, organisers, social movement leaders, and bystanders. Surveillance implicates
not only the rights to protest but also individual’s right to privacy.
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Although surveillance and intelligence collection may serve legitimate purposes, in certain
circumstances, they can also have a chilling effect over the right to protest, infringe privacy
rights, and violate associated human rights. It is important for policing institutions to
understand and acknowledge the history of misuse of these powers. Intelligence gathering
and surveillance tactics have been used by policing institutions as tools of political and
ideological persecution with the goal of silencing dissent, disrupting people’s ability to
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Rights, Art 11.
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organise, cracking down on social movements, and delegitimising their leaders and their
social demands.
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Indiscriminate surveillance, which involves the indiscriminate collection and retention
of personal information, should be prohibited. The creation and retention of activist or
organisational databases has the effect of criminalising groups and individuals based on
their group membership. Any retention and use of personal information obtained through
surveillance must be strictly regulated by a clear national law that is in compliance with
human rights principles.
Practice 22: Prohibit the indiscriminate use of surveillance technologies
The use of indiscriminate surveillance technologies that facilitate the mass capture and
retention of personal information in the context of protests should be prohibited in
accordance with privacy and other individual and collective rights. These powerful new
technologies tend to be deployed in secret – without public notice or discussion, nor proper
safeguards or proper judicial authorisation. This not only intrudes on people’s privacy
but also undermines policing based on openness, transparency and trust. In this way,
these technologies can also have a chilling effect over the right to protest and expression
and can deteriorate the relationship between the police and the public. Indiscriminate
collection and retention of personal information treats everyone in, or in the vicinity of, a
protest or a protest group as a suspect. It is by definition not justified by any individualised
determination and it violates the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.
In the United States, for example, law enforcement are using “sophisticated surveillance
products that draw information from social media and then create easy-to-search databases
for police to look at, [to monitor] where activists are meeting, what they’re saying and
when they’re saying it.” Another increasingly used technology to surveil protesters and
activists are IMSI-catchers, also known as “Stingrays” or “cell site simulators”, invasive cell
phone surveillance devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick cell
phones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. “An IMSI
catcher can potentially capture the call activity of thousands of innocent bystanders while
looking for a single suspect or small group of suspects.”
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Facial recognition technologies are also increasingly used by policing institutions and
their use during protests is highly problematic and intrusive. As of 2016, only five states
in the United States had passed laws limiting some discrete aspect of facial recognition
technology use by policing institutions. These laws are all very limited in scope. The vast
majority of states leave policies governing the use of these technologies up to individual
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security institutions. Disturbingly, most institutions provide little (if any) guidance on
the proper use of facial recognition software. Out of the fifty-two institutions identified
by the Georgetown Center on Privacy & Technology in the United States as maintaining
facial recognition programs, twenty-four of them did not disclose a policy and were
not clearly covered by another service’s policy. Five of these institutions explicitly said
that they had no use policy at all. Of the security services that did provide policies,
only a few required probable cause prior to use of facial recognition technology, more
required reasonable suspicion, and most required a vague “criminal justice purpose” or
didn’t suggest any legal standard at all. This is particularly problematic because of the
high risk of misuse of facial recognition. Any technology that captures and facilitates
the retention of personal identifying information of masses of people, protesters and
bystanders, seriously interferes with the people’s right to privacy and to protest.
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Practice 23: Institute a legal framework that regulates and limits the retention and
use of personal information as well as complies with the principles of necessity,
proportionality and non-discrimination
The wide discretion granted to security institutions to engage in surveillance practices
in the context of protests can give way to the development of intrusive practices. Such
practices are often rationalised by invoking generalised risks of potential disruptive or
criminal behaviour. That discretion must be limited. The collection, retention, or use of
personal information in the context of protest must be regulated by law and comply
with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Surveillance may be conducted as
part of an existing criminal investigation, or subject to an individualised determination
of probable cause, or reasonable grounds to believe, that a crime has been or will be
committed. As noted in the Joint Report, “[l]egislation and policies regulating the collection
and processing of information relating to assemblies or their organizers and participants
must incorporate legality, necessity and proportionality tests. Given the intrusiveness of
such methods, the threshold for these tests is especially high.
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Several police commanders interviewed for this report said that recording events may
allow law enforcement to forgo making arrests for low-level offences during a protest.
They reasoned that by not intervening during the event, they are able to minimise conflict.
However, surveilling an entire event, identifying individual protesters, and compiling that
information cannot be justified by the aim of pursuing low-level offences after the event.
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Generalised claims of possible criminality tend to be used to justify surveillance against
certain politically and socially disfavoured groups, political dissidents, or marginalised
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Stephen White, OBE, Vice President for Europe, the Soufan Group, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 19, 2017).
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groups, among others. When individuals of a certain community or political viewpoint
are identified as posing a “threat” based on nothing more than membership in a group,
there is no individualised or evidence-based justification. Not only does such targeted use
of surveillance violate the principle of non-discrimination, it cannot satisfy the standards
of necessity and proportionality.
271

The surveillance of Black Lives Matter (BLM) activists by law enforcement in the United
States provides a powerful example of how disfavoured groups have been targeted by
policing institutions. A former NYPD detective speaking about police surveillance of BLM
protesters in 2014–2015 explained the standard operating procedure of identifying the
leaders of protests groups. “If you take out the biggest mouth, everybody just withers
away”, he said, explaining, “[once] you identify that person, you can run computer checks
on them to see if they have a warrant out or any summons failures, then you can drag
them in before they go out to speak or rile up the crowd.” Serving as a speaker at a
protest or leading a group in protest does not provide a legitimate basis for conducting
surveillance operations. Nor is the aim of shutting down an event, ensuring that the crowd
“withers away”, a legitimate aim of surveillance or any other tactic.
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This type of surveillance and the accompanying practice of seeking to establish reasons
to arrest and remove protesters is even more problematic when it is used against
communities of colour and groups protesting against the government or police institutions.
In the case of NYPD surveillance of BLM activists, there was no evidence of unlawful or
criminal conduct, and nothing that could reasonably merit undercover operations lasting
months and involving surveillance of individuals before and during events. This was also
the case during the 2014 Football World Cup in Brazil where security institutions tracked
social media, tapped phones, and surveilled organisers, carrying out pre-event arrests for
organising a protest. These measures were explained as necessary because “it is difficult
to obtain satisfactory proof as to the criminal responsibility of those who commit crimes
during protests.” Such justifications are clear violations of the above-mentioned principles.
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Imani Robinson, an organiser and an activist from England and former organiser in BLM in
England, spoke about the heavy surveillance experienced by minority activists in London.
Police confiscating phones and searching for personal information and contact details
(all without a search warrant) is a common enough practice during BLM events that Ms
Robinson advises protesters to bring burner phones instead of their personal phones.
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ARGENTINA: ILLEGAL ESPIONAGE AND COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. Two cases from 2011 and 2015 in Argentina illustrate
how surveillance and intelligence activities are used to surveil social movements
and political and social leaders. In 2011, a group of union leaders and workers were
in a labour dispute with the multinational food company, Kraft. During a workers’
assembly, officers from Argentina’s Gendarmerie (a national security institution)
infiltrated the assembly as undercover agents. The agents were in possession of
judicial warrants that only enabled them to identify workers that were allegedly
committing the crime of blocking a highway.
The workers, who realised that they had been infiltrated, filed a judicial complaint.
This complaint revealed that the Gendarmerie had collected information about the
workers’ political and ideological affiliation, which was being stored in databases,
and was beyond the scope of the judicial warrants. These databases dated back
to the 1990s and included information about different political and social actors,
gathered through undercover policing and illegal surveillance.
In 2015, a public defendant from the City of Esquel, Chubut, Argentina accused the
judiciary of retaining intelligence information on journalists from the area, and on
environmental and indigenous activists from the Mapuche people. The defendant
found this information in a judicial criminal file, which related to allegations of
land seizure against the Mapuche Lof Cushamen community, in the possession of
the Chubut’s Attorney’s Office.
It was revealed that the information had been collected through illegal surveillance
and through diverse sources and analysis practices for classifying the activists.
The information included photos taken from social media platforms and during
protests, and had notes scribbled on them with phrases such as “permanently
holds value judgements over the activity of government officials and the forces”;
“in the events he/she always remains in the back watching and rarely gives
statements or participates in press conferences”; and “it has been revealed that
in the last months he/she travelled across the country to meet with assemblies”.
An investigation revealed that the information had been provided to the judicial
officer by an agent from Argentina’s Federal Intelligence Agency, without
justification or a lawful request to provide the information.
Practice 24: Mandate that non-state actors are only deployed in the context of
protests where there is express enabling legislation and policies that subject them
to the same, if not more restrictive, principles than those governing policing and
security institutions
The use of non-state actors in context of protests, particularly in rural areas where they
are reportedly often deployed, should be strictly prohibited unless expressly authorised by
enabling legislation which subjects non-state actors to the same (if not higher) standards
than those binding policing institutions. Importantly, non-state actors cannot be used to
circumvent human rights standards that apply to security institutions belonging to the
state and states “cannot lawfully engage in any activity, or conclude any agreement with
. . . non-state actors, the foreseeable consequences of which would undermine or defeat
90

the very object and purpose of [a] right, or of any of the ancillary rights designed to give it
effect in practice”.
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By way of an example, tactics and surveillance employed by private security contractor
TigerSwan against protesters in the indigenous-led movement seeking to stop the Dakota
Access Pipeline in the United States provides an example of a non-state actor carrying out
extensive and sophisticated surveillance operations in informal collaboration with security
services and federal agencies with little to no oversight.
278

As these private actors surveil, infiltrate, agitate, harass, and even attack protesters and
activists, they do so without being subjected to the same stringent standards as state actors.
TigerSwan, in engaging the Dakota Access Pipeline protests, described the movement as
“an ideologically driven insurgency with a strong religious component” which “generally
followed the jihadist insurgency model.” In doing so, it conducted extensive electronic
surveillance, as well as aerial surveillance, and infiltrated the protest camps and activist
groups involved. TigerSwan then strategised ways to use their intelligence and infiltration:
“Exploitation of ongoing native versus non-native rifts, and tribal rifts between peaceful
and violent elements is critical in our effort to delegitimize the anti-DAPL movement.”
This non-state actor, with a particular mission to undermine and delegitimise a protest
movement, provided “daily intelligence updates” to security institutions and pushed for
the arrest and prosecution of activists – at times complaining that some police institutions
were not doing enough with the intelligence provided.
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These actors, when acting as agents of the state, should be subject to the same, if not
more restrictive, principles than those that govern policing and security institutions. Under
international law, the conduct of persons or entities that exercise elements of governmental
authority shall be considered actors of the state. Therefore, the state employing nonstate actors is responsible for any human rights violations committed by these actors, and
must ensure that there is oversight and accountability for their actions.
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The use of indiscriminate surveillance technologies that facilitate
the mass capture and retention of personal information in the
context of protests should be prohibited in accordance with
privacy and other individual and collective rights.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/
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SOUTH AFRICA: PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS AND THE #FEESMUSTFALL
MOVEMENT. During the #FeesMustFall movement from 2015-2017 in which
South Africa students protested for fee-free higher education, many South African
universities increased the number of private security guards on their campuses.
The presence of private security guards has become the norm on university
campuses during student protests, regardless of the fact that they have no official
role in terms of South African protest legislation.
The role of private security during the protests was to protect university property
and protect the universities’ interests. In September 2017, the students of Cape
Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT) embarked on a protest. CPUT appointed
the same security company that has been used since the 2015 #FeesMustFall
protest, despite allegations of fraudulent dealings between the university and
the company. This security company also had a history of portraying excessively
aggressive and militarised behaviour. During the 2017 protests, university staff
wrote an open letter to the acting Vice Chancellor making an urgent call for the
removal of the private security company and the “militarisation” of the university.
The security guards of the company were heavily armed with the presence of
“nyalas” (armoured personnel carriers) on the campus. There were allegations
of the private security guards racially profiling students and harassing female
students. The private security was further given a master key to the student
residences which allowed them to access the residences at any given time and
search any student that they suspected of being part of the protests, creating an
atmosphere of fear and terror among the students.
In response, students at the university arranged a mass meeting to discuss the
removal of the private security company. The company surrounded the students
at their meeting which took place in an open area in the university campus. After
several hours, the university management refused to engage with the students
and as a result the students became disgruntled and proceeded to express this
through chanting and continuing their protest on the campus. Shortly after this,
the security guards began firing shots. Students attempted to flee but several
were injured. The university continued to operate in this para-military fashion
over the course of several weeks.
Private security companies have no greater authority than any ordinary citizen in
the management of protests in South Africa. However, the use of private security
in protests has increased and private security has de facto assumed the role of
South African protest policing. South African domestic legislation includes a code
of conduct that private security needs to adhere to. However, it is difficult for
protesters to ensure that private security adheres to these standards as they
are often not clearly identified by name tags which is one of the requirements in
reporting complaints against them.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

The use of indiscriminate surveillance technologies (e.g. facial recognition and IMSI
catchers) during protests should be prohibited.

»»

The collection, retention, and use of the personal information of individual protesters,
organisers, or bystanders by policing and security institutions in the context of protests
should be prohibited in the absence of an individualised suspicion that a crime has
been committed, or is reasonably expected to be committed. The collection, retention,
or use of personal information must comply with human rights standards, including the
principles of necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination.

»»

A generalised and undefined belief that someone taking part in a protest may commit
some offence in the future does not justify surveilling, taking or retaining a photograph,
or recording video footage of protesters.

»»

Any recording of a protest by police institutions should be open, transparent, publicised,
and for the purpose of protecting the protest and the protesters with the goal of using
the material for review and evaluation of the police intervention in a protest. A clear
protocol about how to save, store, preserve, access, and delete the material should be in
place as well as mechanisms and processes to promote public access to the recordings
– particularly in instances of the use of force.

»»

During an event, protesters cannot be stopped and compelled to submit to searches or
photographed without evidence that unlawful conduct has taken place or is reasonably
suspected to take place and they are suspected of being responsible for that conduct. A
decision by police officials to institute these procedures must be subject to the principles
of proportionality and necessity.

»»

The state should not keep any permanent records or databases of activists, organisers,
and individuals involved in social movements.

»»

Seizure of mobile phones and devices and the search of contact details should only
be permitted if there is probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe (based on
credible evidence) that a crime has been, is, or will be committed by the individual
whose device is searched or seized.

»»

Non-state actors should not conduct surveillance or security activities in the context
of protests. To the extent that they engage in these activities, there must be express
enabling legislation and policies that subject them to the same, if not more restrictive,
principles than those governing security services – in line with standards concerning
human rights and state responsibility.
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4

ACCOUNTABILITY AND
OVERSIGHT

Effective oversight also requires an independent body
empowered to investigate misconduct allegations and
recommend disciplinary sanctions, as well as rigorous
internal supervision and investigation.
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OVERVIEW
Ensuring that those who have the power to enforce the law are also subject to it is
critical to ensuring compliance with law and policy but it also often presents a challenge.
Accountability mechanisms are critical. Public trust is severely undermined if police abuse
and criminality goes unchecked.
This section proposes good practices for democratic police accountability and details how
these external and internal oversight mechanisms, in addition to the judicial system, can
build public trust in policing institutions, address patterns of violence and misconduct,
and even vindicate members of policing institutions who engage in good practices. It
also documents the importance of transparency to ensure professionalised policing that
complies with human rights standards.

A. INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International law requires that “[t]he state and its organs shall be held accountable
for their actions in relation to assemblies.” This forms part of the state’s “obligation
to provide to those whose rights have been violated in the context of an assembly an
adequate, effective, and prompt remedy determined by a competent authority having
the power to enforce remedies.”
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•

To fulfil this obligation, “[s]tates should establish and fund . . . non-judicial oversight
including . . . a statutory independent oversight body.” This statutory independent
oversight body must possess all competence and powers for effective protection of
rights in the context of assemblies. The independent body should be empowered to
“investigate complaints from the public, to accept referrals from [policing institutions]
and to initiate investigations itself where it is in the public interest to do so. The body
should investigate all cases of use of force by security services.”
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286

•

The ability to file complaints with monitoring and oversight mechanisms must be
guaranteed to all persons without fear of reprisals or punishment.
287

•

As expressed by the IACHR, impunity produces a strong chilling effect on the exercise of
freedom of expression and the consequences for democracy – which depends on a free,
open, and dynamic exchange of ideas and information – can be particularly severe.
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Joint report, supra note 1 at 20.

Id. at ¶ 89. Similarly, the ACHPR Guidelines state, at para 8.1, that the responsibility of state parties and law enforcement agencies
to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the right to assemble freely with others extends to establishing effective procedures for reporting and reviewing any unlawful use of force, and to providing an adequate, effective and prompt remedy to persons who experience
human rights violations due to the policing of assemblies.
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Id. at ¶ 96(b).

286

Id. at ¶ 96(d).
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IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Violence against journalists and media workers: Inter-American
standards and national practices on prevention, protection and prosecution of perpetrators. OEA/Ser.L/V/II., CIDH/RELE/INF. 12/13, 31
December 2013, para. 2.
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GOOD PRACTICES
The importance of developing an effective independent oversight mechanism for
accountability cannot be overstated. Having judicial and other institutional mechanisms
that fairly investigate claims of misconduct and violence can help ease tensions between
crowds and policing institutions. When people believe that officers who violate human rights
will face consequences, they are less likely to escalate tensions when they see misbehaviour.
Furthermore, public trust in an independent oversight mechanism provides a powerful
tool for vindicating security institutions when public safety requires intervention. Effective
oversight therefore contributes to a legitimacy-enhancing cycle that improves trust and
makes the facilitation of protests less risky for both protesters and policing institutions.
289

290

While this section focuses on independent oversight mechanisms, judicial oversight is an
essential component of external oversight and accountability. An effective judicial system
enforces sanctions against offending officers, compensates victims for harms suffered,
provides vindication for rights that are violated, and seeks to deter future misconduct.
Court supervision is particularly valuable if other accountability mechanisms are lacking or
untrustworthy.
291

Effective oversight also requires an independent body empowered to investigate misconduct
allegations and recommend disciplinary sanctions, as well as rigorous internal supervision
and investigation. Such oversight mechanisms provide a necessary supplement to judicial
remedies by focusing on identifying wrongdoing and criminality. Multiple levels of oversight
thus make it more likely that acts of misconduct or criminality in policing institutions are
detected and dealt with. When officers are allowed to circumvent consequences, it sends
a message that policing institutions are above the law or are held to a different standard
than ordinary citizens – and not to more rigorous codes of conduct as should be the case
with law enforcement agents.
292

Practice 25: Establish, maintain, and capacitate an independent oversight body with
sufficient authority to effectively investigate complaints
International legal standards explicitly require states to establish an independent police
oversight body with a strong mandate. An effective accountability mechanism must
have sufficient access to carry out an investigation and be empowered and capacitated
to prosecute individual officers for violations of the law or internal regulations. To do
this, the independent oversight body must: accept and investigate complaints from the
public; take referrals from members of policing institutions, including through a protected
disclosure mechanism; have the authority to unilaterally initiate investigations; investigate
all instances of the use of force; have full investigatory powers; and be financially viable
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This Report focuses on practices most relevant for accountability in the context of policing protests. Much work has been done
elsewhere extensively identifying good practices in the field of police accountability writ large. See generally, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra
note 46; Craig B. Futterman, Chaclyn Hunt & Jamie Kalven, Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125 (2016).
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See HANDBOOK, supra note 46 at 8–9 (“enhancing accountability can improve police legitimacy and increase public confidence,
which in turn will reinforce the integrity of the system.”); cf. JAPHET BIEGON, ABDULLAHI BORU & DELLY MAWAZO, DOMESTIC ADHERENCE TO CONTINENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN THE PRACTICE OF POLICING ASSEMBLIES IN AFRICA 12––13 (2017).
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See Interview with Raju Bhatt, Solicitor, Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, in London, Eng. (Dec. 15, 2017).

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 7––9, 46––70 (2017). (“The failure to review
and investigate officer use of force has helped create a culture in which officers expect to use force and not be questioned about the
need for or propriety of that use. In this way, CPD’s failure to adequately review officer use of force on a regular basis has combined
with CPD’s failure to properly train and supervise officers to perpetuate a pattern of unlawful use of force within CPD.”).
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or have the financial resources to operate. Policing institutions and other state agents
should be statutorily obligated to facilitate and co-operate with oversight investigations.
The obstruction of, or interference with, an oversight investigation should be an offence.
294

Beyond this baseline, the independent bodies should also “have oversight over the entire
police complaints system”, including the power to conduct systemic reviews of the
practices of policing institutions to identify underlying problems and causes and make
systemic recommendations. Such practices and policies should focus on both urban and
rural areas and delineate procedures for reporting every incident in which the police use
force (whether it results in injury or not) and for accepting complaints. The findings of
investigations, including reasons for any dismissals of complaints, should be made public
and easily accessible subject to limitations on disclosure intended to respect the privacy
rights of complainants.
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ARGENTINA: FRUITLESS ATTEMPTS AT ACCOUNTABILITY. The 2016 City
of Buenos Aires Security Law created the Office of Transparency and External
Control. The Office is charged with the duty to publish the complete files of all
relevant investigations on offences committed by police officers. So far, the
government has not fulfilled that obligation.
At the national level, Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) has faced a
series of obstacles when submitting requests for access to public information on
operational matters in the context of protests and national intelligence. Despite the
existence of the law on access to public information (Law 27.275), the responses
to these requests have been perfunctory, incomplete, or altogether absent.
On 27 November 2017, CELS presented a request for information addressed to
the National Security Minister, Patricia Bullrich, regarding an operation carried
out two days prior by federal forces in the Río Negro province. During this
operation, a member of the Mapuche community of Villa Mascardi, Rafael Nahuel,
was murdered. The operation was in response to a protest by the Mapuche
community over land rights. The Ministry responded with a generic statement
that the operation had been carried out in accordance with the law. There was no
administrative investigation.
Public access is compromised here by the failure of public authorities to comply with
existing legal requirements of transparency. Additionally, the government has been
claiming national security exemptions on intelligence activities with no real oversight –
further frustrating accountability and transparency provided for in the law.
Practice 26: Empower independent oversight mechanisms to impose disciplinary
measures, subpoena witnesses, and initiate prosecutions for violations
Accountability and legitimacy are compromised when the mandate of independent
oversight bodies does not include the power to impose disciplinary measures or to
294

See Joint Report, supra note 1, at ¶ 96(d).
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HANDBOOK, supra note 46 at 71.

Id, at 55 (“Independent oversight bodies that investigate complaints need to be empowered to do so properly and allowed to identify underlying problems and causes . . . and recommend systemic changes.”).
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prompt or initiate criminal prosecutions, and when policing institutions and prosecutors
fail to follow the recommendations or take into account the findings of the independent
oversight body.
Even if disciplinary decisions ultimately remain in the hands of these other actors,
implementing the recommendations should be expected to follow. The adoption of
disciplinary decisions should not rely on calculations of alleged political costs and benefits
of complying with the recommendation. Commanders and prosecutors may have
incentives to “go easy” on the front line officers whom they lead or rely on for cases and
evidence. Vesting the independent oversight body with disciplinary and enforcement
powers, or creating an independent and standalone tribunal to adjudicate and enforce
oversight body recommendations, can overcome this problem. For instance, in Northern
Ireland, the Police Ombudsman has independent authority to investigate suspected
violations and to issue recommendations for discipline or prosecution – recommendations
that are regularly followed.
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Moreover, when the oversight bodies decide not to pursue criminal charges or disciplinary
proceedings, they must adequately disclose to the public their reasons for doing so. The rate
at which the oversight body sustains complaints can provide a good indicator as to whether
investigators take their duties seriously. For example, an academic in England described
a situation in which “there have been thousands of complaints of racism in policing but
none have been upheld.” Low sustained rates often result from “numerous entrenched,
systemic policies and practices that undermine . . . accountability [in policing institutions].”
Even in the best case, low rates of sustained complaints indicate an alarming disconnect
between the experiences of the communities doing the reporting and the experiences of
investigators. Transparency by independent oversight bodies thus holds the investigators
themselves accountable to the public and reinforces confidence in the complaints system.
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Practice 27: Mandate that the oversight process is independent and insulated from
the influence of policing institutions
An effective oversight process requires that the oversight body be independent of politics
or ties to the policing institutions. Ensuring sufficient independence in turn requires a
legally protected commitment to unbiased and professional fact-finding. The staff of the
independent oversight body should display “rigor and professionalism” in carrying out their
duties. To achieve this goal, the oversight body should have a statutory underpinning,
funding separate from the budget of policing institutions, and “complete discretion in
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Interview with Corey Stoughton, Advocacy Director, Liberty, in London, Eng. (Dec. 13, 2017); see also Interview with Dr. Adam Elliott-Cooper, King’s College London, in London, Eng. (Dec. 12, 2017).
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Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 293.) (“In the rare instances when complaints of misconduct are sustained, we found that
discipline is haphazard and unpredictable, and is meted out in a way that does little to deter misconduct.”).
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The Institute for Conflict Research, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 18, 2017); Interview with Stephen White, OBE, Vice President for Europe, the
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Interview with Raju Bhatt, Solicitor, Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, in London, Eng. (Dec. 15, 2017).
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the performance or exercise of its functions.” Additionally, “there must be a fair and
transparent appointment process for the body’s commissioners or councillors”, with an
opportunity for public participation. The selection of staff “should be based on merit rather
than on political or any other affiliation.”
305

306

Policing institutions should foster a culture of compliance and support of independent
oversight and accountability mechanisms. In the modern context of public scrutiny via
smartphones and instant media, an effective accountability regime can make police
interactions with the public easier, and it can help clarify whether or not a police official
is responsible for alleged misconduct or criminality. Conversely, members of policing
institutions should not exploit public opinion to impede or push back against independent
oversight. For example, the engagement of policing institutions in the context of protests
was one of the first issues addressed by Chile’s National Institute for Human Rights after
the government established it in 2010. This oversight body was initially very critical of
police practices, but political pushback was so severe that the Institute shifted its focus to
other human rights issues out of concern for institutional survival. This kind of political
or bureaucratic influence over oversight mechanisms undermines the aims of oversight
bodies and ultimately makes the policing of protests harder, not easier, by deteriorating
trust between police and protesters.
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The oversight body should also be representative of the communities that are policed and
should engage, where possible, with communities in understanding community concerns.
For instance, the oversight body and policing institutions should be representative with
respect to gender and gender identity. They should ensure that gender-specific issues,
such as sexualised searches and other claims of sexual violence or intimidation, are not
unwittingly ignored. An independent and representative oversight body must also avoid
indirect affiliations with policing institutions. One of the most frequent complaints voiced
by members of civil society in England is that staffing oversight bodies with former police
officers can create undue institutional sympathy in favour of the policing institutions.
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311

Practice 28: Enable an open, accessible, and safe complaints mechanism, with a
particular emphasis on facilitating complaints relating to gender-based violence
Finally, the oversight body should be open and accessible to the public. For instance, in
disciplinary proceedings against an officer, complainants should be allowed party status.
Allowing complainants to participate in adjudicative hearings facilitates the oversight and

305
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Cf. Interview with Gary White, MBE, Senior Police Advisor, Saferworld, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 18, 2017); Interview with Nigel Goddard,
Superintendent, Police Services of Northern Ireland, in Belfast, N. Ir. (Dec. 20, 2017).
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Skype Interview with Michelle Bonner, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Victoria (Jan. 25, 2018).
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See HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 15 (recommending men and women have equal representation in police institutions and accountability structures, and that police adopt “gender mainstreaming” strategies that “mak[e] the concerns and experiences of women
as well as men an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all spheres so
that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated”); Jasmine Sankofa, Mapping the Blank: Centering Black Women’s
Vulnerability to Police Sexual Violence to Upend Mainstream Police Reform, 59 HOW. L. J. 651, 666 (2016); cf. PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD
98–103 (2017).
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Advocacy Director, Liberty, in London, Eng. (Dec. 13, 2017); Interview with Dr. Adam Elliott-Cooper, King’s College London, in London,
Eng. (Dec. 12, 2017).
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accountability process by ensuring that the interests of victims are safeguarded and by
bolstering the independence and transparency of oversight institutions.
312

To be open and accessible, the oversight body and police departments must use support
structures and protocols that facilitate public complaints. This is particularly true when
dealing with complaints of gender-based intimidation, coercion, manipulation, and
violence by officers. Such complaints are often overlooked in the popular discourse
surrounding police accountability. Nevertheless, police sexual violence is a widespread
and systemic problem that often has a disparate impact on women, particularly women
of colour. In the United States, for example, the only police behaviour more frequently
complained about than gender-based violence is excessive force. Furthermore, such
sexual misconduct and violence is likely underreported. Victims are generally chosen
because of their perceived vulnerability and often fear retribution from police if they come
forward. The general reticence of sexual assault survivors to report the crime is also welldocumented. To combat this, oversight bodies and police departments should adopt “no
tolerance” policies and conduct regular hiring, training, and supervision activities in ways
that emphasise the unacceptability of police sexual misconduct and violence.
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Because police sexual violence shatters trust in a particularly acute and personal
manner, investigators must protect complainants from retaliation, re-traumatisation, and
criminalisation. For instance, in the case of complaints of sexual violence, any information
that might disclose the identity of the complainant should not be disclosed without the
consent of the complainant. Unfortunately, in practice the provision of systemic support to
sexual violence complainants remains largely aspirational. This status quo must change.
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Because police sexual violence shatters trust in a particularly acute
and personal manner, investigators must protect complainants
from retaliation, re-traumatisation, and criminalisation.

See, e.g., COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, OPINION OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE DETERMINATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE ¶ 30, 77–79 (2009), https://rm.coe.
int/16806daa54.
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See, e.g., Sankofa, supra note 312, at 689–93.

Gender-based police “misconduct” can range from lewd or inappropriate remarks or comments to allegations of sexual assault or
rape. See, e.g., Cara E. Trombadore, Police Officer Sexual Misconduct: An Urgent Call to Action in a Context Disproportionately Threatening
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See generally GOLDMAN ET AL, supra note 278; INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION, THE ABUSE OF POLICE POWERS
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NORTHERN IRELAND: THE POLICE OMBUDSMAN. The Police Ombudsman
in Northern Ireland provides a good example of effective independent oversight.
The peace process, which ended the ethnic violence between Northern Ireland’s
Protestant majority and its Catholic minority, brought substantial reforms to police
oversight. Today, the Ombudsman’s Office is empowered to recommend that an
officer be disciplined, fired, or prosecuted for “police misconduct”. It takes complaints
from the public, is “well-resourced”, and has “complete access to investigate.” In
conducting investigations, the Ombudsman has “powers of constable” which give
it authority to search and seize evidence from police and arrest officers when
necessary. Additionally, as one former commander explained, “anytime a police
officer draws a weapon, they are supposed to notify the Ombudsman’s Office and
offer a justification for why it was necessary.” Experts interviewed for this report
uniformly described the positive impact this powerful Ombudsman’s Office has had
on policing in Northern Ireland.
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An example of a policing of protests investigation by the Police Ombudsman’s
office shows the benefits of these broad powers. On 12 July 2011, violence broke
out in Ardoyne area of Belfast “as Nationalist protesters demonstrated against a
contentious Orange Order parade.” Responding to “stones, heavy masonry, and
roof slates” thrown at officers by the rioters, police authorised use of water cannons
and rubber bullets. The Ombudsman’s office relied upon several key processes to
evaluate the legality of this use of force. All discharges of firearms, including rubber
bullets, were automatically referred to the Ombudsman which collected all relevant
paperwork and use of force reports completed by officers and their commanders.
The Ombudsman placed a senior investigating officer at the event to observe police
decision-making and practices. The investigators also reviewed records to establish
exactly when permissions for use of force were granted and how events unfolded.
Additionally, the investigators checked to make sure each officer who handled
and discharged a weapon had been properly trained and authorised to use those
weapons. The investigators then evaluated measures taken prior to use of force
aimed at preventing the need to use force, and the proportionality of the measure
given the gravity of the threat.
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In finding the police use of force justified, the Ombudsman concluded that police
properly “employed a series of tactics—including discussions with different parties,
the deployment of officers on foot and in vehicles, the use of water cannon, and
the issuing of verbal warnings—before resorting to the use of baton rounds when
these proved ineffective.”
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

States should create independent bodies charged with investigating and adjudicating
misconduct, the use of force, and alleged criminality by policing institutions as well as
systemic reviews of policies and practices.

»»

The independent oversight and accountability mechanisms must have sufficient
funding, resources, audit powers, the power of subpoena, and independence to ensure
effective investigation.

»»

Reporting use of force by policing institutions to the independent mechanism should
be required by law and mandated through internal processes.

»»

Policing and state agents should be obligated, by statute, to facilitate and co-operate with
oversight investigations. Obstruction of, or interference with, an oversight investigation
should be an offence.

»»

A culture of compliance and support of independent oversight and accountability
mechanisms should be fostered.

»»

The public should be able to bring complaints for investigation by the independent
oversight mechanism.

»»

Complainants should have full party status during adjudicative proceedings on the
complaint.

»»

The findings of investigations, including reasons for any dismissals of complaints, should
be made public and easily accessible – subject to limitations on disclosure intended to
respect the privacy rights of complainants.

»»

In the case of complaints of sexual violence or misconduct, any information that
might disclose the identity of the complainant (including the identity of the implicated
officer,) should not be disclosed by the oversight institution without the consent of the
complainant.

»»

Support structures and protocols for sexual violence complainants should be
established. The best interests of the complainant should be protected and promoted
throughout the complaint and accountability process.

»»

The independent oversight mechanisms must be empowered to impose disciplinary
measures or trigger prosecution of individual officers for misconduct or criminality.
Decisions not to pursue prosecutions should be made public (and, where possible,
should be accompanied by certificates of non-prosecution) to enable complainants and
private parties to pursue other remedies.
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B. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND POLICIES
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International law requires that “[t]he state and its organs shall be held accountable
for their actions in relation to assemblies.” To fulfil this obligation, “[s]tates should
establish and fund . . . non-judicial oversight, including an effective internal investigations
process.” As part of these internal procedures, “[a] law enforcement officer who is
under investigation, external or internal, should not be redeployed into the field until
the investigation is complete and the officer is cleared of wrongdoing.”
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•

Governments and law enforcement agencies must ensure that superior officers are
held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials
under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and
firearms and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress, or
report such use.
333

•

Law enforcement agencies must have post-assembly debriefing processes in place.
These processes should promote monitoring, evaluation, and learning from the law
enforcement operation on effective facilitation of the right to assemble. The process
should identify both failings and good practices as well as the effectiveness of risk
assessments and contingency plans for the event.
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GOOD PRACTICES
Policing institutions are obliged to develop internal processes and practices to promote
transparency and accountability, including, but not limited to, establishing clear policies
for effective internal investigations for use of force and suspected misconduct and
criminality. Such internal practices can play a large role in the effectiveness of accountability
mechanisms. If policing institutions choose not to co-operate with oversight mechanisms –
such as by adopting a “code of silence” – they can significantly diminish the efficacy of the
overall accountability scheme.
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The resistance of policing institutions to oversight shifts responsibility to administrative
and judicial oversight bodies, while simultaneously making it more difficult for these bodies
to gather the information needed to investigate and adjudicate complaints. And if there
are little or no consequences for the abuse of power, a system of impunity for misconduct
and criminality can develop. On the other hand, support for accountability mechanisms by
policing institutions not only facilitates the identification and correction of practices that
violate rights – it helps create a culture of protection and promotion of the rights to protest.
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Practice 29: Require that internal investigations and disciplinary processes for
misconduct and criminality by members of policing institutions are instituted,
effectively investigated, and completed
Regardless of what external mechanisms are put in place, policing institutions themselves
should investigate alleged misconduct and criminality and impose disciplinary measures
where appropriate. Such internal mechanisms not only provide another avenue of
remedying misconduct and criminality, but also help officers internalise principles of
human rights-compliant and professionalised policing. Investigations carried out internally
should be meaningful and effective – the goal should be to improve the quality of policing,
not to shield officers from the consequences of criminal conduct.
A key component of effective internal investigation is to mandate reporting of uses of
force within the command structure and to the independent oversight body. Without
data on the frequency, circumstances, and justifications underlying use of force incidents,
evaluating the effectiveness of existing policies, training, or review processes is severely
limited. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department requires internal and external
reporting any time force is used by obligating the internal investigator to notify both the
district attorney and the independent Inspector General’s office.
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These kinds of reporting and notice requirements should supplement a wider emphasis on
de-escalation and non-escalation tactics. If police leadership is to take the need to provide
meaningful accountability seriously, it must also recognise and commend officers who
consistently have positive interactions with protesters or who consistently de-escalate or
do not escalate difficult or trying situations. It must also provide officers with structural
support services that facilitate good policing, including timely and adequate mental health
and social services.
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Relatedly, part of facilitating robust internal investigations is the protection of investigators
or officers co-operating with an investigation from recrimination or backlash from fellow
officers. Police officers conducting internal investigations should never face pressure or
coercion to alter their findings. A serious failure of accountability occurs if investigating
officers engaged in good policing – who make genuine findings of misconduct or provide
evidence and testimony – subsequently face more dangerous assignments, less ability to
call for backup, negative performance reviews, or pressure to resign.
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Finally, officers found to have committed wrongdoing must face meaningful disciplinary
measures. Discipline appeals processes, like adjudications of first instance, should be
independent and impartial. Officers found to have committed an offence should not be
allowed to avoid the consequences of their actions. In short, police commanders must
always take meaningful action on findings of wrongdoing in order to uphold departmental
policy and deter future misconduct or criminality. For example, in Chile a wave of public
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resignations followed the death of a bystander at a protest event in 2011 when two police
officers fired Uzi submachine guns at the crowd. However, these resignations were
mostly for show. The majority of officers who resigned were merely reassigned to different
posts. This sort of false accountability fails to address the systemic issues that allowed
police officers to use live ammunition at a protest in clear violation of international human
rights standards.
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Practice 30: Identify and eliminate processes which frustrate or delay internal
investigations
Due process requires proper investigatory procedures to prevent arbitrary adverse
outcomes. The risk of an officer under investigation, using their expertise to cover up
violations or otherwise undermine investigations before they start, should be addressed.
For instance, officers are well positioned to disrupt the chain of custody of a crucial piece
of evidence against them, thereby making it significantly more difficult for the relevant
fact-finder to determine whether misconduct or criminality occurred.
Effective accountability therefore requires the police to ensure that bad investigatory
practices do not get built into either external or internal investigations. Such bad practices
include: failing to interview witnesses; failing to collect physical evidence like spent
ammunition; failing to consider, account for, or remedy “[t]he potential for inappropriate
coordination of testimony, risk of collusion, and witness coaching during interviews”; asking
cursory questions “aimed at eliciting favourable statements justifying the officer’s actions
rather than seeking truth”; failing to challenge inconsistencies or illogical explanations
during questioning; asking “leading questions favourable to the officer”; failing “to review
and incorporate probative evidence from parallel civil and criminal proceedings based on
the same police incident”; drafting reports “in a manner favourable to the officer by omitting
conflicts in testimony or with physical evidence that undermine the officer’s justification or
by exaggerating evidence favourable to the officer”; and failing to hold officers accountable
for lying to investigators or making “affirmative efforts to conceal evidence.”
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In sum, effective oversight requires upholding the standards of good policing in the
oversight context and avoiding investigatory practices that insulate officers or create
opportunities for collusion, concealment of evidence, or lying. Police officers accused of
misconduct or criminal conduct deserve the same due process protections as everyone
else. Collective bargaining agreements or “Law Enforcement Bills of Rights” that enshrine
into law or practice process requirements that grant special protections for police and
inhibit the effective investigation of accused officers are plainly inappropriate.
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Practice 31: Engage in reflective debriefing sessions after protests that identify
successes, failures, and areas of improvement
In addition to internal investigations that focus on specific instances of misconduct, policing
institutions should also evaluate their record of protecting and promoting human rights
at a systemic level. Carrying out broader review of practices seeks not only to prevent
individual officers from violating human rights, but also to improve department policy so
that rights violations become less likely in the first place.
348

One way to accomplish this goal is to engage in post-event debriefs that allow officers
and commanders to learn from their experiences. Debriefs offer policing institutions the
opportunity to consider rights vindications and rights violations from a broader perspective.
Rather than focusing on individual cases of wrongdoing, debriefs allow police to step back
and consider the ways in which the department as a unit succeeded or failed in protecting
human rights, how events unfolded, and whether a different decision at a key point may
have prevented escalation. The Honourable Frank Iacobucci, former Puisne Justice on the
Supreme Court of Canada, has drawn attention to “the importance of conducting debriefs
in a manner that respects officers’ mental health needs” as well as the utility of debrief selfanalysis, including “whether the officer experienced fear, anxiety and other psychological
and emotional effects during the encounter, and techniques for coping with those effects
while trying to de-escalate a situation.” And as noted by Dr. Alok Mukherjee, former chair
of the Toronto Police Services Board (Canada), debriefing “is not just a training tool, but
an accountability tool that supervisors should use to reinforce the use of de-escalation
tactics.” Good practices should also include allowing policing institutions to consider
issues of systemic discrimination in the protesting context, such as how deployment tactics,
staffing assignments, and arrest decisions can adversely affect women, racial or ethnic
communities, members of the LGBTQI+ community, and other marginalised groups.
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Lessons learned in the debrief can then be applied in the next protesting event. Debriefs
thus provide for an iterative process that builds institutional expertise in rights protection.
Since debriefs can also provide essential information to police oversight bodies who are
engaging in post-event reviews of police conduct, this iterative process ideally includes
engaging with and incorporating systemic guidance from police oversight bodies.

Lessons learned in the debrief can then be applied in the next
protesting event. Debriefs thus provide for an iterative process
that builds institutional expertise in rights protection.
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UNITED STATES: THE LAQUAN MCDONALD COVER-UP. The City of Chicago’s
response to the police shooting of Laquan McDonald provides a paradigmatic
example of poor internal oversight. On 20 October 2014, white Chicago Police
Department (CPD) officer Jason Van Dyke shot seventeen-year-old African-American
Laquan McDonald sixteen times, killing him. Although video of the incident had
been captured on dashcam, the City fought for a year to prevent its public release.
During this time, Officer Van Dyke was placed on paid desk leave. Following a court
order requiring the City to release the video, Van Dyke was charged with murder
mere hours before the dashcam video became publicly available.
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The dashcam video powerfully demonstrated the inadequacy of police records
and the internal investigation. The Chicago Tribune reported:
“In charging Van Dyke with first-degree murder, prosecutors said the officer
opened fire six seconds after exiting his squad car, firing 16 rounds at McDonald
in about 14 seconds as the teen was walking away, and was reloading when
another officer told him to hold his fire. For 13 of those seconds, McDonald
was already lying on the street, prosecutors said. The video did not show
McDonald lunging toward officers as some of them claimed, although there
appears to be a silver object in McDonald’s right hand.”
The reports state investigators viewed the video and found them consistent with
officers’ accounts. In the report that closed the investigation, filed in March [2015],
a detective offered this terse assessment. “Criminal attacked officer,” the report
says, “that officer killed criminal.”
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In the tragic case of Laquan McDonald, officers fabricated a story to cover-up the
misconduct of another officer. An internal investigation not only failed to challenge
or expose the cover-up but accepted it as true. High-level strategic decisions
appear to have been made to suppress evidence and shield Officer Van Dyke from
any accountability until a court order made that position practically and politically
impossible. As a result, the City has suffered an ongoing crisis in public confidence
in the police, and the already fraught relationship between the CPD and the city’s
communities of colour – frequently punctuated by conflicts between police and
protesters denouncing the City’s police department – has deteriorated further.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Policing institutions should establish internal policies and procedures for effective
investigation of complaints for misconduct, use of force, or alleged criminality, and they
should ensure that all officers are aware of their existence and how they work.

»»

Internal investigations must be carried out by high ranking officers or teams with no
involvement in the incident of misconduct or criminality. Preference should be given to
internal investigations carried out by a separate, independent police institution.

»»

States should ensure that no legislation is adopted which frustrates effective investigations
by providing greater procedural protections for officers accused or suspected of
misconduct or alleged criminality than those provided for other government employees
facing dismissal or targets of a criminal investigation (e.g. Law Enforcement Bills of Rights).
In terms of the principles of legality and non-discrimination, officers should not be held to
a lower standard to that of citizens.

»»

An officer under investigation for an offence committed in the context of a protest should
not engage in policing protests until the investigation is complete.

»»

External oversight bodies should be notified why and when an internal investigation is
initiated and completed. Oversight bodies and civil society organisations may be invited
to witness proceedings and to participate as a “friend” or observer in proceedings.

»»

Results of internal investigations should be reported to external oversight bodies and to
the public. Reports on the dismissals of complaints must include written reasons for the
dismissal. Private complainants should have access to the proceedings and have broad
powers to offer evidence and call witnesses.

»»

Departments should implement post-event debriefs to review decisions made and the
steps leading to the use of force, if force was used.

»»

Law enforcement officials should have access to structural, mental health, and social
support systems.

»»

In ordinary performance reviews, police should be evaluated in light of human rightsbased standards.

See, e.g. Ben Austen, Chicago After Laquan McDonald, THE N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/chicago-after-laquan-mcdonald.html; see also Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Video of Chicago Police Shooting a Teenager is Ordered
Released, THE N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/laquan-mcdonald-chicago-police-shooting.html.
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C. TRANSPARENCY
PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS
•

International law provides that “[e]very person has the right to access information related
to assemblies.” In meeting this requirement, “States should proactively disseminate
key information relating to the management of assemblies.” The information
considered key under international law includes: laws and regulations relating to the
management of assemblies; information regarding the responsibilities and procedures
of agencies and bodies that manage assemblies; standard operating procedures and
policies, including codes of conduct, governing the policing of assemblies; the types of
equipment routinely used in policing assemblies; information on the training of law
enforcement officers; and information on how to access accountability processes.
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•

Additionally, “States should enact comprehensive legislation, for example freedom of
information acts, to facilitate public access to information, based upon the principle
of maximum disclosure.” Furthermore, “States should manage information so that
it is comprehensive and easily retrieved, and should respond promptly and fully to all
requests for information.”
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•

Law enforcement agencies should publicly communicate the findings of any internal
debriefings and/or investigations (whether internal and external) resulting from each
assembly operation.
363

GOOD PRACTICES
Transparency in decision-making is an essential component of effective accountability.
Public access enables interested parties to judge for themselves whether state and
police behaviour complies with human rights standards. This public viewing then enables
democratic feedback that can help the state and police better respond to community needs.
Furthermore, transparency should reduce incidences of misconduct by encouraging selfregulation. When police officers and state agents know that their behaviour is under public
scrutiny, they are less likely to engage in activities that violate human rights standards.
Practice 32: Make policies, manuals, reports and statistics on police practices in the
context of protests publicly available
Information about policing in the context of protests should be widely and easily accessible,
in order to provide the maximum opportunity for public understanding and review of police
behaviour. To advance this goal, state officials and the police should ensure: free access to
public records and internal police regulations (including police policies and procedures),
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ample opportunity for media observation of police decision-making and actions, and
civil society observation and monitoring of police behaviour during protests. Such
transparency gives protesters and communities insight into how police make decisions
regarding assemblies, the rules and guidelines they are following, and the policies which
dictate certain strategies and tactics. In turn, these insights inform expectations regarding
police behaviour and help members of the public identify practices that violate the law
or police policy. Access further allows the public to evaluate whether human rightscompliance is embedded in decision-making processes. Finally, transparency plays a
crucial role in accountability by ensuring that the public is adequately informed regarding
who to credit or hold responsible for policing actions.
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As discussed above (see Practice 17 above), policing institutions should also have processes
in place to provide briefings before or at the start of an event on how the event will be
policed. Individuals engaged in journalistic activity should be provided with a contact
person during the event who can respond to specific issues as events unfold. Some
departments have accomplished this by employing a media liaison office and establishing
command posts specifically for media use at protest events. As Chief Doug LePard of
the Metro Vancouver Transit Police explained, “police should communicate well and often.
They should, first, do the right thing and explain what they’re doing and why.”
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Practice 33: Procure crowd-control weapons and equipment in an open and
transparent process
The procurement of equipment and technology, including CCWs, used by policing institutions
in the context of protests often lacks transparency and accountability. The lack of a legal
framework makes it difficult to know and evaluate the process through which decisions
get made to procure these technologies, whether the human rights consequences are
considered and what information is provided to states and policing institutions on how
these weapons should be used.
To fix this gap in regulation and accountability, states and policing institutions should
make public the criteria used to acquire these technologies. Information on testing,
development, impact, and suggested use provided by companies to police should be
provided to the public along with the use of force policies and more specific equipment
policies. It should also be part of the written procurement proceedings and subjected to
audits. Because “guidelines and standard operation procedures are often industry driven
and the people designing (and profiting from) weapons are the ones determining how they
should or should not be used”, public access to and review of these standards is crucial for
democratic accountability. Moreover, states and policing institutions should ensure that
standards and regulations are created in consultation with, and awareness of, groups that
may be disproportionately impacted by crowd-control weapons e.g. children, pregnant
women. Finally, to improve public understanding of how these weapons are used and the
371
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impact they have, detailed reporting requirements should be developed to track the use
of each weapon, the context in which it is used, the specific justification offered for its use,
and a detailed accounting of the resulting injuries.
UNITED STATES: THE STANDING ROCK PROTESTS, 2017. In opposition to
the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline in the midwestern United States,
protesters and water protectors camped out for more than a year near North
Dakota’s Standing Rock Sioux Tribe reservation. Local law enforcement agencies,
led by the Morton County Sheriff’s Department, aggressively deployed militarised
gear and weapons to intimidate peaceful protesters and violently crack down on
a historic indigenous-led movement.
372

Personnel and equipment pouring in from over seventy-five law enforcement
agencies from around the country and National Guard troops created a battlefieldlike atmosphere at Standing Rock.
373

The deployment of CCWs at the Standing Rock protests and the injuries inflicted
by these weapons demonstrate the need for regulation and accountability with
respect to so-called “less lethal weapons”. In addition to automatic rifles, law
enforcement at Standing Rock used sound cannons, tear gas, mace, rubber bullets,
and concussion grenades against water protectors. Police also used potentially
fatal water cannons for hours in below-freezing weather to disperse protesters.
An estimated 300 protesters were injured in November 2016, twenty-six of whom
were hospitalised. According to eyewitness reports, many suffered hypothermia
as a result of being soaked with water from the water cannons while other
demonstrators suffered seizures, multiple bone fractures from projectiles fired
by police, internal bleeding from a rubber bullet injury, broken ligaments, loss of
bowel control, loss of consciousness, and one elder went into cardiac arrest.
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See, e.g., Julia Carrie Wong & Sam Levin, Standing Rock protesters hold out against extraordinary police violence, THE GUARDIAN (Nov.
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DALLAS GOLDTOOTH (Nov. 20, 2016), https://soundcloud.com/dallas-goldtooth.
372

373

Id.

374

Id.

375

Id.

111

The deployment of CCWs at the Standing Rock protests and
the injuries inflicted by these weapons demonstrate the need
for regulation and accountability with respect to so-called
“less lethal weapons.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

»»

Policies for training, protecting, and promoting the rights to protest, use of force
manuals, and basic outlines of decision-making and the chain of command should be
made public and be easily accessible.

»»

Policing institutions should extend access to decision-making processes to media, civil
society, medical, and monitoring groups – prior to, during, and after protests.

»»

Post-event review processes should be accessible to the public. States should inform
the public of the number of people arrested and hospitalised, and the places and
reasons for detention. No names or personal identifying information of people arrested,
hospitalised or detained may be disclosed to the public at large without the consent of
the person concerned.

»»

The state should make public the decision-making processes and criteria used to
determine what crowd-control weapons and equipment are acquired, developed,
or traded. All steps within that decision-making process should be documented and
traceable.

»»

Reporting on the deployment and use of crowd-control weapons and equipment, as
well as all uses of force should be mandated and comprehensive (including description
of circumstances justifying the use of weapons, crowd-control equipment, and/or force).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The practices documented in this report provide a roadmap on how states, and their
policing and security institutions and individual commanders (and officers) can find ways
to better serve the people, to protect their rights, and to identify and address counterproductive/entrenched strategies and practices. This report aims to document successful,
as well as problematic, attempts to improve security approaches to protest and to place
them into a comprehensive framework for human rights-compliant and professionalised
policing of protests and assemblies. Ultimately, the protection and promotion of the
rights to protest requires a comprehensive rights-protective legal framework reinforced
by institutional mechanisms and a political and police leadership committed to fostering
a culture of engagement and protection. Moving away from repression and violence
demands systemic, multi-dimensional reform.
Entrenching non-discrimination and equality of treatment in policing institutions depends
not only on affirmative legal obligations but also requires a profound change in how
officers are recruited, hired, trained, promoted and disciplined. Ensuring non-escalation
and no use of force during protests – even and especially when protests are disorderly
or challenge the political establishment – requires establishing systems and strategies
all aimed at minimising violence. These include: training and use of dialogues officers,
engagement with protesters and protection of journalistic activity, effective planning, and
implementation of precautionary measures. It also requires training and equipping police
officers for graduated use of force, and putting systems in place for effective reporting on
use of force. Finally, entrenching these good practices depends on establishing effective
internal and external accountability mechanisms so violations and failures are discovered
and remedied. Without accountability, any reform and improvement can be quickly lost.
The good and problematic practices catalogued in this report aim to provide a toolkit for
policing institutions everywhere to evaluate their existing policies, practices, and institutional
mechanisms. They provide detailed discussion of how to implement legal principles and
the kinds of challenges and complications that can arise. INCLO and IHRC hope this report
can promote open, practical, and well-informed dialogue between activists, human rights
defenders, and policing institutions on human rights-compliant policing and the ways in
which good practices serve individuals engaged in public speech and assembly and the
goals of security and policing institutions alike.
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